CHAPTER XVIII

PRINCIPLES OF EXTERNAL POLICY

§ 1. IN the three preceding chapters we have been considering the rules of international duty that should be maintained, by common opinion-and as far as possible applied in arbitration between States-in the interest of humanity at large. We have seen reason to adopt, at any rate as regards the relations of civilised and well-ordered States, a system analogous to what, in dealing with civil relations, is called Individualism, of which the fundamental rules prescribe avoidance of injury to person and property and enforcement of contracts; and we have examined the modifications of these rules, rendered necessary by the essential differences between States and individuals,—especially by the enlargement of the right and duty of self-protection, consequent on the want of a common government in the society of States. the present chapter I propose to contemplate international matters from a somewhat different point of view, and to consider the principles and aims by which the action of any particular government should be determined in dealing with the external relations of its State.

In

Here the most fundamental question is whether a government should take as the ultimate end and criterion of right conduct, in dealing with communities and individuals outside it, the interest or happiness of all the persons concerned, or merely the interest of the particular group of human beings which it governs and represents and their posterity, including any aliens voluntarily admitted to the

privileges of membership. I am not prepared to maintain that the two criteria will always practically coincide, and in case of conflict I cannot hesitate to prefer the former; to prefer the latter would appear to me deliberate immorality. At the same time, I think it important not to exaggerate the divergence between the private interest of any particular State and the general interest of the community of nations. I conceive that it will be usually the interest of any particular State to conform to what we have laid down as the rules of international duty, so long as it has a reasonable expectation of similar conformity on the part of its neighbours, at any rate in dealing with civilised, coherent, and well-ordered States, in whose case conquest could not be justified in the interest of the conquered State as a means of getting rid of the evils of disorder, or in the interest of humanity at large as a means of substituting a higher civilisation for a lower. And so far as the past conduct of any foreign State shows that reciprocal fulfilment of international duty cannot reasonably be expected from it, any State that may have to deal with it must, I conceive, be allowed in the interests of humanity, the extension of the right of self-protection which its own interests would prompt it to claim. From any point of view, it must be held right for a State to anticipate an attack which it has reasonable grounds for regarding as imminent, to meet wiles with wiles, as well as force with force, and in extreme cases to stamp out incurable international brigandage even by the severe measure of annihilating the independent existence of the offending State. Indeed, I should hold that even the violation of the rights of an innocent neutral state may be justified in self-defence, if it is clear that its resources can and will be used for hostile attack by a high-handed aggressor.

Again, it seems to be plain that, in its own interest, no less than in that of humanity at large, a State should incur some risk of sacrifice in order to avoid war, by accepting arbitration on all points of minor importance, or negotiation if an impartial arbiter cannot be found; and that it should

make it a point of international policy to aim at improving the machinery of arbitration.

It is more difficult to give a general answer to the question whether it is the right policy to run the risk of war in order to prevent high-handed aggression by another state against a third. As we have seen, this cannot be imposed as a strict duty, on the principle that I have adopted. Still, where the assailant is clearly in the wrong, I think that any powerful neighbouring state-even if its own interests are not directly threatened-ought to manifest a general readiness to co-operate in forcible suppression of the wrong. Indeed, unless we suppose that the mere exercise of superior force is kept under some check by the fear of the intervention of other states against palpable injustice, war between states decidedly unequal in strength will hardly retain its moral character at all: to treat it, as I have done, as a sanction against the breach of international duty would be solemn trifling. And I think that co-operation to prevent wanton breaches of international peace is the best mode of preparing the way for the ultimate federation of civilised states, to which I look forward. But in the present stage of civilisation, it would, I think, be a mistake to try to prevent wars altogether in this way. We may hope to put down by it palpable and high-handed aggression, —including, perhaps, the refusal to submit minor points to arbitration; but it is not applicable where there is a conflict of reasonable claims, too vague and doubtful to be clearly settled by general consent, and at the same time too serious to be submitted to arbitration. We may illustrate this by the present relations of France and Germany. I hold that the war of 1870-71 was substantially an aggression on the part of the French, prompted by a quite inadmissible claim of France to prevent, or obtain territorial compensation for, the alteration of the balance of power caused by the unification of Germany. I hold, therefore, that Germany, having repelled the aggression, had a right to take substantial guarantees against its repetition at the expense of France. At the same time, I think that the dismemberment actually

inflicted was a punishment in which no civilised nation can be expected to acquiesce, so long as the portion torn away retains a preponderant desire for reunion. Accordingly, if

at the present time France took an opportunity for going to war with Germany for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, my sympathies would be on the side of France at the same time, the claim of Germany to retain the provinces would seem to me so far defensible that I should not regard it as a clear duty of neighbouring states to interfere on either side.

However this important question of policy is to be determined, it will be admitted that, on one ground or another, war must be regarded as a constant danger, the preparation for which constitutes the most important part of those internal functions of government which, as was before noticed, are indissolubly connected with its external functions. But as to the extent and manner of such preparation I conceive that it is impossible to lay down any useful general rules: the policy of each State must be so largely determined by relations to its neighbours, which vary from State to State, and may be fundamentally changed from time to time. Thus, the policy of a relatively small State will reasonably differ from that of a relatively large one; the policy of an island from that of a country with continental neighbours; and so forth.

So again, no general rules can be laid down as regards alliances, beyond the statement before given of the strong grounds for supporting purely defensive leagues as the best substitute and preparation for a federation able to maintain peace among civilised States.

§ 2. So far I have been considering what should be done by a particular State for the maintenance of the system of restraints imposed on civilised States generally by the rules of international duty; but in an enunciation of the principles of external policy it is no less important to consider the relations that any State should aim at establishing with alien communities and territories, within the limits fixed by strict international obligations. Here the important questions are (I.) how far the government of a State should allow (a) free

trade—that is, trade only hampered by taxes imposed for the sole purpose of raising revenue-between its subjects and foreigners; and (b) free immigration of aliens into its territory and (II.) how far it should aim at expansion of territory, and absorption of the foreign communities inhabiting the territories annexed.

I. A full discussion of the burning question of Free Trade I consider more suitable to a treatise on political economy. Here I will only say that the economic argument for Free Trade, considered from what I may call a cosmopolitan point of view, i.e. in relation to the interests of the aggregate of the States trading-is a simple application of the general argument for laisser faire, given in a previous chapter (x.). I regard it as broadly and generally true, though I think that a theoretical economist is bound to point out exceptional cases in which it fails; but I need not notice. these here, because the consideration of them does not lead me to regard any interference with free trade as practically desirable from a cosmopolitan point of view. This conclusion indeed seems to be now accepted even in the countries in which the faith in the benefits of protection to native industry is most strongly held; since we do not find that in any of these countries protection to local industries is seriously advocated as a measure conducive to the economic interests of the whole nation. This is conspicuously illustrated by the case of the United States, in which, in spite of its strongly protective duties. on foreign imports, no one-so far as I know-has ever proposed to interfere with the present unrestricted freedom of internal trade.

The question, however, is materially altered if we restrict our regard to the sectional interest of the group of persons inhabiting a particular portion of the whole region over which trade is carried on, supposing them to constitute an independent community. I cannot deny that it may, under certain conditions, be economically gainful to this group sometimes (1) to resist by import duties an industrial change which unrestricted free trade would cause, and sometimes

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