tracts freely entered into, it would follow that-if freedom be the ultimate end-such contracts ought to be legally enforced in all cases in which they do not tend to impair the freedom of any third party. But no actual system of law attempts anything like this: in England (e.g.) no engagement to render personal services-with the doubtful exception of the marriage vow-gives the promisee a legal claim to more than pecuniary damages: all such contracts, if unfulfilled, turn into mere debts of money so far as their legal force goes. And on utilitarian grounds this limited and qualified enforcement of contract is justifiable: since, on the one hand, if men could not rely generally on the fulfilment of mutual engagements, the complex co-operation required for social wellbeing would be on a dangerously precarious footing; and, on the other hand, what is important from a utilitarian point of view is not that A should perform his promise, but that B should not be damaged by his non-performance.1 From this point of view, again, there are obvious reasons for imposing certain further conditions on the legal validity of engagements for future conduct, even when freely entered into: similar in the main to those already noticed as limiting the legal validity of the transfer of property.

§ 3. The general maintenance of (1) the Right of personal security, including security to health and reputation, (2)

1 Since the performance of a promise to render personal services might obviously cause loss or inconvenience to the promiser, outweighing the utility to the promisee, it seems-from the point of view of utilitarian individualism -a clearly excessive interference to enforce specific performance, wherever the damage to the promisee through non-performance is of a kind that admits of adequate pecuniary compensation. In other cases, in which pecuniary compensation would be inapplicable or inadequate, there is a different reason for not enforcing specific performance of contracts to render personal services, viz. that the utility of the service to the recipient depends on qualities which cannot be secured by legal coercion. E.g. a painter can be forced to paint a picture, but he cannot be forced to paint such a picture as his customer, in making the contract, desired to obtain. Still, if the end of Law were not utility but the realisation of Freedom-this being taken to include the enforcement of contracts freely made-the logical course would be to enforce specific performance, so far as possible, in all cases in which the promisee desired it.

the Right of private property, and (3) the Right to fulfilment of contracts freely entered into, constitutes what may be called the "individualistic minimum" of primary governmental interference so far as sane adults alone are concerned: on the individualistic principle, if the community consisted entirely of sane adults, any legal obligations not included under the above heads ought only to be of the secondary and subordinate kinds before mentioned-i.e. they could only be justified as conducive to the prevention or reparation of encroachments on these primary rights.1 But, under the actual conditions of human life, every society contains a large number of persons with regard to whom the most thoroughgoing individualist recognises the absurdity of maintaining that they require no more from others than non-interference and observance of contract: it is universally admitted that some legal provision must be made for supplying lunatics and children with the means of subsistence, and some authority vested in some persons to restrain them from actions mischievous to themselves as well as to others. The case of children is, of course, by far the most important. Here, if we once admit that, with a view to the general happiness, the burden of supporting, directing, and training children must be legally placed somewhere, there can be no doubt that, on the individualistic principle, it must be thrown on the parents: since it would obviously be the gravest interference with an individual's freedom of action to compel him to contribute to the support of an indefinite number of his neighbour's children. Indeed, we may say that a State that had gone so far in the direction of communism as to undertake the burden of providing for all the children of its members could hardly stop short of completely communistic institutions. To secure the effective performance of parental duty, as thus defined, some provision for the registration of births in the names of both parents would seem to be required: but it is not easy to justify, on the indivi1 These secondary rights and obligations will be considered in a subsequent chapter (ix.) on the Prevention and Reparation of Wrongs.

dualistic principle, the refusal, which is found in the legal systems of all European communities, to recognise any connubial contracts that do not contemplate a permanent and monogamic union. At any rate both this refusal, and other restrictions on the free union of the sexes, such as the prohibition of marriage between near relatives, can, I conceive, be only justified—in a strictly individualistic systemas indirectly necessary to provide for the due support and education of children. The exact kind of regulation which, from this point of view, would be most expedient in a modern civilised society is, I think, impossible to determine from any general consideration of human nature, in which the inherited customs and sentiments that actually govern the relations of the sexes in such societies are left out of account. And since it is fundamentally important, for the attainment of the general end at which law aims in this department, that a strong unreflecting moral aversion should be felt for the conduct legally prohibited, it would probably be inexpedient in the present treatise to weigh the utilitarian arguments for or against particular details of the marriage law. It is sufficient to say generally that the individualistic legislator must judge all actual or proposed restrictions on the free union of the sexes from the point of view that has just been indicated in respect, that is, of their tendency to secure due provision, control, and training for children until they are old enough to become ordinary members of an individualistic community.

