fusion of the different portions of the community. The resulting inconvenience and mischief is likely to be much more serious in some departments of law than in others. Thus it is likely to be comparatively trifling in the case of the laws relating to the tenure of land in which, at the same time, the considerations in favour of maintaining local divergences are likely to be specially strong. On the other hand, variation will probably be specially great in the case of commercial law, from the tendency of commercial relations to extend beyond the limits of a single district and also in the law relating to domestic conditions, since the institution of the family is normally protected as we have before observed-by strong moral sentiments, which are liable to be at once offended and weakened by the collisions between discordant rules.1

This question, however, cannot be finally dealt with apart from the considerations relating to the structure of government which will come before us in the second portion of this treatise. Leaving it for the present, let us turn to consider briefly the variations in law and in other forms of governmental interference, which may be rationally grounded on differences not in the nature of men or the structure of societies, but in their physical environment. Some departments of law scarcely admit of variation on this ground; thus (e.g.) the regulation of the family and the conditions under which it is expedient to enforce contract are not likely to vary with variations in the physical circum

1 As an American writer says, speaking from experience :-"Diversity of commercial rules in the several States impedes and annoys business, for American business pays little heed to State lines. Conflicting laws of marriage and divorce unsettle family relations, and undermine the moral basis of society. . . . It is possible that a man married in New York, divorced and re-married in Indiana, shall be the lawful husband of one woman in Indiana, and shall be regarded by the law of New York as the husband of another. By the law of Indiana his status is completely regular; by the law of New York he is a bigamist. He may have a second family of children who, by the law of Indiana, are legitimate, but by the law of New York are bastards." (Prof. Munroe Smith, on State Statute, and Common Law, in the Political Science Quarterly for March 1888.) It is in the part of the marriage-law that relates to the conditions of divorce, and of the remarriage of divorced persons, that variation is specially mischievous.

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stances of different societies: and the protection of person and reputation from injury intentionally inflicted will be equally required everywhere. There are more likely to be important differences required in the governmental interference which I have distinguished as "indirectly individualistic"; especially owing to the peculiar dangers of mutual mischief which arise under urban as contrasted with rural conditions, from the closer packing of human beings: thus sanitary regulations are likely to be different in town and country respectively: it has even been said that "each town has its own drainage problem." Similarly, the protection against the introduction of diseases from abroad will require regulations on the borders of a country which will not be necessary in inland districts. Again, we have seen that the general principle of securing to each individual the fullest possible opportunity to employ his labour and undisturbed enjoyment of its results, has to be carried out differently in relation to different kinds of natural utilities: for instance, special regulations are likely to be necessary for mines, for fisheries, for forests; and these, by the nature of the case, are likely to be applicable to certain districts in the country and not to others. For similar reasons special kinds of the interference that we have called-in a wide sensesocialistic, may be only required in special localities: as (e.g.) for the draining of a marshy district, or for the irrigation of one deficient in water, or for the protection of low-lying lands against floods, or for the more elaborate provision of water for household use, which urban conditions render desirable.

CHAPTER XV

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DUTY

§ 1. I Now pass to consider that part of the work of Government which is primarily external; that is, which has for its end the maintenance of proper relations between the community governed and other communities and individuals outside it. As we have already seen (Chapter xi.), the existence of these external relations, in anything like their present form, must have very important effects on the internal relations of the community. Even in ordinary times, in most European States, the taxation required for the purpose of protecting the community and its interests against the attacks of external enemies exceeds that required for all its internal functions taken together; while in critical emergencies of war a government is commonly held to have a right to demand from the governed far more severe sacrifices, and even the most perilous personal services. Further, an important part of the duty of any government towards foreigners is to exercise adequate care in preventing its own subjects from doing them mischief. Hence the functions of government that are primarily external have in various important ways an internal aspect, which can never be altogether excluded; but for the present I shall concentrate attention on their external aspect, and accordingly endeavour to sketch in outline the conduct that States, as represented by their governments, ought to pursue towards other States and their members.

In framing this sketch I shall begin by assuming, as

the ultimate end and standard of right international conduct, the general happiness of all the human beings concerned, and not merely the interest of one particular State.1 At the same time we must proceed on the assumption that a universal political order, maintained by a government representing the civilised part of humanity, is an ideal beyond the range of practical effort. We must suppose that civilised States are existing side by side under separate governments, exercising independent and supreme control over separate portions of the earth's surface; that, therefore, there is no central organ of legislation, by whose action any rule of international conduct which thoughtful persons may regard as desirable could be at once laid down as binding on civilised States generally; and no central executive able to crush any recalcitrant nation with irresistible force. How, under these circumstances, rules of international duty are to be introduced and maintained, I shall hereafter consider; 2 but at any rate we have to bear in mind, in framing a scheme of these rules for which we desire to obtain acceptance, that they must be such as an independent group of human beings can be made to obey, amid all the difficulties of the struggle for existence among individuals and societies; partly, no doubt, by their own. sentiments of justice and humanity, but chiefly by their fear of the disapprobation of other nations, and the more or less indefinite danger of consequent hostile action on the part of these nations. Under these circumstances it seems doubtful how far the distinction between "legal" and "moral" rules and sanctions which is of so great and pervading importance in the regulation of civil relations within a community-can be consistently or usefully applied to international relations. It seems best to discuss this question at the close of our examination of the principles of international duty. Meanwhile I shall avoid applying the term "legal" at all to the mutual claims of States; but it will be

1 The difficult question presented by the apparent divergence, in certain cases, between the interest of a state and its international duty as here determined, will be discussed in a subsequent chapter (xviii). 2 See Chap. xvii.

sometimes necessary to distinguish what I will call "strict" duties, the violations of which I regard as wrongs justifying war in the last resort if reparation is obstinately refused, from merely unkind or unfriendly acts or omissions, which I only regard as justifying retaliatory unfriendliness and general disapprobation, but not breaches of international peace.

We may conveniently begin by considering summarily how far the different principles, by a combination of which, though in unequal proportions, civil order within a normal modern community has been seen to be regulated, are applicable to the relations of States.

In the first place, the absence of a supreme supervising government seems to exclude the possibility of "paternal" interference, except of a kind that would be unhesitatingly rejected in the civil relations of sane adults. No one would propose that a single private individual, or voluntary combination of private individuals, should be empowered-except under the strictest governmental supervision-to interfere with another sane adult for that other's good; the danger of such control being exercised in the interest of the protecting individual or group would be thought to outweigh any possible advantage to the person controlled. And a similar danger renders this kind of quasi-paternal control generally inexpedient in the case of States, at least if they are at all equal in grade of civilisation, and sufficiently coherent internally to be regarded as united wholes. It may, however, be sometimes advantageous for a weak State to be placed under the protection of a group of its neighbours, through whose mutual jealousies it may thus secure greater practical freedom from interference than if it were left in nominally complete independence: but this is hardly analogous to what we have called "paternal" interference. Again, a semicivilised State may sometimes gain more than it loses by being brought into a condition of semi-dependence on a more civilised neighbour; but in the historical instances in which this relation has been established it has usually been by a selfinterested encroachment of the protecting State, acquiesced in, rather than approved by, other nations; and the general