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-spinsters and widows-who are thrown on their own resources for a livelihood: and it is not supported, even in the case of wives, by the practice of the wealthier classes in framing marriage-settlements, since elaborate care is usually taken to protect the pecuniary interests of the wife against the misconduct of her husband.1 I do not know any other important class of sane adults in whose case the argument -so far as it is used to justify lifelong exclusion-is even plausible in a modern state.

The second argument, therefore-that the excluded class will make a dangerously bad use of the vote-is the more important; and it seems worth while to examine in detail the different species of such misuse that are chiefly dangerous.

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Firstly, this bad use may be (a) morally perverted, or merely intellectually mistaken. Of the former misuse the three chief kinds are caused respectively by intimidation,2 bribery and dishonest demagogy. The patriotic voter will obviously vote for the candidate whom he regards as most competent to promote the wellbeing of the community by legislation; but it is in accordance with the general principle on which representative government is based, that in estimating the candidate's competence he should have particular regard for the special political interests of the section of the community to which he belongs, and aim especially at securing an intelligent concern for these:-though he ought, of course, not to desire that these special interests should be promoted at the expense of justice and the common good. Now if the elector is in such a position that a candidate or his friends may seriously injure him without open illegality and without material

1 It is sometimes urged that women who are thrown on their own resources do not form a distinct economic and social class, like landlords or artisans ; so that their interests may be adequately represented by men of the same class. But we cannot assume either (1) that women are not more fit for some lucrative occupations than for others, supposing all to be equally open to them, or (2) that they are not in danger of being excluded from some lucrative occupations, in the interests of men.

2 By "intimidation" is here meant the threatening of conduct that would be in itself legal, apart from its aim of influencing the vote of the person threatened. See chap. iv. § 4, pp. 59, 60.

sacrifice to themselves-it is obvious that his private interest may be artificially weighed, by fear of dismissal, loss of custom, etc., so as to induce him to vote for a candidate whom he does not really trust as a protector of his political interests. In this case the vote is perverted by intimidation: which must be carefully distinguished from what Bagehot has called the "habitual deference" which sometimes leads persons of humble social position to vote in accordance with the judgment of those above them in station: since this sincere deference to the opinion of the rich and powerful, though it may be mistaken, is not demoralising.

Again, if the elector is poor, his concern for his political interests may be similarly outweighed by a bribe which the candidate or his friends may afford without material sacrifice. This, of course, is all the more probable in proportion as the elector is unenlightened as to his real political interests: still, it cannot be said that the danger of bribery proceeds entirely from unenlightenment; since it may easily be that the probable difference, as affecting his private interests, between the kinds of legislation offered by competing political parties ought reasonably to be valued at less than the £5 note which the candidate is willing to offer. But the object of giving him a vote is not simply to secure his private interests, but to secure the presence in the legislative organ of the varied knowledge and intelligent concern for all sections of the community that is necessary for good legislation and this aim is defeated so far as the elector yields to bribery.

It is, however, a still worse form of bribery if the candidate tempts the elector with promises to further his political interests by legislation which both know to be contrary to the general good: since against the candidate who merely bribes pecuniarily we have only a certain general presumption that he is not likely to be a good legislator, but a candidate who bribes by promising mischievous measures has definitely pledged himself to be a bad one. This third perversion of the vote I call dishonest demagogy.

It is to be observed, however, that even where the

demagogue is dishonest, the elector may be honest but mistaken: he may believe that the legislation promised him is just and conducive to the common good, and may vote legitimately according to his lights. Or, again, the demagogue who is promising to further the sinister interests of a class may himself be honest but mistaken: he may be a charlatan who genuinely believes himself to be a statesman. The danger that under a widely-extended suffrage the ultimate interest of the community may be sacrificed to the real or merely apparent interests of the numerical majority may occur through any of these modes of demagogy; and in a community not radically demoralised the danger from the two latter modes is likely to be much greater than from dishonest demagogy recognised as such.

