acceptance of the democratic principle rests on this latter ground, it is obvious that it does not logically lead us any way towards the conclusion that any ordinary honest citizen is as qualified for government work as any other.

§ 4. Accordingly, it is generally admitted by theoretical advocates of democracy in modern times that the part of government work which is entrusted to particular individuals or elected assemblies should be entrusted to persons specially qualified. And so far as this is admitted, the principle of aristocracy, as above defined,-that the work of government is a form of skilled labour which should be in the hands of those who possess the requisite skill—is implicitly accepted. Hence, I do not consider representative government even when the suffrage is universal as merely a mode of organising democracy, but rather as a combination or fusion of democracy and aristocracy. This fusion or combination may become less or more aristocratic in character through various minor modifications. Thus, it may be made less aristocratic by increasing the intervention of the people at large in legislation-through measures like the "referendum" and "initiative" before mentioned-by shortening the time for which the legislature or the executive is appointed, by the habit of demanding elaborate pledges at elections, or even imposing "mandates" at other times to which the representatives submit, and by the practice of appointing executive officials on grounds other than their qualifications for office. Correspondingly it tends to be made more aristocratic by lengthening the duration of parliaments, by the habit of choosing representatives for proved ability, and abstaining from the exaction of pledges and the imposition of mandates, and by the practice of giving executive appointments to the persons best qualified by caressing or corrupting the army. I think, therefore, that there is, on the whole, no adequate reason to assume that democratic governments are likely to be less in danger of violent revolution than other forms of government in States of which the members do not regard government as something naturally changeable. But I should still hold that when government has come to be thus regarded, a democratic form of government-in the sense above defined -affords the best chance of stability.

to fill them. But these latter modifications can hardly be said to make it less democratic, in the sense in which I first defined and in which alone I accept the democratic principle at least so long as the consciousness of active consent remains vigorous in the citizens generally.

It may be said, however, that such an introduction of the aristocratic principle as is involved in the representative form of government will not be sufficient to prevent the masses, stimulated by demagogues, from forcing on legislation having the character which Aristotle attaches to the term "democracy"; i.e. legislation oppressive to the rich, and therefore sacrificing the interest of the community as a whole to the sectional interest of the poor majority. Indeed, as I have already said, some persons regard it as an essential characteristic of the democratic form of government, that the power of government is used to promote the interests of the masses. And certainly in any dispute between the poor majority and the rich minority, the former, being through democracy "judges in their own cause," are likely to give a verdict in their own favour: especially as, from their numerical preponderance, it is less palpably wrong to identify their interests with that of the community as a whole. Hence it may be plausibly maintained that, even if the principle of electing the best qualified be carried out successfully to some extent, it will not prevent the real ultimate interest of the community from being sacrificed to the immediate or the apparent interests of the masses; the persons chosen as legislators or administrators may be really skilful and able in adapting means to political ends, but they will be under irresistible pressure to use their talents in promoting sectional rather than national interests. I do not myself think that this danger can be completely guarded against; but I am inclined to hope that it may be materially reduced if the legislators receive no salary; since they will then be more independent, and being drawn in the main from the minority of persons of wealth and leisure, will be generally disposed, from training and habit, and also from regard to the sentiment of their class, to do justice to

the reasonable claims of the rich in any disputed question on which rich and poor are opposed.

. In fact, by establishing non-payment of legislators, we introduce an oligarchical element into the government, and effect in some degree the kind of fusion between oligarchy and democracy which Aristotle recommended as the best practical solution of the war of classes in the city-states of Greece. And I think that non-payment of legislators is likely to be an institution more easy to maintain against a strong drift towards democracy than other oligarchical expedients limited suffrage, plural vote, etc.-because it has the advantage, which the poor are likely to appreciate, of saving money. For the same reason the oligarchical effect of the measure is not likely to be extensively neutralised— though it may be to some extent-by combinations of the poor to elect members of their own class and pay them a salary.

