Power. Political power, in an orderly society, is PAGES 597-599 599-602 2. The power exercised by any individual or body of persons 3. It is doubtful how far a body that can dismiss an organ of government is to be regarded as its political superior (1) if it can only dismiss at certain periodic intervals, or (2) if it is not completely capable of corporate action. 602-604 4. In a certain sense it is true that the mass of the people in any country is the ultimate depository of political power. But in other than democratic states this power is unconsciously possessed, unexercised, and largely un- feared. Still the wishes of the community impose some limits on governmental power, even in un- democratic communities, through the fear of disorder; and, for a similar reason, leaders of opinion outside Government have a share of political power. 5. If we ask where supreme political power rests in a State with a given governmental structure, we must extend further the assumption that it is "orderly"; we must take "order" to include performance of the assigned functions, on the part of the different organs of 6. The actual complexity in the distribution of political power will be further illustrated by considering the question "where supreme political power resides," in relation to the chief forms of Government distinguished 7. The effective physical force of different sections of the community is by no means proportioned to their numbers. A standing army of professional soldiers is therefore a source of danger to a State. 8. A moral right of insurrection, as an ultimate resource against misgovernment, must be admitted in a 607-611 611-616 616-618 618-623 CHAPTER I SCOPE AND METHOD OF POLITICS Aral questions, in our age and country, most persons ned from comparatively early years to pronounce 11 t conscious processes of reasoning, sometimes Acisions; sometimes arrived at intuitively, or at them. f rational processes of more or less length. The a free country-at least above a certain low ellectual development-are similarly accustomed nhesitatingly many, if not all, of the political ich the course of their national life brings before in this case, to a greater extent than in the former, the decisions are arrived at as the result of conscious reasoning from certain general principles or assumptions. Now the primary aim of the Political Theory that is here to be expounded is not to supply any entirely new method of obtaining reasoned answers to political questions; but rather, by careful reflection, to introduce greater clearness and consistency into the kind of thought and reasoning with which we are all more or less familiar. In order to arrive at sound conclusions on practical questions-I do not mean infallible conclusions, but conclusions as free from error as human beings, in the present stage of their development, can hope to reach-much detailed knowledge is needed which the general theory of politics cannot profess to give: it can only point out the nature of this further knowledge, and the sources from which it is to be obtained. The general B theory of politics ought to classify the considerations by which any given political question should be decided, and indicate their general bearing on the question: but the degree of weight to be attached to each species of considerations in any particular case has mostly to be learnt from experience: so that the main practical use of the theory is to show how experience is to be interrogated. Still, clearness and precision in our general political conceptions, definiteness and consistency in our fundamental assumptions and methods of reasoning, though they do not constitute anything like a complete protection against erroneous practical conclusions, are yet, I believe, of considerable practical value; and the systematic effort to acquire them deserves an important place in the intellectual training of a thoroughly educated man and citizen. We may appropriately begin by trying to attain clearness and precision in our general conception of the subject investigated. In the first place, it seems to me convenient and in accordance with usage to draw a distinction,which is sometimes overlooked,-between "Politics" and the "Social Science," or, as it is now most commonly called, Sociology. I take the former study as having a narrower scope than the latter: Sociology, as I conceive it, deals with human societies generally; Politics with political✓ or governed societies regarded as possessing government. The difference between the two subjects is not indeed great, if we merely consider the number of human beings included in either case; since the vast majority of mankind are, and have been in historical times, members of political or governed societies. Still, we know of inferior races who only exhibit this characteristic doubtfully and imperfectly: as Mr. Spencer points out (Princ. of Soc., § 228), "groups of Esquimaux, of Australians, of Bushmen, of Fuegians, are without even that primary contrast of parts implied by settled chieftainship. Their members are subject to no control but such as is temporarily acquired by the stronger, or more cunning, or more experienced." Such groups, therefore, lack what we now regard as an essential characteristic of political society, though they can hardly be excluded from the range of "Sociology" or the "Social Science."1 But we are more concerned to note that the members even of societies that have settled governments have relations to each other of the greatest importance, which, though they could hardly be maintained without government, are still, in the main, not determined by it: and, accordingly, in those branches of social science which. are primarily concerned with these other relations, the fact of government drops properly into the background. Consider, for instance, the industrial or professional system of modern communities, by which men are distinguished from and related to each other as physicians, teachers, masons, carpenters, etc. This vast system of relations, with all the minutely subdivided organisation of labour which it involves, has been in the main constructed without the direct action of government: though, no doubt, it could not be maintained without the enforcement, through governmental agency, of rights of property, contracts, etc.; and though it has been importantly modified-to a varying extent in different ages and countries-by direct governmental interference. Accordingly, it has been possible for the followers of Adam Smith to separate the study of the industrial organisation of society-under the name of "Political Economy "2-almost entirely from the study of its political organisation: and this separation I should in the main adopt, though I think it is liable to be carried too far. We have also to note-what is sometimes over 1 Even in the case of superior races, in a primitive condition, it is often difficult to find anything that can be properly called government-except during war. Thus Burckhardt (Notes on the Bedouins, i. pp. 115-6) tells us that though "every Arab tribe has its chief sheikh, and every camp is headed by a sheikh or at least by an Arab of some consideration," still "the sheikh has no actual authority over individuals . his commands would be treated with contempt, but deference" may be "paid to his advice." ... 2 In my Principles of Political Economy (Introduction, ch. ii. § 2) I have pointed out that the term "Political Economy" was originally used to denote an art rather than a science-the theory of right governmental management of national industry, and not the theory of the manner in which industry tends to organise itself independently of governmental interference. looked by writers who lay stress on the analogy between the organism of an individual man (or other animal) and the "social organism"-that human beings, considered in respect of their industrial or economic relations, fall into groups differing widely both in extent and in sharpness of definition from the groups into which they are combined by their political relations. Thus most of the citizens of any European community have, through foreign trade, economic relations of more or less importance with the members of some other communities: and not a few of them have a closer economic connection with some foreigners than they have with most of their fellow-citizens. I might further illustrate the foregoing remarks by referring to other relations of various kinds, by which civilised men, in the present age, are socially connected into groups not coinciding with either of those just discussed. Some of these groups-religious societies being the most important example-have a kind of government, and may therefore be called quasi-political; though, as they exist in modern states generally, they differ importantly from political societies in the strictest sense, the most important difference being that the government of such a quasi-political group cannot inflict on its members any (mundane) penalty more formidable than exclusion from membership. There are other groups again-for example, those constituted by the possession of a common language and literature-which have, as such, no government at all. But I have said enough to show that the fact of government is only a part, though a very important part, of the whole fact of social organisation; and to make clear the distinction I wish to draw between "Social Science" or or "Sociology," which treats of human society. generally, and "Politics," which treats of political societies regarded in their political aspect. § 2. The question, however, still remains how far Politics can be properly or advantageously separated from the general science of society. To this question J. S. Mill (Logic, B. VI. ch. ix. § 4) appears to give a decidedly negative answer. |