division of labour which civilisation has brought, ordinary members of a community organised on an individualistic basis have continually to choose experts for skilled work of which the chooser does not understand the methods: and the result is commonly accepted as tolerably satisfactory. Thus to revert to a comparison already made-most men value highly the control that they acquire, by the free choice of their physician, over the operation of applying drugs to the cure of their diseases; though they know themselves to be wholly unable to prescribe medicines for themselves. I shall accordingly assume for the present that the ordinary work of legislation is to be left in the hands of selected legislators; deferring to a subsequent chapter the discussion of the legislative intervention which it may be expedient to reserve to the people at large.

To sum up I am prepared to accept, in a certain sense, the proposition-widely regarded as the fundamental principle of the modern constitutional state-" that a man ought not to be made to submit to any laws or to pay any taxes to which he has not consented personally or through his representatives;" but I accept it not as an absolute or ultimate principle of constitutional equity, but merely as a rule based on a generalisation with regard to human nature which I do not maintain to be universally true, and the force of which may be outweighed by other considerations. It still remains open to argument whether the whole, or the greater part of any given community, is not in such an intellectual and moral condition-from lack of intelligence, lack of orderly temper, lack of national cohesion, or other causes that its interests will be better promoted by a legislature over which it has no control, than by one which it is allowed to elect. All that can be fairly contended on general grounds is, that the burden of proof should be distinctly laid on those who wish to withhold the security for suitable legislation that such control affords. The same may be said of the exclusion of any class of sane adults from electoral privileges, in a community where the representative system is established.

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§ 2. The reasons that I have just given for constituting a representative assembly as the whole or chief part of the organ of legislation are those that have usually been most prominently put forward on its behalf. But some writers of repute appear to attach still more importance to what I may call the educative effect of representative or popular government. The alleged educative advantages are partly intellectual-the training given by participation in the management of public affairs; partly moral-the "invigorating effect of freedom on the character" in developing patriotism and public spirit, self-reliance and energetic self-help. As regards the first kind of advantage, this argument, if valid at all, seems to make more strongly for the direct participation of the people in legislation than for representative government; since the mere choice of a legislator is not likely to exercise and train the intellect so effectively as the effort to estimate the grounds for and against any proposed law. Still, in proportion as choice implies supervision and criticism of the legislator's work, the argument may be used in favour of either form of popular government. But in neither case can I regard it as a strong reason for giving legislative functions-either directly or indirectly-to persons whose minds are as yet incompetent to perform the intellectual processes required for coming to rational conclusions on the questions with which a modern legislature has to deal. There seem to be but slender grounds for thinking that such persons will receive valuable intellectual training through mere experience of the effects of their decisions; since it requires a certain grasp of the right method of dealing with any class of problems to be able to derive instruction from one's mistakes and the political blunderer can generally, without manifest absurdity, attribute the bad consequences of his blunders to circumstances incapable of being foreseen, or to the perversity and stupidity of other men.2

1 e.g. J. S. Mill, Representative Government, chap. iii.

2 It would be satisfactory to feel confident, with Story (Constitution of the United States, Book III. ch. ix. § 575) that the representative system, by

The argument based on the moral advantages of "free government seems to me to have more weight; but the consideration of it brings again before us the confusion which the common use of the word "Freedom" is apt to cause.1 When a writer speaks of "Free" institutions he sometimes means to imply that the government leaves the individual alone to look after his own affairs; sometimes that the private members of the community exercise an effective control over the government: sometimes he seems to imply both together, apparently assuming a necessary connection between the two facts, which we may conveniently distinguish as "civil" and "constitutional" freedom respectively. But there is no certainty that a representative legislature, chosen by universal suffrage, will not interfere with the free action of individuals more than an absolute monarch would the essential difference is merely, that under absolute monarchy a majority of sane adults may be forced to submit to laws that they permanently dislike, whereas if a popularly elected assembly is supreme in legislation, this coercion can only be applied to a minority. To this extent constitutional freedom affords a security for civil freedom; but a priori reasoning and experience combine to show that there is no further necessary connection between the two. For instance, I understand that Government does nothing to prevent a man from getting as drunk as he likes in Russia whereas the vigorous democracy of the United States has established severely restrictive liquor-laws.2

awakening "a desire to examine and sift and debate all public proceedings," must tend to "gradually furnish the mind "-of the mass of the electorate"with safe and solid materials for judgment upon all public affairs;" but I know no adequate grounds for this optimistic conclusion.