Now intimidation may be partly prevented by the secrecy of the ballot; and the importance of preventing it is, in my opinion, a decisive argument for secret voting in spite of the strong objections that may be urged against it. Still, this prevention cannot be made complete, since in many cases the way in which an elector has voted may be inferred, with a high degree of probability, from his own words and actions or those of others; and if there is a strong probability that a particular class will vote in a particular way, such a class, when in a small minority, incur nearly all the risks of openly voting against their opponents by venturing to go to the ballot-box. Bribery, again, may-more easily than intimidation-be partly put down. by penalties: but the difficulty of legally preventing an exchange into which both parties are desirous to enter is shown by experience to be very great in private transactions, and it is therefore likely that the purchase of votes will always go on to some extent. Nor is it probable that any efforts to disseminate truth and sound reasoning are likely to put down demagogy altogether. Hence it must be recognised as possible that on these grounds the disadvantages of giving the suffrage to poor, dependent, and ignorant persons may outweigh the disadvantages of excluding them. 1 See, for instance, Mill, Representative Government, chap. x.

Whether this is likely to be the case at any particular time and place it does not belong to general theory to decide. The decision will partly depend on a consideration which I have not yet taken into account-the intensity of the desire to exercise the franchise felt by the excluded class. For where this desire is weak, not only is the danger from exclusion less, since this cannot cause much discontent; but the danger from inclusion is greater, since persons who have no genuine consciousness of political interests needing defence lack the normal motives to legitimate voting, and are therefore more in danger of perversion. If their political interests do not really suffer by their exclusion, the most pressing reason for giving them a vote vanishes: if their interests do suffer, and it is only the consciousness of their need that is wanting, it is a case for agitation rather than immediate enfranchisement.

§ 4. In any case I think that the permanent exclusion of any class of sane self-supporting adults, on account of poverty alone, from the share of the control over legislation which the representative system aims at giving to the citizens at large, is invidious and difficult to maintain. There is more to be said for imposing such an exclusion on avoidable ignorance of an extreme kind: i.e. refusing the suffrage to persons who have not attained a certain educational standard;-provided that facilities for education are within the reach of all classes. Various other exclusions are permanently defensible on different grounds. Thus it seems reasonable to withhold the suffrage- partly as a deterrent, partly as a security against its perversion—from persons who have committed grave offences of any kind; also from all who have been convicted of buying or selling votes, or intimidating electors. In some cases, disgraceful conduct not amounting to crime seems a sufficient ground for exclusion-e.g. the keeping of a brothel, where this is tolerated. I also hold it to be reasonable to disfranchise persons who without crime have demonstrably failed to maintain their economic independence-i.e. paupers, and bankrupts who have not paid their creditors in full: on the ground that,

by becoming a burden on society they have forfeited their claim to the vote as a protection of their private interests, while their influence on current politics is not likely to be advantageous to the public. Other temporary exclusions. appear to be desirable for reasons that involve no sort of discredit. Thus, I should advocate an inferior limit of age somewhat higher than that of ordinary legal maturity; since it is reasonable that a man should not have a share in the control of public affairs until after some years of the experience gained by the independent management of his own affairs; and there seems to be no material danger that the persons excluded by youth would suffer through a sacrifice of their interests to the interests of older men. Further, when we examine the possibilities of bringing the motive of private interest into illicit operation in political elections, we are led to distinguish a special class of persons in whose case this operation cannot effectually be excluded, except by a partial withdrawal of the right of voting. I mean persons employed by candidates or their friends for the work of an election: it seems difficult to prevent the remuneration for such employment from practically operating like a bribe, if the employees are allowed to vote. in the same election. A similar danger exists in some measure in the case of permanent employment, private or governmental: but not such as to justify a sweeping disfranchisement of employees. There is, however, a special ground for excluding from the exercise of the suffrage such employees of government as are charged with the function. of physical coercion-policemen or soldiers on active service

-on the score of the peculiar importance of keeping them impartial in political conflicts: if, at least, there is a serious danger of disorder being caused by the violence of political partisanship. The withdrawal of the vote in this last case would also prevent the distribution of the army from being manipulated for electoral purposes: and it would be less likely to be felt as a grievance, since any portion of the army that is abroad must be excluded from voting.

It must, however, be admitted that the disfranchisement

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