According to my view, then, the representative system in its best form will realise to a substantial extent the principle of aristocracy in combination with the principle of democracy. More often, however, in modern constitutions, the principle of aristocracy has been thought to find a partial application in the construction of a senate or "upper chamber, on a non-representative basis, side by side with a representative branch of the legislature. And such a senate may fairly be called "aristocratic "—in the sense here given to the word-if its members are selected by the executive on the ground of special qualifications, or obtain their seats ex officio. On the other hand, heredity, pure and simple the inheritance of membership of a class absolutely closed-is, as a mode of assigning governmental functions, but doubtfully aristocratic; while it is intensely oligarchical, in the strict numerical sense of the term, and tends to be so in the Aristotelian sense also; since such members of the governing caste as have not inherited wealth are likely to use their inherited power, if it be substantial in amount, as a means of obtaining 1 See chap. xxiii. § 3.

wealth. So far, however, as merit opens an entrance into the privileged body and demerit excludes from it, it acquires a partially aristocratic character.1

In any case, whether we view these modes of appointment as aristocratic or oligarchic, I conceive that any or all of them are perfectly reconcilable with democracy if they are only applied to a part of the supreme government, and if the constitution under which they are applied rests on the active consent of the citizens. It is quite conceivable that a people might at once maintain a full consciousness of being able to alter their government if they chose, and yet maintain even heredity as an element in the construction of one or more among the highest organs of government-from a strong apprehension of its advantages as compared with any available alternative.2

§ 5. The last statement applies equally to the case in which one of the highest organs of government is an individual. Indeed the principle of monarchy in the wide sense before explained-the attribution of large governmental powers to a single individual-would seem, so far as rationally justifiable, to be a particular application of the principle of aristocracy; since it is obviously desirable that such an individual should possess very special qualifications for government. Still, it seems better to treat the two principles as distinct; since, as we saw, the main argument for monarchy does not depend on the possibility of finding an individual uniquely qualified for the work entrusted to him; but rather on the advantages gained by the concentration of power and responsibility in one man's hands, even when the individual selected may not be markedly superior to several other available candidates for the post.

1 The English peerage has the former of these characteristics; and should it ever be thought worth while to reform the House of Lords while retaining its hereditary basis, it would seem desirable to increase its aristocratic quality by some arrangement tending to exclude the sons of peers who have given no evidence of qualification for the work of government.

2

I do not, however, think this result probable or desirable. See ch. xxiii. § 3. 3 It must be observed that if the monarch obtains his post by inheritance, the responsibility is only maintained by the fear of disapprobation and disorder..

It is to be observed that the importance of the set advantages -as compared with the gain of the more many-sided and balanced consideration of questions, and the more circumspect and generally more influential judgments, that may be expected to be obtained from a bench or council or assembly, is very different in different departments of work. No one, I think, doubts that it is better to entrust the management of a campaign to a single man; on the other hand, it is generally agreed that the legislative organ in a modern State must, with a view to efficiency as well as to popular acceptance, include a number of persons representing respectively different sections of the community; nor would any one propose that the supreme court of justice should consist of a single judge. The sphere of the monarchical principle is to be found, if anywhere, in the organisation of the executive.1 The practical questions, then, for modern states, so far as monarchy is concerned, are (1) how far is it desirable that the executive should be under a single head? and (2) how far is this arrangement reconcilable with the prevalence of democracy?

The first question has been fully considered in a previous chapter (xxii.). We saw that in the English system of parliamentary government, though the supreme executive cabinet may be for long periods completely under the control of the prime minister, it is hardly possible to secure this result; since the extent of the predominance of the prime minister over his colleagues must largely depend on his personal influence with Parliament and with the people. It seems therefore necessary, in order to give the supreme executive a regularly monarchical organisation, that the effective head of the executive-whether holding office for life or for a short period-should be irremovable by Parlia

1 It should be observed that the monarchical principle-in the wide sense here used-may be applied in a subordinate way by organising each separate department of the executive under a single head, with a considerable power of making independent decisions, even though supreme executive power is vested in a council or assembly. The expediency of this mode of organisation has been already discussed (chap. xxi.), and I have thought it best not to complicate the present discussion by introducing this question here.