covered, that the law is higher than the magistrate, who administers it; that the constitution is higher than both; and that the supreme power, remaining with the people, is higher than all the three. With perfect consistency, therefore, the power of pardoning may subsist in our democratical governments: with perfect propriety, we think, it is vested in the president of the United States.

The constitution, too, of Pennsylvania, animated by the wise and powerful recommendation, conveyed, by innumerable channels, to the convention, which proposed and framed it," that they should imitate, as far as it applies, the excellent model exhibited in the constitution of the United States "-the constitution of Pennsylvania 1 vests the power of pardoning in the governor of the common'wealth.

It is by no means, however, a unanimous sentiment, if we collect the public sentiment from the constitutions of the different states of the Union, that the power of pardoning criminals should be vested solely in the supreme executive authority of the state.

By the constitution of New York,2 the governor, in cases of treason or murder, can only suspend the execution of the sentence, until it shall be reported to the legislature, at their subsequent meeting; and they shall either pardon, or direct the execution of the criminal, or grant a further reprieve.

In the state of Delaware the governor possesses the power of granting pardons, except where the law shall otherwise direct. A similar legislative control is imposed on the governors of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, by the constitutions of those states.5

1 Art. 2, s. 9.

2 S. 18.

3 Cons. Del. s. 7.

Cons. Mar. s. 33. Cons. Vir. p. 127. Cons. N. C. s. 19.

By the present constitution of Delaware, this legislative control over the power of the governor to grant pardons is destroyed-Art. 3, s. 9.

In the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts and South Carolina, pardons can be granted only after a conviction.1

The president and vice-president hold their offices dur ing the term of four years.

The president shall, at stated times, receive, for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period, for which he is elected; and he shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

I here finish what I propose to say concerning the second great division of the national government-its executive authority.

In Vermont, the power of the executive to grant pardons is restrained in cases of treason and murder; in which they have power "to grant reprieves, but not to pardon, until after the end of the next session of assembly." Cons. c. 2, s. 11. By the constitution of Kentucky, the power of pardoning is, in cases of treason, vested in the general assembly, but the governor may grant reprieves until the end of their next session. Art. 3, s. 11. In Tennessee and Ohio, pardons can be granted only after conviction. Cons. Tenn. art. 2, s. 6; Cons. Ohio, art. 2, s. 5. In Georgia likewise, according to her present constitution, the governor can grant pardons only after conviction; and in cases of treason and murder, he can only respite the execution, and make report thereof to the next general assembly, by whom a pardon may be granted. Cons. Geor. art. 2, s. 7. Ed.

1 Cons. N. H. pp. 18, 19. Cons. Mass. c. 2, ss. 1, 8. 2, s. 7.

Cons. S. C. art.

[The nature, extent and effect of the pardoning power and its exercise have been frequently determined. The most notable and instructive instances are found in the cases of Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Cummings v. U. S., Id. 277; Carlisle v. U. S., 16 Wall. 147, and Armstrong v. U. S., 13 Wall. 154.]

CHAPTER III.

OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

THE judicial power of the United States is vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as are established by congress.1

A court, according to my Lord Coke,' is a place where justice is judicially administered.3

To Egypt, where much wisdom, we are assured, was to be learned, we trace the first institution of courts of justice. Concerning its administration, the Egyptians were remarkably vigilant and exact; for they believed, that on it depended entirely the support or the dissolution of society. Their highest tribunal was composed of thirty judges. At the head of it was placed the person, who at once, possessed the greatest share of wisdom, of probity, and of the public esteem.

1 Cons. U. S. art. 3, s. 1.

2 1 Ins. 58.

[ This definition of a court seems entirely inadequate, it merely describes how and what is done-viz., justice is judicially administered and denominates the court as a place.

The following seem to be essential elements: A court is a tribunal consisting of one or more persons. A court is a tribunal established by law, with power to hear controversies between persons and administer relief or punishment in accordance with established rules of law.

“To administer justice judicially” is too indefinite to convey the information essential to a definition, and does not suit the modern idea of separating the legislative from the judicial power.

See Dillon's Lectures Law and Jurisprudence, p. 31-2, referring to Chicago & C. Ry. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418.]

+1 Gog. Or. L. 55.

The trials, it is said, were carried on in writing; and, to avoid unnecessary delay, the parties were allowed to make only one reply on each side. When the evidence was closed, the judges consulted together concerning the merits of the cause. When they were fully understood and considered, the president gave the signal for proceeding to a judgment, by taking in his hand a small image, adorned with precious stones. When the sentence was pronounced, the president touched, with the image, the party, who had gained his cause. The image was without eyes; and was the symbol, by which the Egyptians were accustomed to represent Truth. It is probably from this circumstance, that Justice has been painted blind.

The judges of this court received from government what was necessary for their support; so that the people paid them nothing for obtaining justice.

We are told, that no advocates were admitted in this tribunal; but that the parties themselves drew up their own processes. This, however, must probably be understood with some limitation; for we cannot reasonably imagine, that all the inhabitants of Egypt were not only taught to write, but were also possessed of a degree of legal skill, sufficient to qualify them for composing their own defences. It is not unlikely, that the regulation went no farther than one, which we have seen adopted in another state-Every one has a right to be heard by himself and his counsel.

On the model of this high tribunal of Egypt, was formed the celebrated court of the Areopagus at Athens. This court was instituted, one thousand and five hundred years before the Christian era, by Cecrops, who was originally of Sais, a city of the lower Egypt, and to whom Athens, the seat of literature and politeness, of eloquence and patriotism, owed its foundation and first establishments.

This excellent man relinquished the fertile banks of

the Nile, in order to avoid the tyranny, under which his native country, at that time, groaned. After a tedious voyage, he reached the shores of Attica; and was received in the most friendly manner by its inhabitants. Placed, after some time, at the head of their affairs, he conceived the noble design of bestowing happiness on his adopted country. For this purpose, he introduced among his new compatriots many valuable and memorable institutions, of which, indeed, he was not strictly the authorif he had, he would have been the first of legislators and the greatest of mortals-but which he brought, probably with his own judicious improvements, from a nation, who had been attentive to carry them to perfection during a long series of ages. Some of his institutions in all of them wisdom and humanity shone conspicuous—will claim our future attention. At present, it is directed to the court of the Areopagus.

Aristides-well qualified to decide upon this subject; for he was distinguished by the appellation of the just-informs us, that this court was the most sacred and venerable tribunal in all Greece. From its first establishment, it never pronounced a sentence, which gave reasonable cause of complaint. Strangers, even sovereigns, solicited and submitted to its decisions; which contributed, more than anything else, to disseminate the principles of justice first among the Grecians.1

The proceedings in this tribunal were, in some instances, very solemn and striking. In a prosecution for murder, the prosecutor was obliged to swear, that he was related to the person deceased-for none but near relations could prosecute-and that the prisoner was the cause of his death. The prisoner swore, that he was innocent of the crime, of which he was accused. Each confirmed his oath with the most direful imprecations; wishing that, if he

12 Gog. Or. L. 16, 21. 1 Anac. 11.