1 Cf. ante, chap. iv. § 1.

2 I may observe that the confusion of thought which hangs about the notion "freedom" becomes still worse confounded in the case of the term "liberal," by blending with the notion of "liberality" in the sense in which it is opposed to "meanness :" so that the term "liberal" comes to be applied not only to measures which secure to individuals civil freedom, or extend popular control over government, but also to measures which spend public money without stint. Both these confusions are effectively exposed in Mr. Bruce Smith's Liberty and Liberalism (1887).

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Distinguishing, then, between constitutional and civil freedom, I think we may fairly infer, from our general knowledge of human nature, that the possession of the former will tend to develop patriotism and public spirit. Ceteris paribus, a man who has a share in the management of public affairs is more likely to feel that they are his own affairs, and to exert himself, and make sacrifices when required, to promote the welfare of the state. But there is no similar reason why constitutional freedom should make individuals more self-reliant and self-helpful in the management of their private affairs indeed, it even seems rather paradoxical to say that the best method of rousing persons to energetic effort in the promotion of their private interests is to give them the interests of other persons to look after, and to hold out to them the hope of persuading or compelling Government to improve their circumstances. On the whole, therefore, while I admit that active, self-helpful, self-reliant peoples are most likely to have some system of popular control over their government in effective working, I am rather inclined to regard it as generally true, that a people of this kind will want a share in their government and will agitate till they get it, than that the exercise of the franchise will tend to give them these qualities. In any case, when a nation of this kind has once obtained the control over legislation, which is given by the establishment of a representative legislature, it is likely to be very difficult to bring it into a condition of permanent general contentment with any legislature that has no popular element :—at least until it has had prolonged and bitter experience of the disasters arising from popular government. What we have practically to consider in laying down principles of constitutional law for such a nation is not whether it is to have a representative assembly as a main part of the legislative organ, but in what way the deficiencies of such an assembly may best be remedied or minimised.

§ 3. In examining these deficiencies and the remedies proposed for them we shall be led naturally to the consideration of the proper modes and conditions of the election

of legislators. Hitherto I have spoken of them as elected by divisions of the community, assuming vaguely that these divisions would include all sane adults, who are not disqualified on special grounds. And it is obvious that the general arguments for a representative legislature lead prima facie to this conclusion: if any class is deprived of representation, the advantages aimed at in the institution are lost so far as this class is concerned. Indeed there may be even more danger that the special needs of such a class will be neglected and its special interests sacrificed, by a legislature representing other classes exclusively, than there would be under a despotism; since a despot has less motive than an assembly representing only a portion of the community for dividing unequally any natural concern that he may feel for the interests of those whom he governs. This is the fundamental objection to any attempt to improve the quality of a representative legislature by restricting what is called the "suffrage," "franchise," or "active" electoral privilege i.e. the right of voting, as distinct from the right of being voted for viz. that it sacrifices pro tanto the special advantages at which representative government aims. A further objection lies in the sense of injustice that such an excluded class is likely to feel in consequence of its unequal

treatment.

Still these objections are not decisive, from a utilitarian point of view they may be outweighed by special proof (1) that the class in question will not suffer by exclusion because its interests will be adequately cared for by the representatives of those included, or (2) that it is likely to make a dangerously bad use of the vote. The first of these arguments obviously only neutralises a part of the grounds for universalising the suffrage; it does not affect the " educational" grounds. It has some force in the case of women, owing to the intimate relations of affection that bind them to men: it may be plausibly urged that the political interests of wives, daughters and sisters, are safe in the hands of husbands, fathers and brothers. The argument, however, is obviously least applicable to the considerable minority of adult women