important governmental functions, especially the right of electing their magistrates, and calling them to account, and a sort of balance would be maintained between rich and poor by the preponderant political influence of men of moderate means. But even this type was but rarely realised within the range of Aristotle's experience; the predominant characteristic of the later political development of free Greece was a struggle between rich and poor, in which the winning party set up either selfish and oppressive oligarchy, or selfish and oppressive democracy; unless, as sometimes happened, an ambitious individual took advantage of disorder to establish himself as a Tyrannus. If we wish to arrange these bad forms of government in the order of demerit, we have to invert the order in which I have given the better forms, since of all bad governments the rule of a single individual in his own interest is the worst, and the oppressive rule of the few is worse than the oppressive rule of the many.

It should be observed that Aristotle also uses the terms "aristocratic," "oligarchic," and "democratic" to denote characteristics which the same polity may possess in different elements or features of its constitution; indeed what he calls constitutional government is conceived by him as a kind of mixture of oligarchy and democracy, which may also have in some degree an aristocratic character.

Turning now to the modern use of the terms, I note first that the notions of " monarchy," and "kingship," 1" tyranny," and "despotism," are materially changed. The modern term "monarchy" is largely used to denote governments in which only a share of power is left to the single individual called the "monarch." Again, if the power of the monarch is not constitutionally limited we call it "despotism"; but as this term does not suggest a power irregular and lawless in its origin, it does not correspond to the Greek "Tyrannis.” On the other hand this latter term is not accurately expressed by the modern "tyranny," because a modern despot would 1 Aristotle's "Monarchy" includes both Tyrannis and true Kingship. 2 Aristotle notes a similar use: but he pays little attention to it.

not be called a tyrant unless his rule were harshly oppressive, whereas a Greek Tyrannus might find his interests best subserved by mild and benevolent government: moreover, we consider that oligarchs and democrats can exercise "tyranny" as well as monarchs. Indeed in a modern discussion we should not mention tyranny except as an evil to be guarded against: nor, in constructing a suitable government for a modern State, have we occasion to consider despotism, except as an alternative possibly preferable to prolonged disorder in certain acute diseases of the body politic. We have, however, noted important reasons for allotting extensive powers to a single individual in the organisations of modern government not because a modern thinker can, any more than Aristotle, hope to obtain by any practicable mode of appointment a man unique in wisdom and virtue to fill the place of king or president; but rather on account of the greater unity and consistency in design attained by leaving the management of governmental work to a single man, and the greater vigour in execution attained by leaving him unfettered control and undivided responsibility. How far and under what circumstances the executive government should be organised on what may-in this wide sense-be called a "monarchical" plan, has been already to some extent considered and it will be convenient to defer further discussion of it till we have examined the modern conceptions of oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

In the whole nomenclature the term which has least altered its signification in its modern use is " oligarchy": for we, like Aristotle, commonly denote by this the government of a wealthy minority in their own interest. But the Aristotelian distinction between "oligarchy" and "aristocracy" has been largely obliterated, so that the two terms are often used almost as convertible: still the distinction so far lingers that "oligarchical" has generally a bad signification, while "aristocratic" is felt to be in itself at least a neutral term, even if the person using it disapproves of aristocracy. Moreover, the "aristocratic" element of a

modern community is vaguely understood to be not merely rich, but to have acquired, on the average, through hereditary wealth, leisure, and social position, a cultivation of mind above that of the "masses" and also certain valuable traditions of political experience: so that its claim to a share in government disproportionate to its members is based on a belief in its superior intellectual qualifications. It therefore seems to me possible, without doing too much violence to current usage, to give the term a signification akin to the Aristotelian; accordingly, I shall mean by " aristocracy" the government of persons specially qualified by abilities, training, and experience for the work of government.

