and of Germany it is the most striking feature of recent European history; and North America shows us an impressive example of a political society maintaining internal peace over a region larger than Western Europe.1 Usually

no doubt this aggregation of civilised mankind into larger unions, so far as it has been voluntary, has been mainly due to the pressure of external dangers from enemies common to the smaller uniting bodies; and there are no present signs that foreign perils, sufficiently formidable to produce this effect, are likely to threaten the group of West-European nations. But if the boundaries of existing civilised states undergo no material change, the relative strength. of the United States, as compared with the West-European States, will before the end of the next century so decidedly preponderate, that the most powerful of the latter will keenly feel its inferiority in any conflict with the former. And even apart from this motive to union, it seems not impossible that the economic burdens entailed by war, the preponderantly industrial character of modern political societies, the increasing facilities and habits of communication among Europeans and the consequently intensified consciousness of their common civilisation, may, before many generations have passed, bring about an extensive federation of civilised states strong enough to put down wars among its members. But, in any case, this ideal is at present beyond the range of practical politics. There is not at present, and there is no immediate prospect developing, any consciousness of common nationality among Europeans or West-Europeans as such: and the practically dominant political ideal of the present age does not include an extension of government beyond the limits of the nation. As in Greek history the practically dominant ideal

1 I do not overlook the centrifugal forces that have also been at work throughout European history: especially, in recent times, those due to the claims of nationalities, and the tendency of colonies when full grown to separate from the mother-country. Still it does not seem rash to forecast as probable, on the basis of our knowledge of past history, that the forces tending to the formation of continually larger political unions will on the whole prevail.

is a society of independent City-states, so, in the period to which we belong, it is a society of Nation-states.

§ 2. To get a clearer view of this ideal, let us examine. more closely the conceptions of "State" and "Nation" as currently used.

I must begin by distinguishing between (1) the narrower use of the word "State" to denote the community considered exclusively in its corporate capacity, as the subject of public as distinct from private rights and obligations; and (2) its wider use to denote the community however considered. In previous chapters we have been led to conceive the community as capable of holding property and incurring debts in its corporate capacity: and, in speaking of these as the property and debts "of the State," we intend to distinguish them from the aggregate of the properties and the debts of the members of the community. This distinction, we may observe, is recognised by foreigners as well as natives. Thus, if England were to go bankrupt no individual Englishman would be held liable for any part of the large sums that his State owes to foreigners; and, according to the usage of war, an invader of England would freely take the public property of the English State, but he would not seize the property of individual Englishmen beyond exacting certain limited "contributions." A similar distinction is implied when we speak of philanthropic duties as incumbent on "society" but not on "the State." At other times, however, we apply the term rather to the "body politic" considered as an aggregate of individuals: thus we might speak of England as a rich State, having in view the wealth possessed by the aggregate of Englishmen. It would be inconvenient to be obliged to avoid either use of the term; but I shall try to prevent the ambiguity from causing any confusion.

In the present chapter I shall take the wider signification. I shall mean by a State what I have also called a Political Society; i.e. a body of human beings, deriving its corporate unity from the fact that its members acknowledge permanent obedience to the same government, which represents the

society in its collective capacity, and ought to aim in all its actions at the promotion of their common interests. And I shall assume this government to be independent, in the sense that it is not in habitual obedience to any foreign individual or body or to the government of a larger whole.1 It would, however, be contrary to usage to apply the term "State" to all human societies living under independent governments -including (e.g.) nomad tribes :-it must be added therefore that the term implies a certain degree of civilised order. The exact degree of civilisation implied, according to usage, is hardly clear: but we may lay down (1) that in a community that is called a State there is understood to be an effective consciousness of the distinction before explained, between the rights and obligations of the community in its corporate capacity and the rights and obligations of the individuals composing it; and (2) that the community so designated is understood to be in settled occupation of a certain territory. It seems essential to the modern conception of a State that its government should exercise supreme dominion over a particular portion of the earth's surface: and if we once admit that the range of governmental control is to be limited, the advantage of determining its limits by territorial boundaries is obvious: since the government's task of protecting its subjects from wrong would manifestly become tenfold more difficult if they were liable to be brought into contact, to an indefinite extent, with persons who might legitimately refuse obedience to their government. Accordingly, in modern times, it is generally recognised as a fundamental right of a civilised state that its government should have unquestioned power of determining and enforcing law within the limits of the territory that is recognised as belonging to it. It is only in the case of weak and imperfectly ordered communities that serious limitations of this

1 It is to be observed that the assumption of complete independence is not always implied in the current usage of the term "State." Thus, the several members of the North American Union are called States, though not independent in their external relations, and not even completely independent in their internal legislation and administration. But it seems to me most convenient here to exclude this latter use.

power are demanded by the civilised communities who have dealings with them:1 and it is doubtful whether, even in such cases, more good than harm results from granting the demand.

Indeed, in modern political thought the connection between a political society and its territory is so close that the two notions almost blend, and the same words are used indifferently to express either: thus we sometimes mean by a "State" the territory of a political community, and we sometimes mean by a "Country" the political community inhabiting it. We speak of crossing the boundaries of a "state," and we say that a "country" has made up its mind.2

So far I have considered the unity of a State as depending solely on the fact that its members obey a common government. And I do not think that any other bond is essentially implied in the definition of a State. But we recognise that a political society is in an unsatisfactory and comparatively unstable condition when its members have no consciousness of any bond of unity among them except their obedience to the same government. Such a society is lacking in the cohesive force required to resist the disorganising shocks and jars which foreign wars and domestic discontents are likely to cause from time to time. Accordingly, we recognise it as desirable that the members of a State should be united by the further bonds vaguely implied in the term Nation. I think, however, that the implications of this important term are liable to be obscured by attempts to give them great definiteness. I think it impossible to name any particular bond of union among those that chiefly contribute to the internal cohesion of a strongly-united society-belief in a common origin, possession of a common language and literature, pride in common historic traditions, community of social customs, community of religion

1 Thus Europeans are not justiciable by native courts in the Turkish dominions.

2 In ancient Greek thought a corresponding fusion took place between the notions of "City" and "State," represented by the one word woλs.

In

which is essential to our conception of a Nation-State. popular talk it is often assumed that the members of a Nation are descended from the same stock; but some of the leading modern nations-so called-are notoriously of very mixed race, and it does not appear that the knowledge of this mixture has any material effect in diminishing the consciousness of nationality. Again, the memories of a common political history, and especially of common struggles against foreign foes, have a tendency to cause the community of patriotic sentiment which the term "nation" implies: still, the present imperfect cohesion of the Austro-Hungarian State shows that this cause cannot be counted upon to produce the required effect. In the case just mentioned differences of language seem to have operated importantly against cohesion: and indeed in most recent movements for the formation of states upon a truly "national" basiswhether by aggregation or division-community of language seems to have been widely taken as a criterion of nationality still, it seems clear from the cases of Switzerland on the one hand and Ireland on the other, that community of language and community of national sentiment are not necessarily connected. Again, at certain stages in the history of civilisation, religious belief has been a powerful nation-making force, and powerful also to disintegrate nations but these stages seem to be now past in the development of the leading West-European and American States. I think, therefore, that what is really essential to the modern conception of a State which is also a Nation is merely that the persons composing it should have a consciousness of belonging to one another, of being members of one body, over and above what they derive from the mere fact of being under one government; so that, if their government were destroyed by war or revolution, they would still hold firmly together. When they have this consciousness we regard them as forming a "nation," whatever else they may lack thus we should speak without hesitation of the Swiss nation, because we attribute to the Swiss this community of patriotic sentiment, in spite of differences of language and