judicious if performed after consultation and with knowledge of the intentions of others. I admit, however, that a new danger to freedom is introduced if concert in such action is the result of pressure:-i.e. if among the persons who combine to exclude others from voluntary social relations, there are some who are only induced to combine by the fear of being similarly excluded if they refuse. I think that this moral coercion to coerce—“ coercion in the second degree" is usually mischievous: but it is difficult to say that it is so always it is difficult to say that there is no vice so dangerous and contagious as to justify a concerted refusal to associate with the associates of those who practise it. And it could hardly be expedient to require judicial proof of the presence of such vice in order to justify this concerted exclusion: since it is often in cases where such judicial proof is difficult that the social sanction is especially needed to supplement the deficiencies of the legal sanction.

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On the whole, therefore, while admitting that the social sanction may easily be misapplied in such cases, I should generally prefer to leave it to the moral opinion of other sections of the community to censure and repress the misapplication. I conclude, therefore, that the moral coercion exercised both by individuals and by associations, so far as it is effected by acts legitimate apart from their coercive intent, should not generally be made a legal offence, if the mischief it causes can be kept within tolerable limits by any other means: though any intimidation by committing or threatening acts of physical violence or other violation of ordinary rights—including breaches of contract -should be repressed with as much severity as may be required.

Even where an industrial combination cannot reasonably be attacked as an encroachment on the freedom of outsiders, or otherwise oppressive to individuals, it may still be opposed in the interest of the community as a whole, through the establishment of a monopoly,-total or partial. We have already seen that the theoretical demonstration of the tendency

of industrial freedom to promote the most economic production of social utility fails in the case of monopoly: in fact, the most deep-seated weakness and most formidable danger of Individualism lies in the indefinite possibility-which it cannot but admit-that the "free competition" on which it relies may by "free combination" be turned into its economic opposite, Monopoly. But here, again, it does not seem desirable-unless under very exceptional circumstances-to meet the danger by direct repression: since any attempt to fix legal limits to the extent to which traders may profit by the intensity of demand for their commodity, and the limitation of its supply, would involve too extensive interference with freedom of exchange. If, however, any department of production shows an irresistible tendency to fall under the conditions of monopoly, Government may sometimes advantageously intervene in the way of industrial competition-supposing the business to be such as may efficiently be carried on by or under the control of Government. Also, where commercial associations such as railways, water companies, etc.-require special powers of compulsory purchase, Government may, in return for the grant of such powers, impose conditions which may prevent any resulting monopoly from being used to the disadvantage of the community.

So far I have been speaking of combinations of which the aim is to promote the economic interests of the combiners. It is, of course, possible that combinations for other ends-political or non-political-may attempt to gain their ends by injuring or intimidating opponents through exclusion, or threat of exclusion, from economic relations: but this method is likely to be dangerous to those who use it in a civilised community, so far as such an association mainly depends for its force on agreement in opinion and sentiment; since it will ordinarily be liable to lose more by alienating all who respect intellectual independence than it can gain by moral coercion. It is, I think, more likely that economic or social pressure, severely felt by those on whom it falls, may incidentally result from the natural exclusiveness of a group of persons bound together by strong community of

sentiment springing from community of beliefs on matters of vital moment.

§ 4. This leads us to the question that has historically been the most important of those that arise under the present head, as to the relation which the government of the State should take up towards religious associations. If we approach this question from the point of view of the State, as we naturally do in the present connection, two divergent methods of treatment at once suggest themselves. We may start with assuming the existence of voluntary religious associations, and consider how the State should proceed to maximise the advantages derivable from them and minimise the dangers that they involve: or we may start with the existence of religious associations as problematical, and consider whether the social needs that they supply are needs which it is in any case the business of Government to meet somehow, and, if so, how they should be met. The former of these points of view is most natural to a European student of Politics: at the same time, in a theoretical discussion of the subject, it seemed best to begin with the latter; which I accordingly adopted in a previous chapter (xiii. § 5), in which I considered how far it is the business of Government to provide efficient instruction in morality. In the present chapter I shall adopt the other point of view; I shall assume the existence of the historic religious associations called Churches, with the character that they actually have in the communities that share West-European civilisation, and shall consider what relations the State should endeavour to maintain with them. I may begin by stating the following conclusions, to which the previous discussion seemed clearly to lead.

Firstly, the Christian churches meet a social need of fundamental importance, which it would be desirable for Government to supply if it could do so effectually; while yet there are decisive objections to any governmental organisation for this purpose. With a view, therefore, to the systematic teaching of morality, it is a gain to the State that the action of the churches should be vigorous and effective,

so far as it is in harmony with the social and political order which it is the aim of Government to maintain.

Secondly, so far as this harmony exists, the churches are likely to fulfil their function better if kept independent of the State. For, if the clergy acquire the character of officials appointed and paid by the State, they become exposed in some degree to the objections before stated against a governmental organisation for teaching morality: and are therefore likely to be less effective in rendering the service for which the State appoints and pays them.

It remains to consider whether there is adequate ground for governmental interference with a church-or any other association that offers men moral instruction and guidance,on account of the danger of conflict between the conception of social order advocated by the Church, and that which Government aims at maintaining. If the collision takes the open and palpable form of incitements to resist or disobey the laws or legal commands of Government, it must of course be repressed but it is a more doubtful question whether the general danger of disobedience promoted by the rulers or leaders of the Church-or of mischievous exclusion or intimidation, difficult to repress by legal penalties—is an adequate justification of a permanent interference of Government with a view to avert the danger.

The right answer to this question must, I think, depend very much on the size of the religious association in question and the character of its organisation. The risk of collision is obviously less-as Adam Smith pointed outwhere there are a number of small religious bodies than it is where one decidedly preponderates. It is less where private judgment is encouraged as in Protestant sectsthan it is where obedience of laity to clergy, and of clergy to their ecclesiastical rulers, is strongly inculcated. It is seriously intensified and complicated when the Church is not confined within the limits of one State, supposing the habit of obedience to ecclesiastical rulers to be strong; since, in this case, there will be a body of persons within the State who may at any time be bound by their ideas of religious

duty to obey the orders of foreigners. It should be added that there is hardly any question on which the traditional habits and sentiments which a community derives from its previous history are more important considerations in determining the proper course of action for a statesman, than they are on the question of interference with religious bodies.

§ 5. Supposing it decided that intervention of some kind. is desirable on the ground above stated, the question remains of what kind. Direct prohibition of any religious teaching not clearly immoral in its tendency is invidious and objectionable, as interfering with the free communication of beliefs on which the development and diffusion of knowledge depend; and is likely to be ineffective or worse in the most dangerous cases, from the ease with which opinions and sentiments hostile to government may be secretly propagated among persons united by a community of religious feeling, and the increased virulence that they are likely to assume from the resentment caused by repression.

A better course is for the State to secure a certain control over religious teaching, by the grant of privileges the withdrawal of which would only reduce the Church to the level of other voluntary associations. There are various methods by which this result may be attained. Firstly, apart from pecuniary aid, there are various minor privileges which the State may allow to religious bodies, which would seem to be an obviously reasonable return for the services received from them. It may give special protection to religious meetings from disturbances-whether of a hostile kind, or caused by sellers of refreshment, hawkers, etc., if the meeting is in the open air. It may give to religious beliefs special protection from contumelious treatment-such as is now given by our law of blasphemy (as reduced by modern. judicial interpretation), at least to the beliefs which Christians have in common. It may exempt the ministers of specified religious associations from compulsory civil functions, such as serving on juries, and from military functions where military service is compulsory; on the other hand, it may confer on