be the safest guardians of their own pecuniary interests. Even among male adults it is not difficult to find instances of persons not insane, who are so recklessly passionate or self-indulgent, or so easily deluded, that a wise parent or friend would prefer to place any gift or bequest intended for their benefit in the hands of trustees. Still it remains broadly and generally true that this proposition is, as Mill says, an "elementary maxim of prudence" on which men commonly act without hesitation in their private affairs: and it is primarily on this ground of common experience that he maintains the validity of this maxim as a principle for the construction of the "ideally best polity;" though he appeals for confirmation to the specifically political experience which the history of oppressed classes in different ages and countries abundantly furnishes.

These and other fundamental assumptions of deductive politics we shall have to discuss more fully in subsequent chapters in which I shall consider carefully the limitations and exceptions to which they ought to be taken as subject. Here I will only say, that while it is a grave and not uncommon error to treat generalisations as to human conduct which are only approximately true as if they were universally and absolutely true, it is a no less serious mistake -and perhaps it is at the present time the more prevalent and dangerous mistake-to throw a rule aside as valueless, or treat it as having only a vague and indefinite validity, because we find it subject to important limitations and exceptions. Whereas the truth is, that in most cases our knowledge, in any real and important sense, of a general truth relating to human action and its motives and effects, develops pari passu with our knowledge of its limitations and exceptions: until we have a definite and clear apprehension of the latter, we cannot have a firm grasp of the former. This will, I think, be abundantly illustrated in the exposition of political principles that follows: I have said enough for the present to illustrate the general nature, and to give a prima facie justification, of the deductive method which I shall be mainly engaged in developing.

For myself, while I regard this method as useful and even indispensable, I quite admit the importance of bearing constantly in mind its inevitable limitations and imperfections. It must never be forgotten that no particular nation is composed of individuals having only the few simple and general characteristics which are all we can include in our conception of the civilised man to whom our abstract political reasoning relates. An actual nation consists of persons of whom the predominant number have, besides the general characteristics just mentioned, a certain vaguely defined complex of particular characteristics which we call the "national character" of Englishmen, Frenchmen, etc.; among which sentiments and habits of thought and action, formed by the previous history of the nation, must always occupy a prominent place: and a consideration of these particular characteristics may modify to an indefinite extent the conclusions arrived at by general deductive reasoning. Thus I may conclude, from the point of view of abstract theory, that by taking twelve plain men and shutting them up in a room till they are unanimous, I am likely to get but a blunt and clumsy instrument for the administration of criminal justice: but this defect may be more than compensated by the peculiar confidence placed in this instrument by a people whom the unbroken tradition of centuries has taught to regard trial by jury as the "palladium of its liberties." So again, no one constructing a legislative organ, composed of two chambers, for a newly-founded community of modern civilised men, would propose that membership of the second or revising chamber should be handed down from father to son, like a piece of private property: but, in a country that has long been led by a hereditary aristocracy, a chamber so appointed may have a valuable power of resistance to dangerous popular impulses which it may be difficult to obtain by any other mode of appointment.

These are questions which we shall afterwards have to discuss I only refer to them now by way of illustration; and in order to warn the reader that, in my opinion, no questions of this kind-regarded as practical problems presented for

solution to a particular nation at a particular time-can be absolutely and finally determined by the general deductive method which I shall try to work out in subsequent chapters. At the same time this general treatment of the subject cannot fail, in my opinion, to be useful, provided that we are not misled into regarding it as complete and final: useful, not merely as a preparatory exercise, but because considerations of the general kind with which we shall be concerned must always form an important part of the discussion of any question of practical politics, though they have to be combined with—and to a varying extent overruled by— considerations of a more special kind. Indeed the least reflection will show that in ordinary political discussions reference is continually made to propositions laid down as true of civilised man generally, not merely of the English species of civilised man. Why is strong resistance made to legislation interfering with freedom of contract? Because it is thought that men in general are likely to know their own interest better than any government can know it for them; or that they are likely to gain more in vigour of intellect and character by being left to manage their own affairs than they are likely to lose materially through foolish contracts. Why is it proposed to increase the number of peasant proprietors? Because it is thought that men in general will labour more energetically if they receive the whole advantage resulting from their labour. And, similarly, in other cases of current interest.

§ 4. The study of Politics, then, as I shall treat it, is concerned primarily with constructing on the basis of certain psychological premises the system of relations which ought to be established among the persons governing, and between them and the governed, in a society composed of civilised men, as we know them-of civilised men, we may say, in the last stage which has as yet been reached in the progress of civilisation. It has two main divisions, (1) one relating to the Functions of Government, and (2) the other to its Structure or Constitution; but it also includes as an important though less extensive division-an inquiry into

the relations that ought to exist between government and governed, besides such relations as are already defined in the determination of governmental functions. This last inquiry I have thought it most convenient to take after concluding the two first-mentioned divisions of the subject. Of these two main divisions, the first, in logical order of discussion, ought clearly to precede the second in investigating the best constitution we are considering the fitness of Government as an instrument to do a particular work and in such a consideration we obviously ought to get as clear an idea as possible of the work that has to be done before we proceed to consider how the instrument ought to be constituted. Let us begin, then, by considering the Functions of Government. Here, again, an obvious distinction suggests itself between Internal and External Functions-i.e. between the regulation of the action of government on the members of the community governed, and the management of its relations to other communities and individuals. Of these the former will naturally occupy our attention first, as being more essentially implied in our general notion of political society; since we can conceive-indeed many have looked forward to -the union of the human race under one "parliament of man"; or, again, we can conceive a political society so much. separated from others by physical barriers as to have no important external relations.

Of the Internal Functions of Government the establishment and administration of Law is admittedly the most important and to this accordingly our attention will be first directed. But before we proceed to the consideration of what Law and Government ought to be, it is desirable to undertake a preliminary inquiry into the characteristics that are essentially implied in the commonly received notions of Government and Law. To this we will proceed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICS

§ 1. AN eminent writer,1 who treats of the "Logic of Politics," distinguishes a "preliminary branch" of the science of Politics, which he regards as an essential preparation for a practical no less than for a purely theoretical study of the subject, though it does not itself include an answer to any practical questions. This preliminary study, he explains, deals with the structure and functions of government not as they ought to be but as they must be; that is, it teaches what is essentially involved in the idea of political government, and explains the necessary instruments and methods of government-laws and their sanctions, executive commands and judicial decisions, the establishment of rights and obligations, etc. Its aim is to make clear by discussion and definition these and other general notions that enter into our complex conception of political society; but it does not inquire into the operation and tendency of any particular kinds of laws or executive commands, or of any particular organisation of the judicature or any other governmental institutions; nor does it urge the preference of any one law or institution to any other. "It explains the meaning of monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, but does not teach which is the best form. It shows what is the nature of punishment, but does not say which punishments are the most efficacious. It explains the nature of a dependency, without arguing the question should colonies have a separate government?"

1 Mr. Bain, in his Logic; Induction, ch. viii.