partiality that may be reasonably attributed to the home government seems to render it generally desirable that the management of the aborigines should not be regarded as an "internal affair" of the colony, so long as there is any serious danger of a conflict of races or persecution of the inferior race.

But, as was before said,1 the question of the relations to be established between colonists and aborigines is most important in colonies where the manual labour can never be in the main supplied by the superior race: since here the composite character of the population must be regarded as permanent unless the races blend. To a society so constituted the governmental structure sketched in the preceding chapters is prima facie unsuited: but the extent and nature of the modifications that should be introduced into it must vary very much with the degree of civilisation actually reached by the inferior race, and its apparent capacity for further improvement. It will be difficult to prevent a simple oligarchy of the superior race from being tyrannical on the other hand, it seems a desperate resource to give equality of electoral privileges to members of the inferior race while admittedly unfit to control the operations of government, in the mere hope that experience may in time educate them up to a tolerable degree of fitness. So long as the composite society presents this dilemma, it will probably conduce to its wellbeing as a whole that the colony should remain a dependency; so that, even where the business of government is mainly left in the hands of the colonists, the control of the central government may prevent or mitigate any palpable oppression of the inferior

race.

1 Chap. xviii. § 8.

CHAPTER XXVII

CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE OVER GOVERNMENT

§ 1. IN the preceding chapters we have been considering the structure of governing organs, on the assumption that government is a business requiring special gifts, training, and practice; and that, accordingly, it ought to be placed in the hands of a special group of persons, carefully selected for the purpose. We have now to turn to an important question, briefly noticed and postponed at an early stage of the discussion, viz. what share in the work of government should be assigned, in a modern civilised community, to the mass of the citizens? In some ages and countries it has been the prevalent opinion, the established constitutional doctrine, that the mass of the people "have nothing to do with the laws but to obey them." But this is not the view upon which our construction of government has proceeded. In framing our supreme legislative and executive organs we have adopted, in the main, the principle of "representative" or "responsible" government; we have regarded it as fundamentally important, not only that governors should be subject to the watchful criticism of the governed, but also that the latter should periodically, in selecting their governors, pass judgment on the political conduct of those who seek their suffrages a second time. It remains to consider whether this indirect influence on government is sufficient, or whether there should be further any direct intervention of the

citizens at large-whom, for brevity, I will call "the people" in legislation or governmental administration.1

This question is closely connected with another of fundamental importance: viz., whether the freedom or interests of individuals should be protected from encroachment on the part of the legislature by any constitutional rules, which the ordinary legislature is bound to obey. For, if the latter question be answered affirmatively, the direct intervention of the people is a simple and obvious mode of providing for the changes that may be from time to time required in the constitutional rules restraining the ordinary legislature. English political experience, however, has afforded no example either of constitutional limitations on the legislative power of Parliament, or of direct intervention of the people at large in government; the prevailing view in Western Europe would seem to be that the latter is inexpedient in a well-ordered state; and in England at least it is thought that the old difficulty "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" is sufficiently met in the case of the legislature by establishing representative government. And certainly in a state in which the fully qualified citizens directly appoint, at intervals of a few years, the members of the chief organ of legislation, and directly or indirectly determine the heads of the executive departments, no governmental aggression on the rights of individuals is likely to take place, except such as the majority of fully qualified citizens receive with at least acquiescence. This acquiescence may indeed be due to a want of full perception of the effects of governmental measures, or a want of ready sympathy with the persons who are most directly injured by them: accordingly, in order that the protection afforded by the representative system may be as effective as possible, it is important that any persons aggrieved by the action of government should have the opportunity of arousing the attention and interest of the mass of their fellow-citizens, by oral and written discussion.

1 The arguments for and against the intervention of a casually selected group of ordinary citizens in judicial work have already been considered.

And, speaking more generally, in order that the function of electing legislators and administrators may be well performed by ordinary electors, it is recognised as desirable—we may say indispensable that they should be enlightened and stimulated by full and free criticisms of current legislation and administration.

Hence freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble peacefully for the consideration and emphatic statement of political grievances, are, in the view of Englishmen, an essential part of the "free institutions" on which they pride themselves; but it has never been felt to be necessary that these or any other rights of individual citizens should be protected against the ordinary legislature by any constitutional rules having legal force. It is held that they will be sufficiently protected by public opinion and the representative character of the legislature.

Accordingly, before considering the expediency of any further restraints on the ordinary legislature, beyond what the representative system provides, it seems desirable to ascertain the exact relation which the right of periodical election should be held to establish between the members of the representative assembly and their constituents. In one view of this relation, the essence of representative government is that the people represented govern through their representatives: the latter are regarded as agents, appointed to carry out the wishes of their constituents, and properly liable to dismissal if in any point they insist on carrying into effect their own judgment, in opposition to the judgment of those whom they "represent." This view is manifested in the demand sometimes made by a constituency that their representative should resign because he does not vote as they like, in the statement that the House of Commons has not "received a mandate from the electors to do such and such things, and similar utterances, common in England at the present time.

I

This view is very naturally suggested by a consideration of the historical origin of representative government. shall begin therefore by pointing out that the form of

representative government actually established in this and most other European countries - Switzerland being an exception is in any case ill adapted for realising this conception of its spirit and design.

§ 2. If the framers of a constitution really aimed at making the will of the majority, at any given time, supreme in legislation, it would be easy to make regulations which would at any rate secure a much closer approximation to this result. than is realised under the ordinary representative system of government. It would be easy to introduce what is known in Switzerland as the "Obligatory Referendum1": i.e. to treat all parliamentary deliberation as merely preliminary, and enact that all Acts of Parliament should be submitted to the electors for formal approval before they become valid as laws. It would be possible, indeed, to go further still, and introduce the right of "Initiative" actually established in some Swiss cantons: i.e. to make it the duty of the Legislature to publish legislative proposals brought forward by a certain proportion of the electorate, and cause them to be voted on by the constituents at local polling places. Perhaps it may be held that it would be absurd to throw on the people at large. the actual work of legislation, since the people only form general aims and wishes, for which it is the business of the legislative expert to supply appropriate particular rules fit to be enacted, but that these general aims and wishes should be regarded as paramount by a representative legislature. And certainly it would be difficult for the citizens at large to perform effectively the complicated discussion that is often required to mould a legislative scheme into the most acceptable form. Nor would it be practicable for the constituents to direct the action of the representative in every detail during such discussions; since it would sometimes happen that compromises and modifications were suggested at the last moment, rendering any previously expressed wishes of the constituents irrelevant to the issue finally put to the vote; while to give

1 In contrast to the "Facultative Referendum": by which a measure is referred to the popular vote, only when such reference is demanded by a certain number of citizens.