the superior race cannot or will not undertake the main part of the manual work required: in this case the demand of the capitalist employer for a steady supply of reliable labour led modern civilisation in its earlier stage back to the institution of slavery in an extreme form: and prompts even now to longing aspirations after some system of compulsory labour, which shall have the economic advantages of slavery without its evils. But I know no ground for thinking that such system can be devised: and should accordingly deprecate any attempt to approximate to it. I do not therefore infer as some have inferred-that contracts of long duration ought to be prohibited altogether; but only that they ought to be carefully supervised and closely watched. The need for this vigilance arises equally it may be even greater when the labourers in question are not natives, but aliens belonging to a lower grade of civilisation; at the same time there are strong economic reasons for introducing labour from abroad in colonies of this class, where the natives are either not sufficiently numerous or wanting in industrial capacity. Here, again, we require the aid of special experience to determine the precise conditions under which such contracts should be allowed in the diverse circumstances that may arise.

PART II

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS

RELATIONS TO THE GOVERNED

CHAPTER XIX

METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT

§ 1. IN the preceding chapters we have been occupied in surveying the work of government from the point of view of the governed: that is, we have concentrated attention on the effects that Government ought to aim at producing in the condition and mutual relations of the private members of the community governed, and in their relations to individuals and communities outside. In the six following chapters I shall be employed in considering how Government should be constituted for the proper performance of the functions which our discussion up to this point has marked out for it; how the necessary organs of government should be appointed; and what should be their mutual relations. The present chapter forms the transition or connecting link between the two discussions. I propose here to make a brief survey of the whole work marked out for government, with the special object of determining in a general way the kind of methods and instruments that will be required for its satisfactory accomplishment.

1

I shall assume, for simplicity, that we are concerned with what may be called "unitary" States: that is, with States in which the ordinary exercise of the highest powers of Government belongs to a central organ or organs, exercising control over all the members of the State; while only matters of secondary importance are handed over to the independent

1 I use this term to contrast them with Federal and other composite States, the peculiarities of which will form the subject of a special chapter (xxvi.).