we have worked out the lessons of common cases. not, therefore, join in the full cry against anomalies; in my judgment it may quickly overrun the scent, and so miss what we should be glad to find.
Subject to this saving remark, however, I not only admit, but maintain, that our constitution is full of curious oddities, which are impeding and mischievous, and ought to be struck out. Our law very often reminds one of those outskirts of cities where you cannot for a long time tell how the streets come to wind about in so capricious and serpent-like a manner. At last it strikes you that they grew up, house by house, on the devious tracks of the old green lanes; and if you follow on to the existing fields, you may often find the change half complete. Just so the lines of our constitution were framed in old eras of sparse population, few wants, and simple habits; and we adhere in seeming to their shape, though civilisation has come with its dangers, complications, and enjoyments. These anomalies, in a hundred instances, mark the old boundaries of a constitutional struggle. The casual line was traced according to the strength of deceased combatants; succeeding generations fought elsewhere; and the hesitating line of a half-drawn battle was left to stand for a perpetual limit.
I do not count as an anomaly the existence of our double government, with all its infinite accidents, though half the superficial peculiarities that are often complained of arise out of it. The co-existence of a Queen's seeming prerogative and a Downing Street's real government is
just suited to such a country as this, in such an age as ours." *
So well is our real Government concealed, that if you tell a cabman to drive to "Downing Street," he most likely will never have heard of it, and will not in the least know where to take you. It is only a "disguised republic" which is suited to such a being as the Englishman in such a century as the nineteenth.
Ambassador, duty of, 120
America, connection between legis-
lature and executive in, 17;
greatest of presidential coun-
tries, 20; the Electoral College
of, 24, 25, 31, 131, 256
American Congress, lix.-lxx., 17,
18, 24, 27, 170, 223, 228; Con-
stitution, the, Introduction,
lviii.-ix., 58, 82, 98, 111, 131,
202, 220-229, 286; President,
the, 131, 153, 154, 190, 223;
war, the, civil, 30, 31, 87, 220,
227
Americans, elective first magistrate
and, 12; and newspapers, 22;
and Queen's letter to Mrs.
Lincoln, 38: une vrai peuple
moderne, 286
Aristocracy, power in constitu-
encies, 167, 210
Army and Navy, the, administration
of, 215
Assembly, the French, liv.-lv.; the
National, lv.
Athenians, the, 37
Australia, 252, 263
Aylesbury case, the, 99
BALANCES, checks and, of English
Constitution, 219-253. See
Supposed Checks
Bavaria, 195
Bedford, Duke of, 95
Bill, Reform, of 1867, xvi., xxv.,
xxvi.
Bismarck, 204, 249
Board of Trade, the, 215
Bolingbroke, Lord, 140, 164
Bosworth, Battle of, 278
Breckenridge, Mr., 24, 131
Bright, John, xvi., xxxix., 121, 166
Brougham, Lord, 114, 140, 141
Buckingham Palace, 50, 51
Budget, method of preparation,
217, 218
Bureaucracy,
most shallow of
Governments, 194; inconsis-
tent with art of business, 197-
199
Burke, Edmund, 79, 166, 193
Butler, Samuel, 80
CABINET and Foreign Treaties, the,
xli.-liii.; 1-32; meaning of,
11; a board of control, 13; &
combining committee, 14;
fusion of two powers, 15; com-
parison with Presidential
system, 16, 17; educator of the
nation, 19; system and de-
bates, 20, 21; how elected, 24;
special advantages of constitu-
tion, 28; crisis and change,
29; leading statesmen become
household ideas, 31; un-royal
form of Cabinet government,
66-72; management of House
of Commons, 127; check of, in
finance, 137; outside influence,
239
Government, the pre-
requisites of, and peculiar form
which they have assumed in
England, 254-271; a double
set of conditions, 254; mutual
confidence and trust, 256;
national mind and rationality,
257; rarity of a competent
legislature, 258; originally a
preservative body, 259; an
adjusting legislature, 260; con-
ditions of fitness, 261; of satis-
factory election, 262-265; the
deferential nation, 265-270;
England the type of, 266; the
theatrical show, 267; unstable
equilibrium, 270, 271
Campbell, Lord, 114
Canada, 101
Chadwick, Mr., 189, 190
Chambers, the French, 171
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the,
17; enemy of the Exchequer,
213, 217;"Comptrollership of
the," 213; Lord Chancellor, 213
Charlemagne, 81
Charles II., 50, 283
Charter, the Great, 280, 281;
"Select Charters " (Stubbs),
Chatham, Lord, 29, 67, 79, 114
Checks and balances, 3. See Sup-
posed Checks, etc.
