government, and in the relations established-whether by constitutional law or constitutional morality-between the governors and the governed. I mean such disadvantages as (1) the danger of overburdening the governmental machinery with work, (2) the danger of increasing the power capable of being used by governing persons oppressively or corruptly, (3) the danger that the delicate economic functions of government will be hampered by the desire to gratify certain specially influential sections of the community for instance, when legislation is in the hands of a representative assembly, the more the functions of Government are extended in a socialistic direction, the greater becomes the risk that contested elections will exhibit an immoral competition between candidates promising to procure public money for the benefit of particular classes and districts. When, along with these dangers, we take into account that the work of government must be done by persons who-even with the best arrangement for effective supervision and promotion of merit-can only have a part of the stimulus to energy and enterprise which the independent worker feels, it will be easily understood that we are not justified in concluding that governmental interference is always expedient, even where laisser faire leads to a manifestly unsatisfactory result; its expediency has to be decided in any particular case by a careful estimate of advantages and drawbacks, requiring data obtained from specific experience, which it does not come within the scope of this treatise to give.

1 As I shall explain in chapter xix, the disadvantages of increasing the work of government may be in some cases avoided by placing public funds and functions in the hands of private corporations under governmental supervision.

NOTE. It has seemed to me most convenient to reserve the consideration of governmental interference with foreign trade-of which the reader may naturally expect to find a discussion in the present chapter-until I come to treat of the "Principles of External Policy" (chap. xviii).

CHAPTER XI

THE MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT

§ 1. IN considering the individualistic minimum of governmental interference, I passed over one branch of it which all would admit; the function of providing for the defence of government against attack, and procuring the means necessary for its support and for the adequate discharge of its other functions. I passed this over for the time as being secondary and derivative: for the cost in money, coercion, or otherwise, that is generally needed to keep up any part of the work of government is obviously in itself a sacrifice, which only becomes justifiable when the work for which it is imposed has been shown to be either necessary or sufficiently useful to be worth the cost. On the other hand, the consideration of cost may be of decisive importance in determining the limits of governmental action:-since here, as in private affairs, the question whether a certain utility should be sought in a certain way may depend on the price that has to be paid for it. In any case it seems desirable at this point to consider (1) the restraints which it is expedient to place on private individuals, in order to protect Government against attack, and to render its discharge of its functions more efficient,1 and (2) the manner in which the personal services and the material commodities required for governmental work should be obtained.

1 The restraints to be placed on Government, to secure the protection of private individuals against governmental oppression or extortion will be more conveniently considered in the second part of the treatise.

M

Under the first head we may begin by assuming that the life, health, reputation, etc., of persons exercising governmental functions will receive protection similar to that afforded to private individuals by such a system of law as has been sketched out in the preceding chapters and we may make a similar assumption with regard to the land or other wealth which Government manages as "public property," either as being necessary to the performance of governmental functions, or most generally useful when held in public ownership. These points need no argument and it is also obvious that any overt resistance to governmental officials in the discharge of their legitimate functions should be effectively repressed :-though, of course, when such an official has exceeded his lawful functions in applying coercion to any private individual, reparation should be made to the latter for any injury he may have suffered from the unlawful aggression, and punishment should be inflicted on the aggressor if his excess has been wilful or grave. It is more doubtful how far a private person is to be held justified in resisting what he believes to be unlawful aggression on the part of a governmental official, just as he would resist similar aggression on the part of a private individual. It seems most simple and logical to lay down that an official acting illegally loses all advantage of his official character, so far as this action is concerned: still there are important grounds for limiting the right of selfdefence more narrowly where the apparent aggressor is an officer of government: since a conflict of force between a private person and a governmental officer is more disturbing and dangerous to social order than a similar conflict between private persons; again, in the former case there is a general presumption that the apparent aggressor is better acquainted with the limits of his legitimate functions than the private individual whose rights he apparently invades : finally, reparation is somewhat more secure in the case of aggres

1 I assume, of course, a state of society in which the relations of government and governed are so far well ordered that the supreme ent to

be trusted to repair wrongs committed by its subordinat means for securing this result will be considered in

sion by a governmental officer than it is in the case of private aggression, since the private aggressor may escape. On the whole, then, it would seem expedient that the legal right of self-defence against aggressions of governmental officials should, as far as possible, be limited to cases in which the illegitimacy of the official's attack is manifest and unmistakable, or the injury threatened irreparable.

I have been speaking above of strictly legal rights of resistance, as conceivably exercised against subordinate officials. The consideration of the constitutional1 or moral right of private persons to resist oppressive action on the part of a supreme organ of government will come more properly at a later stage of the discussion; for which I also reserve the important question how far special restraints should be imposed on freedom of speech and freedom of association of private individuals in order more completely to guard against the danger of seditious resistance to the supreme government.

Leaving the question of open resistance and incitement. to resistance, it may be laid down further that any attempt to prevent or pervert the exercise of any governmental powers by bribing or in any way threatening the officials concerned should be severely repressed; and, generally, any dangerous attempt to throw obstacles directly or indirectly in the way of the discharge of governmental functions should be prohibited under penalties, unless for special reasons it should appear that such penal interference would be likely to be attended with evils outweighing its advantages. The most difficult question under this latter head relates to the assistance that relatives and friends are prompted to render to criminals desirous of escaping justice. Such assistance should certainly be viewed generally as a breach of social duty; but to punish it with unrelenting rigour would bring the law into harsh-and somewhat demoralising-collision with the affectionate feelings and habits of mutual service which powerfully move men to aid

1 It is obvious that there cannot be a strictly legal right of resisting a supreme legislative organ of government.

near kinsmen or intimate friends in distress.

On the whole,

it is probably best to reserve the punishment of "accessories after the fact" for the gravest class of crimes, and even in this case to exempt from punishment the mutual secret aid of husbands and wives, or children and parents.

§ 2. Let us now proceed to a general survey of the means by which the personal services and material commodities required by government are to be provided. It must be admitted that, in some respects, this survey would come more appropriately after we have discussed the external relations of political communities, and the important governmental functions connected with them;-since, in most modern states, the larger share of the cost of government is caused by these functions. On the other hand, however largely the expenditure of government may be due to its external relations, the burden of providing the required supplies must fall almost entirely within the community: foreign tributes, whether exacted politically or under exceptional circumstances-obtained by taxing foreign trade, can rarely amount to more than a small fraction of such supplies. I propose, accordingly, to introduce the discussion of the resources of government here; though in so doing I must to some extent anticipate the aspect of governmental work, which will come more fully before us in subsequent chapters.

The commodities required by government may be divided into (1) Personal services, (2) Material products of labour, and (3) Natural resources, especially land and its contents. Of these the third class may have belonged to the community from the first, and never have been permitted to be appropriated by individuals: it is only with regard to the first two classes that the questions necessarily arise whether they are to be obtained (a) voluntarily or compulsorily, (b) gratuitously or by purchase. For the higher parts of the work of government, if they do not involve continuous and fatiguing labour, the required services are likely to be obtainable without either compulsion or pecuniary emolument; as the dignity and power attached