I have said "specially qualified," and not "best qualified," because it is a widespread opinion in modern times that the mass of adults—or male adults-in any civilised state is better qualified for the most important political decisions, than any small minority of persons, however much they may be chosen with a view to special qualifications. For, in passing from Aristotelian to modern thought, the associations and sentiments which the word "democracy" carries with it have become very different: the term represents for us not merely a depressingly prevalent political fact, but a widely and enthusiastically accepted political ideal. The drift towards democracy which we note in the later history of free Greece does not appear to have had either as cause or effect a corresponding movement in philosophic thought: but the corresponding drift in modern times is even more marked in the history of political ideas than it is in the history of political facts. But this tendency to idealise democracy is liable to involve some confusion of thought, which I will now attempt to remove.

§ 2. Firstly, persons who adopt a democratic ideal sometimes put forward as the principle of democracy a proposition which is indistinguishable from what I have taken as the principle of good government: viz. that all laws and political institutions should be framed with a view to the welfare of the people at large, so that no privileges should be given to any particular individual or class except on grounds of public

utility. I conceive, however, that this principle not only might but would be universally conceded by the modern advocates of every form of civilised government : 1 SO that to treat it as a characteristic principle of democracy introduces fundamental confusion. There is more to be said for distinguishing as democratic the principle that in estimating public welfare, conceived more precisely as "general happiness" of the members of the community, "everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one." 2 So far, indeed, as this merely means that the happiness of any one member of society should be no more the concern of the legislator than the equal happiness of any other member, it is obviously implied in the acceptance of "greatest general happiness" as the ultimate end: but if it is meant that equality in the distribution of happiness is in itself to be aimed at, the maxim is certainly different from the general utilitarian principle which I have taken as fundamental; 3 at the same time I conceive that its adoption is not unlikely to follow from giving the control over legislation to the mass of adults. To this interpretation of "democracy" I shall therefore return; here I will only say that it does not seem to me the proper interpretation, according to the original derivation and prevalent use of the word. The "principle of democracy" ought, I conceive, to relate primarily to the structure of government and not to the mode in which its functions should be exercised.

3

Limiting ourselves then for the present to the consideration of the structure of government, let us ask how, in this department, we are to define the fundamental principle of democracy. There are, I think, two competing definitions;

1 I here overlook, for brevity, the possible divergence between the welfare of any one political society and the welfare of humanity at large.

The quotation is from Bentham: I do not, however, think that Bentham intended to deny (1) that one person may be more capable of happiness than another; or (2) that, if so, the former's happiness is more important than the latter's as an element of general happiness.

To aim at equality in distribution of happiness may obviously bể incompatible with aiming at the greatest happiness on the whole, if the happiness of one person can ever be increased by diminishing to a less extent the happiness of another already less happy.

or perhaps I should rather say two distinct principles, explicitly or implicitly assumed in arguing in favour of political institutions commonly recognised as democratic. One of these, which I myself accept as a principle that the modern State should aim at realising-is "that government should rest on the active consent of the citizens"; the other is "that any one self-supporting and law-abiding citizen is, on the average, as well qualified as another for the work of government." This latter proposition I in the main reject; but I admit that, according to one view of the proof of the first proposition, the second is to some extent implied, and that where democracy-as defined by the first proposition-is fully developed, there is likely to be a tendency to accept and act upon the second to some extent.

In order to examine the relation between the two propositions, it will be well to define the former more precisely. In the first place, I mean by "active consent" something quite different from the passive acquiescence, the absence of any conscious desire to change the structure or modify the action of government, which may exist under a pure monarchy or oligarchy no less than under a democracy, wherever the members of the community have lost or have not yet acquired the habit of regarding their government as a condition of life which it is in their power to change. Even in such a society the views and sentiments of the governed ordinarily impose certain limits on their government-there are certain things which the latter abstains from doing for fear of exciting discontent and possible disaster:—but this effect is normally produced without consciousness. By "active consent," on the other hand, I imply that the citizens are conscious that they can legitimately alter the structure or the action of their government if a sufficient number of them choose to go through a certain process; so that if they make no effort to alter either, they exercise a distinct act of choice:-they may not like their government or its ways, but they at least prefer not to take the trouble of trying to change them.

Again, when I speak of the active consent and the pre