Chesterfield, Lord, 115
China, 101, 110
Cobden, xxxix., 142
Code Napoleon, xxxiii., 196
Colonial Office, the, 216, 235;
governors, 234-236
Columbus, 119
Commons, the House of, effect of
Reform Act of 1867, xxv.-li.,
13, 14, 15, 46, 47, 57, 60, 62,
66, 89, 96, 99, 100, 107, 108;
no leisure, greatest defect of,
109, 112, 114; and Cabinet,
127, 130, 175; its main func-
tion, 130; relations to Premier,
131, 132; importance of elec-
tive function, 132; the expres-
sive function, 133; the teach-
ing function, 133; informing
function, 133, 172-175; func-
tion of legislation,
135;
"special acts and statutes,
135; financial function, 136;
principal of taxation, 136;
check of the Cabinet, 137;
government by a public meet-
ing, 138-140, 145; principle
of party inherent, 142; modera-
tion needful, 144, 155; diffi-
culties of an Opposition coming
into power, 144-145; consti-
tuency and parliamentary
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government, 146; ultra-demo-
cratic theory, 146; Mr. Hare's
scheme, 150; compulsory and
voluntary constituencies, 151-
158; free government and self-
government, 159; parliament
of 1859, 161; the landed in-
terest, 163; reason for parlia-
mentary reform, 166; embodi-
ment and expression of public
opinion, 168; teaching task
not well done, 169, 170; com-
parison of debates with Ameri-
can, French, 171; "protected
ability," 171; the prime
minister, 169; ultimate autho-
rity in English Constitution,
227; growth of, 277
Comyn's "Digest," 58
Constitution, the English, vii.-liii;
false descriptions of, 2; theory
of "Checks and Balances," 3;
dignified and efficient parts,
4, 13; theatrical elements in,
8; characteristic merit of old
institutions, 9, 10; errors as
to power of sovereign, 57; old
Constitution gave power which
present does not, 77; error
concerning, 176; the English
as model for American, 220-
229; its safety valve and regu-
lator, 229. See also Cabinet,
Monarchy, History; American
Federal, see American
Conyngham, Marchioness of, 72
Corn Laws, the, 100, 104, 121, 122
Corporation of the City of London,
288, 289
Court, after Middle Ages, 47;
arguments for and against a,
50-52; the French, 51, 52
Court Circular, the, 38
Cranbourne, Lord (Lord Salisbury),
177
Cromwell, 49, 282, 283
Crown, The, power of, xxxviii. ;
checks on, xxxix.-xlii., 12, 42,
53, 288
DARBY GRIFFITH, 181
Darwin, 250, 251
Davis, Jefferson, 18
Delaware, State of, 98
Derby, Lord, xi, xxvii, xxxiv, 45,
68; and Duke of Wellington,
100-104, 121
George I., 42, 50, 53, 83
George II., 42, 50, 53, 83
George III., 42, 43, 50, 53, 58, 60,
61, 67, 70, 77, 79, 80, 83, 86,
87, 225, 232, 238, 247, 254, 285,
289
George IV., 53, 72, 83, 247, 285
Germany, functionary systems, 196
Gladstone, W. E., xviii., xxi., 31,
153, 176, 177, 217
Goethe, 78
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