ing from laisser faire in special cases. And as regards the sociological argument in particular, it can be shown. by general reasoning that there are important cases in which it manifestly fails to establish the practical conclusion based on it.

In examining these cases from the point of view of general theory, it is convenient to begin by granting the assumption-tacitly made in the general economic argument that I have just given—that the higher market value of products and services consumed by the rich, as compared with those consumed by the poor, represents a correspondingly higher degree of utility to society. I shall presently point out how paradoxical this supposition is: but for formal clearness of discussion it is as well to begin by making it; since even on this supposition it can, I think, be shown that there are several distinct cases in which, under a strictly individualistic system of governmental interference, the individual's interest has no tendency to prompt him to the course of action most conducive to the common interest.

§ 2. In the first place, it should be observed that the individualistic argument, even if fully granted, would only justify appropriation to the labourer and free exchange of the utilities produced by labour; it affords no direct justification for the appropriation of natural resources, which private property in material things inevitably involves. Hence, so far as this appropriation of natural resources restricts other men's opportunities of applying labour productively—so far as there is not, to use Locke's phrase, “enough and as good left for others" of the unlaboured commodity appropriated -the appropriation is of doubtful legitimacy, from the point of view of the strictest individualism; and must be regarded as theoretically subject to limitation or regulation, in the interest of the whole aggregate of individuals concerned. How far this limitation and regulation should go must be determined by experience in different departments: but it may be laid down generally that it is the duty of Government as representing the community to prevent the bounties of nature from being wasted by the unrestricted pursuit of

private interest. Thus, for instance, it may properly interfere to protect mines and fisheries from wasteful exhaustion, and save rare and useful species of plants from extermination; and, when necessary, may undertake or control the management of natural watercourses, with a view both to irrigation and to the supply of motive power. And I conceive that measures of a much more sweeping kind in the same direction-including even the complete abolition of private property in land-are theoretically defensible on the basis of individualism; they have, indeed, received the support of thoroughgoing advocates of this doctrine.1

Secondly, individuals may not be able—at all, or without inconvenience practically deterrent to remunerate themselves by the sale of the utilities which it is for the general interest that they should render to society. This may be either because the utility is from its nature incapable of being appropriated, or because though undeniably important from the point of view of the community-its value to any individual is too uncertain and remote to render it worth purchasing on grounds of private interest. An example of the former is furnished by forests: since private landowners who maintain forests cannot by free exchange exact any return for such benefit as they may confer on the community by its favourable influence on climate in moderating and equalising

1 The abolition of private ownership of land is not only emphatically advocated in Mr. Herbert Spencer's early treatise on Social Statics-which does not altogether represent his later views-it is also suggested as a probable result of industrial development in his later treatise on Political Institutions, ch. xv. pp. 540, 541.

I cannot regard as valid the historical reasoning which leads Mr. Spencer to conclude that private ownership of land, having been "established by force" and not by contract, is likely to disappear at a more advanced stage of civilisation. But I quite admit it to be possible that a modern community, while maintaining generally the present merely individualistic character of its laws and institutions, may resume the communal ownership" of land, giving due compensation to existing owners: though, for reasons which I have elsewhere given (Political Economy, Book iii. ch. vi. § 5) I think that the economic disadvantages of such a change would outweigh its advantages, at the present stage of social and political development.

To prevent any misunderstanding, I ought perhaps to state explicitly that I regard the proposal to confiscate the property of landowners without compensation as unworthy of serious discussion.

rainfall. The other case may be illustrated by scientific investigation generally; since most of the advances made in scientific knowledge, even though they may be ultimately the source of important material benefits to man's estate, would hardly remunerate the investigator if treated as marketable commodities, and only communicated to private individuals who were willing to pay for them.

