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Supposing that it is decided to establish such a tribunal, it might properly be made identical with that before proposed for the ultimate control of the judiciary. It should accordingly consist of a small number of persons, partly judges of the highest grade and partly members of one or both legislative chambers, elected by their respective chambers in some way that would secure a proportional representation of different sections. I say one or both" chambers, because I think that the function might with advantage be given to the Senate alone-as being more likely to contain and elect statesmen of ripe experience and judicial temperprovided that the Senate is so elected as to possess adequate representative weight. In any case the element contributed by the legislature—which should form the majority in the tribunal-might be expected to bring experience of political business, and to counteract any tendency on the part of the judges to apply too technical methods to the case; while it might be hoped that the judicial element would prevent the matter from being decided by a mere party vote.

CHAPTER XXV

LOCAL AND SECTIONAL GOVERNMENT

§ 1. EVEN in the larger modern states, if of the unitary type, the greater part of the supreme decisions in the work of government are normally made in a city selected as a political centre. It is here that the supreme legislature usually meets, and the courts that finally decide doubtful points in the interpretation of the law; and the superior officials in most executive departments ordinarily transact business here. Still, as we have seen, to prevent excessive cost or delay in the administration of justice an adequate provision of local tribunals is required. Similarly, most internal executive functions, whether coercive or industrial, obviously need officials locally dispersed,-policemen and soldiers for the maintenance of order, collectors of taxes direct and indirect, managers of roads and public land of all kinds, postmasters and other officials occupied in conveyance and communication, relieving officers, sanitary inspectors, and so forth. In speaking, however, of "local governments" in a unitary state, we chiefly mean organs which, though completely subordinate to the central legislature, are independent of the central executive in appointment and, to some extent, in their decisions, and exercise a partially independent control over certain parts of public finance; and in the present chapter I shall confine my attention mainly to such partially independent organs.

The primary reason for this local independence is, that 1 Chiefly, as we shall see, in their executive or administrative decisions.

it is required to realise the full advantages of that reaction of the governed on the governing organs which representative or responsible government seeks to bring about. Such advantages may lie in the direction either of greater The accepted rationale efficiency or of greater economy. of responsible government rests on the principle that the interests of any group of governed persons are likely to be best looked after by governing persons whom they have the power from time to time to dismiss, directly or indirectly. It is an obvious inference from this principle that governmental functions which affect solely or mainly the inhabitants of a limited portion of a state should be placed under the special control of this section of the community; in order that the criticism of this section, backed by the power of appointment and dismissal, may bring about a closer adaptation of administrative activity to its peculiar needs. Especially in matters-such as education and poor-relief-in which valuable aid can and should be given to governmental work by the voluntary efforts of private persons, we may expect to secure important gains by localising the control of the electorate over the work. Again, so far as any governmental services are properly regarded as rendered exclusively or mainly to a group of persons who live within a certain district, the whole or main expense of these services may be equitably thrown on these persons; and so far as this expense cannot conveniently be met by payments voluntarily made by the recipients of the services, -the comparison of cost with utility is likely to be more accurately performed if the financial management of this department of governmental business is entrusted to a separate locally-elected organ.

But there are other reasons why a vigorous development of local government is important, if not indispensable, to the effective working of representative institutions in a community as large as most modern states are. Over-centralisation, in such a community, introduces two opposite dangers. In the first place, if the only action that an ordinary citizen is called upon to take, in reference to public affairs of any great

interest or importance, is that of voting at intervals of several years, as a unit in a group of many thousand electors, for a member of the central legislature, or even for the head of the executive, there is a danger that the control of the citizens generally over their government will become slack and ineffective; so that their exercise of the vote will be especially liable to be perverted by the sinister influences which we have before examined. But again, the same cause that tends to render the political consciousness of the ordinary citizen too languid at ordinary times also tends to increase the risk from occasional gusts of discontent and excitement, causing unreasonable expectations and complaints of government; since the mass of the community cannot but lack that general diffused knowledge of the real nature of governmental business, and the conditions and limitations. under which it is carried on, which results from being brought into intimate social relations with the persons actually responsible for it. In short, whatever "educative" value is rightly attributed to representative government largely depends on the development of local institutions.

We must also take into account the danger of overloading the central government with work. The importance of this danger grows in proportion as a more extended view is taken of the proper function of government; if the tendency actually operative in England towards increasingly extensive and complex governmental interference is in the main justifiable-as we have seen reason to think-it becomes increasingly important that the work to be done should be carefully distributed among different organs, so that none may be overburdened.

On the other side, we have to reckon the economic and. other advantages of having similar matters everywhere managed on a single uniform plan. We have also to consider the probability that both the central government and its critics as compared with local governments and criticswill have the superior enlightenment derived from greater general knowledge, wider experience, and more highly-trained intellects; and we have to consider the greater danger in a

small locality that the sinister influence of a powerful individual, or corporation, or combination of persons with similar interests, may predominate to the detriment of the public. The force of these considerations will naturally vary with different circumstances, such as the condition of the arts of industry, the size of the local areas to which separate organs of government are allotted, the ease or difficulty of communication between different parts of the territory of the State. Moreover, the practical conclusion to which these considerations point may often be not centralisation pure and simple, but a combination of local and central organs-or of organs representing smaller and larger areas respectivelyin the same department of governmental work: the organ representing the smaller area having the management of details, while the determination of principles and general supervision are left to the government of the larger area.

This division of labour, however, is often difficult to arrange; and the difficulty is increased when the question arises of using the organs of local government, as subordinate organs of the central executive, for the performance of functions. which are of national rather than sectional interest-such as the enforcement of obedience to laws passed by the central legislature. On the one hand, it may be obviously inconvenient and uneconomical to divide the local business of government between two sets of organs, the one independent of the central executive and the other strictly subordinate to it; while yet, if this is not done, the independence of the locally-appointed organs is liable to interfere with the harmonious performance of executive functions.

Finally, we have to note that the allotment of any considerable independent powers to local organs of government is-like any other division of authority-liable to be a source of danger at crises: since local disaffection may find in these organs a ready-made machinery for organising resistance to the central government.

§ 2. It is by balancing the different considerations above given that the separation of governmental functions into central and local, and the local limits of the localised independent

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