Assuming the marriage union to be, under ordinary circumstances, indissoluble, it seems almost necessary to maintain by law the right of the husband to the society of his wife; and, on the other hand, to give the wife the right of obtaining from her husband the means of subsistence, so far as her own income from property or earnings does not suffice for this purpose;-either right being liable to forfeiture on account of conjugal infidelity or other gross misbehaviour. Whether it is desirable-with a view to prevent domestic dissension or distrust "to go beyond

this in the way of extending the husband's control over the wife's property or actions, and correspondingly extending the protection given by law to the wife in case the husband misuses his powers, is less easy to decide; but we may say that, from an individualistic point of view, the burden of proof lies entirely with those who advocate such further restrictions on Freedom. As regards the definition of parental duties and rights, it seems clear that on the individualistic principle-the period of parental control should not be prolonged beyond the time at which the child reaches physical and intellectual maturity; and that, as the growth towards maturity is gradual, legal independence should also be reached by degrees. I do not think it is in accordance with the individualistic principle that the legal duty of parents to children shall extend beyond that of giving care and sustenance up to the time at which they can earn their own living, and such training as will enable them to earn it; but the point will be considered when we come to deal with bequest and inheritance.)

To sum up, I conclude that I am in harmony with common sense in taking, as the fundamental basis of individualistic legislation, not the proposition that freedom is to be sought as an ultimate end, but what may more appropriately be called the principle of mutual non-interference, understood in a utilitarian sense. On this view, the general aims of individualistic legislation may be stated as follows: (1) To secure to every sane adult freedom to provide for his own happiness, by adapting the material world to the satisfaction of his needs and desires, and establishing such relations with other human beings as may in his opinion conduce to the same end; (2) to secure him from pain or loss, caused directly or indirectly by the action of other human beings—including in this loss any damage due to the non-performance of engagements made without coercion or deception; while (3) throwing on parents the duties of care, sustenance, and education of children, until they are able to provide for themselves, and regulating family relations -and to some extent the relations of the sexes generally—

with a view to the better performance of such parental duties. To the chief legal rights and duties established under this last head I shall occasionally refer as "family" rights and duties; but, for the most part, I shall abstain from examining them in any further detail.

§ 4. Let us now proceed to consider more fully the application of the individualistic principle, thus understood, to the relations, other than domestic or sexual, of sane adults: that is, to determine the chief particular rights into which the general right to non-interference naturally breaks up, when we seek to realise it under the actual circumstances of human life in society.

The following appear to be the chief ways in which A may interfere with B's interests or happiness—otherwise than by physical constraint or confinement which I need not further discuss: (1) By impeding his efforts to adapt his material environment to the satisfaction of his needs and desires (2) by breach of contract: (3) by causing him physical injury or discomfort: (4) by interfering with his relations to other human beings: (5) by false statements, leading him to act or abstain from acting in a manner detrimental to himself: (6) by moral coercion or intimidation : (7) by causing him mental annoyance of some other kind. In the chapters that follow I shall be chiefly concerned with the rights and obligations to be established under the first two heads: since the regulation of the use of material things and especially of that exclusive use which is the essence of property, and the determination of the conditions of legally valid contracts, are the most important topics in a general survey of civil law from a political point of view. Contract is the main link by which the complex system of co-operation that characterises a modern civilised society is knit together: while the most marked differences in the outward lives of ordinary members of a modern society depend mainly on differences in the extent of their rights of property; and consequently the acquisition of property is usually the most prominent aim of the actions of such persons in their most important social relations outside