CHAPTER XXI

THE EXECUTIVE

§ 1. WE have seen that the governmental business classed as executive is very diverse in kind. It should include all the measures required for the due protection of the interests of the community and its members in their relations with foreigners, especially the organisation and direction of the military forces of the State; all the actions not strictly judicial required to prevent members of the community from causing injury to each other or to the public interests and to secure their co-operation for common ends, so far as this is not better left to voluntary association; and finally, all the industry required for utilising such part of the wealth and resources of the community as it is expedient to keep in public ownership, and for providing all commodities needed by the State or its members that are not better provided by private industry and free exchange. The extent of the work under these different heads,-especially the last mentioned,-will vary with the circumstances of the community and its political and social habits and traditions; but in all modern States its multifarious nature has led to its distribution into several departments, under separate management for ordinary purposes. Now when we speak in constitutional discussion of "the executive," or executive branch of government," we commonly refer not to the whole aggregate of persons engaged in the performance of these functions in the different departments, or even to all who exercise coercive power- it would seem

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absurd to speak of the policeman who bids one "move on as a "member of the executive," but to the body or individual that exercises supreme control, within the limits of law, over all these functions, or the most important of them. The first question, therefore, that suggests itself in considering the structure of the executive organ of government is why any such unity of supreme control over all the branches of executive business is required, besides the control of the legislature and the judiciary.

In considering this question we must put out of sight the actual conditions of English government; in which the "Cabinet," formed by the Parliamentary heads of the chief executive departments, is in fact a committee of the legislature, whose work largely consists in first preparing and then carrying through the legislature all important new laws. Let us suppose that this work is done by other committees of the legislature, and that the "ministers" composing the cabinet have merely to manage the executive work of their departments; each making proposals from time to time for such new legislation as seems desirable in his own department, and advising on the proposals that are made by other persons affecting his work, but not otherwise taking part in legislative business. What reason would there then be for controlling the independence of action of ministers within their respective departments, so far as the law left them discretion, further than by the criticism of the legislature, backed by its power of legislative interference?

In the first place, the advantage of such further control is manifest, so far as the work of any one department is so related to the work of another that a mutual adjustment is continually required for the efficient performance of both: since in this case a disagreement in policy between two heads of departments might lead to a disastrous paralysis of governmental activities, and it will be clearly a gain to obviate or materially reduce this danger by placing both under the

1 It is generally agreed that some functions may be properly placed under the management of local governments; but the question how far these local governments should be independent of central control is one that we have yet to consider.

supreme control of king, president, prime minister, or council. Now it can hardly be said that this intimate connection exists in the case of many departments of executive work at ordinary times: for instance, there seems to be no such need of continuous adjustment between the work of a Ministry of Education and that of a Poor Law Board, or between either and the work of a Ministry of Public Works or of the Post Office, or between any of these departments and the Foreign Office, or the management of the Army and Navy; the idea of a "unity of general policy" to be maintained in the ordinary administration of all these departments would be quite fanciful. Still, there are important cases in which this unity of policy is a continual need; thus in England questions of foreign affairs have to be constantly considered in reference to their effects on colonial interests; and in other cases collisions and frictions are liable to occur from time to time, which a common control might prevent or speedily remove. But it is especially at grave crises of national existence that the importance of unity of control to secure harmony of action among the principal departments of the executive becomes manifest. Thus, in war, it is obviously necessary that the management of the army and that of the navy should harmonise with each other, and with the management of foreign affairs, and also with that of the financial department, at any rate if financial pressure should occur. If, again, the war should be complicated by internal disorder or sedition, it would be important that the Home Department should not be at discord with the others. Again, as we have seen, the State must be prepared for exceptional occasions of extreme need, on which law has to be overridden or temporarily suspended by the executive for some great interest of social order or wellbeing; and it seems important that the responsibility of such interference should not rest on a single head of a department.

Secondly, it seems clear that all departments of which the expenditure is important and liable to vary, so far as their cost falls on the national treasury, must be under one

1 See Earl Grey, Parliamentary Government and Reform (chap. iii.).

supreme control from a financial point of view; in order that the demands made by each on the public purse may be duly considered in relation both to the demands of all the rest and the state of the public resources. It does not, however, necessarily follow that this control should be vested in an executive organ: indeed, as the legislature is the ultimate money-granting organ, it seems obvious that the estimates of expenditure and supply for the year-or any other period for which taxation may be determinedshould be prepared by a committee of the legislature; and that this should supervise, from an economic point of view, the organisation and working of the executive departments. But such supervision is necessarily difficult and delicate, and its effective performance requires great knowledge of details, concentrated labour, and continuous experience and perhaps we can hardly expect to find these qualifications in a finance committee of an assembly periodically elected and thus liable to be changed at short intervals to an indefinite extent -unless it is aided by a permanent executive department, such as the Treasury is in England. Hence it seems probable that the best result will be attained in respect of economy and efficiency together, if the estimate of necessary or desirable expenditure, and the proposals for obtaining funds to meet it, are primarily made on the responsibility of a supreme executive body or individual, representing all the departments.

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I shall accordingly assume that-in a unitary state such as we are now considering all or the most important permanent departments of centralised executive business will be under the supreme direction_of_one_individual or body, to whose decisions the heads of departments and their subordinates will conform: and I shall refer to this depositary of the supreme executive power as the "supreme executive' or-where there is no danger of ambiguity-" the executive." 1 1 I do not mean to affirm that the English Treasury, as at present organised, possesses the required qualifications in an adequate degree.

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2 The deeper division of governmental functions that characterises a composite State and its possible effects on the organisation of the executive will be considered later (chap. xxvi.).

§ 2. But before we inquire how this "supreme executive is to be constituted and appointed, it seems desirable to obtain a general view of the organisation suitable to the whole body of officials employed in executive work ;—confining ourselves to the work that belongs to the centralised executive, and leaving the consideration of local executive organs to a future chapter. As we have just seen, the whole Lexecutive business will tend to be divided into a number of branches whose interdependence at ordinary times will often be slight. In some cases it may be necessary, for economy of highly skilled labour, to place two or more of such naturally separate branches under one management, even as regards its ordinary routine. But the general aim of a rational distribution of executive work will clearly be to place under a common management, in each department, such portions. of public business as have naturally a. close connection; either because the efficient performance of one such portion of business is impossible if other portions are performed inefficiently or on independent plans, or because the experience gained in the management of one portion of the business will tend to render the managers more competent to deal with another portion. And in the most important departments this natural grouping of business appears to be now carried out in modern States generally.

Assuming then that the work in each of the departments with which we are concerned requires unity of management for its effective performance, let us consider generally how the officials employed in the work should be appointed, and in what relations they should stand to each other. We may begin by observing that the line between "service of government" and ordinary civil obedience is not to be sharply drawn. As we have seen (ch. xi. § 2), it should be held generally incumbent on the governed to perform occasional services of a personal kind, in aid of the functions of government-such as giving evidence in courts of justice and otherwise assisting in the discovery of crime, giving information for statistical purposes, etc.; and in crises of defensive war or civil disorder all who are capable