Even where the inconvenience of selling a commodity would not be deterrent, the waste of time and labour that the process would involve may be so great as to render it on the whole a more profitable arrangement for the community to provide the commodity out of public funds. For instance, no one doubts that it would be inexpedient to leave bridges in towns generally to be provided by private enterprise and paid by tolls.1

Again, there is an important class of cases in which the individuals have an adequate motive for rendering some service to society, but not for rendering as much service as it is in their power to render. These are cases in which competition is excluded by natural or artificial monopoly. Whenever an individual or group of individuals monopolise temporarily or permanently the production or sale of a commodity, the interests of the monopolists may conflict very materially with the interests of the community; since the demand for a monopolised commodity is often of such a nature that a greater total profit can be obtained from the sale of a smaller

1 Here I may appropriately notice the waste of time and trouble in forming business connexion, which seems inevitable under a competitive system. This may be illustrated by the sums spent by private traders on advertisements and in the promotion of joint-stock companies. Such expenditure constitutes a serious set-off against the economic advantages of competition: and we have to add to this the trouble and time spent in rendering services of comparatively small utility by traders who have not yet established a business connexion, or who are slowly losing business either through the pressure of competitors or through some other industrial change. This latter kind of waste may be prolonged almost indefinitely: since if an uneconomic superfluity of traders has been once established in any department, competition may take effect in distributing business, so as to keep the price of the traders' services high while keeping his remuneration low. The remarkable success of artisans' cooperative stores renders it probable that there is much waste of this kind in the ordinary business of small retail traders.

quantity, owing to the extent to which the price would fall if the supply were increased. The importance of this case, it may be observed, tends to increase as the opportunities for monopoly grow with the growth of civilisation: partly from the increasing advantages of industry on a large scale, partly from the increasing ease with which combination among the members of any class of producers is brought about and maintained.1

Combination resulting in monopoly may, as I have just shown, be a source of economic loss to the community. On the other hand, there are cases in which combined action or abstinence on the part of a whole class of producers is required to realise a certain utility, either at all or in the most economical way: and in such cases the intervention of Government, though not the only method of securing the result, is likely to be the most effective method. If, indeed, we could assume that all the persons concerned will act in the most intelligent way, the matter might be left to voluntary association; but in any community of human beings that we can hope to see, the most we can expect is that the great majority of any industrial class will be adequately enlightened, vigilant, and careful, in protecting their own interests and where the efforts and sacrifices of a great majority might be rendered useless by the neglect of one or two individuals, it would be dangerous to trust to voluntary association. The protection of land below the sea-level against floods, or of useful animals and plants against infectious diseases, are cases of this kind which we have already noticed.

And the ground for governmental interference is still stronger if the very fact of a combination among the great majority of an industrial class to attain a given result materially increases the inducement for individuals to stand

It is noteworthy that economic arguments to prove the advantage of "free competition" commonly assume that the notion of free competition excludes monopoly resulting from combination: and yet the governmental interference needed to repress such combination is manifestly contrary to Individualism as a political principle,-so far at least as the combination is the result of perfectly uncoerced choice on the part of the persons combining.

aloof from the combination. Thus, if it were ever so clearly the interest of shopkeepers to close their shops on Sundays or other holidays, provided the closing were universal, it would still be very difficult to effect the result by purely voluntary combination: since the closing of a great number of shops would obviously tend to throw custom into the hands of the few who kept their shops open.

Even where the need of uniformity is not imperative, voluntary combination is likely to be found inadequate for the attainment of results of public importance, if the interest of any individual in such results is indirect and uncertain; -as may easily be the case even though the public interest is plain and undeniable.

Finally, there are certain kinds of utility which Government, in a well-ordered modern community, is peculiarly adapted to provide. Thus, being financially more stable. than private individuals and companies, it can give completer security to creditors; and is thus specially adapted to undertake banking and insurance for the poor, and to bear the responsibilities of a paper currency for the community generally. So again, it enjoys special facilities for collecting and diffusing useful statistical information,-a point of growing importance in modern communities.

§ 3. I have said enough to show that, even in the ideal society of intelligent persons which is contemplated in the traditional argument for laisser faire, there is no reason to suppose that a purely individualistic organisation of industry would be the most effective and economical. And the reasons above given largely explain the extent to which in modern States the provision of utilities-other than security from wrong-is undertaken by Government in the name of the community, or subjected to special governmental regulations, instead of being left to private enterprise ; on the ground that the interests of the whole community will be better promoted by this arrangement. Thus certain portions of the surface of the globe-the original raw material and instrument of industry-have always been held in common, as obviously more useful when open to