exigencies of the next northern campaign. On the 11th of November and 2d December he submitted to congress a plan of operations for the ensuing year, both at the north and on the Hudson, and pointed out what was requisite in troops, provisions, artillery, ammunition, fortifications, and naval force. He informed General Washington on the 30th January, 1777, that the ensuing campaign would require at Ticonderoga, ten thousand men, besides two thousand men more, for the several points of communication, and for Fort Schuyler on the Mohawk. His orders to every branch of his department, and his advice to congress, to General Washington, to the authorities in the New England states, and in his own state, were comprehensive, provident, wise, skilful, patriotic, and almost incessant. He did all that the efforts of any one individual could do for the public service, until the 20th of March, when he went to Philadelphia and found himself superseded in effect by General Gates, in his northern command. The orders he had given for the security of Ticonderoga, and the letters he had written to that effect prior to that event, would fill a volume.

He took his seat in congress as a delegate from New York, and at his request, a committee of inquiry was instituted to examine into his military conduct. The satisfaction afforded was prompt and complete, and by the resolution of congress of the 22d of May, he was directed to resume the command of the northern department of New York, consisting of Albany, Ticonderoga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies. During the interval of two months that he was in Philadelphia, he was bestowing on the public interests, his usual vigilance. Being the second major-general in the armies of the United States, (General Lee only being his superior,) he was in active command on the Delaware, directing fortifications, and accelerating troops and provisions to the commander-in-chief. He also contributed most essentially while in congress to reorganize the commissary department.

But the storm that was gathering on the frontiers of his native state, soon engrossed all his attention, and he went into the command with an ardor and vigor that can scarcely be conceived. He arrived in Albany on the 3d of June, where he met General Gates. The latter, offended with congress for not allowing him to remain commander-in-chief at the north, and unwilling at any rate to serve under SCHUYLER, who offered him the command at Ticonderoga, he, at his own request, had leave to withdraw from the department. Nothing, literally nothing, he observed, had been done during his

absence, to improve the means of defence on the frontiers. Nothing had been done, comparatively speaking, to supply Ticonderoga with provisions. But General SCHUYLER was fortunately in this season in good health, a blessing which he had not enjoyed the last two years. He now displayed his activity, fervor, and energy in a brilliant manner. General St. Clair was placed by him in the command at Ticonderoga, and specially directed to fortify Mount Indepen· dence. He informed Congress, on the 14th of June, that considering the extensiveness of the works at Ticonderoga, the smallness of the garrison was alarming, and incompetent to maintain it, and that he found the department in the greatest confusion. Application was made to the eastern states to hasten on the remainder of their troops, and he informed them that the garrison at Ticonderoga did not then exceed two thousand two hundred men, sick included. On the 16th of June, General Washington was apprised by him of the fact that he had no troops to oppose to Sir John Johnson on the Mohawk. He visited Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on the 20th, and found them not in a good state of defence, and very deficient in troops and provisions; but it was resolved, at a council of officers called by him, that they be defended as long as possible. General SCHUYLER then hastened back to the Hudson, the more effectually to provide for the garrison, reinforcements of provisions and men, and nothing conducive to that great object was omitted. He solicited reinforcements of every kind with intense anxiety. On the 28th of June, he communicated by expresses to General Washington, to the governor of Connecticut, to the president of Massachusetts, to the committee of Berkshire, and to the committee of safety of New York, his apprehensions for the safety of the garrison at Ticonderoga, from the inadequacy of the means of defence. On the 28th and 30th of June, (for dates now become important,) he encouraged St. Clair, that he should move up with the continental troops and militia, as soon as he could possibly set them in motion, and "he hoped to have the pleasure of seeing him in possession of his post." So again on the 5th of July, he assured him the troops from Peekskill, and the militia were in motion, and "he hoped to see him in a day or two." On the 7th, he informed General Washington by letter, that he was up as far as Saratoga, with about seven hundred continental troops, and about one thousand four hundred militia. He was then in the utmost distress for provisions, and he then and there met the news, that General St. Clair had abandoned

Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on the 6th, with the loss of all his military equipments.

These posts were evacuated upon the advice of a council of officers, founded on the extreme weakness of the garrison, the extensiveness of the works, and an insufficiency of provisions. But General SCHUYLER had given no order for the evacuation. It was done without his advice, direction, or knowledge. It was as much a matter of surprise to him, as to the country. He expected to have been able in a few days to have joined General St. Clair with a very considerable body of troops, and he observed most truly in a letter of the 14th of July, to Chief Justice Jay, "that if Ticonderoga was not sufficiently fortified and supplied with provisions, it was not his fault; if there was a want of men he was not to blame."

The last scene of General SCHUYLER'S military life, was full of action befitting the occasion, and worthy of his character. Every quarter of his department was replete with difficulty and danger. The frontier on the Mohawk was menaced by an army of one thousand six hundred regulars, tories, and Indians, under LieutenantColonel St. Leger, and he cheered and encouraged Brigadier-General Herkimer to rouse the militia, and act with alacrity in defence of that frontier. He addressed the civil and military authorities in every direction, with manly firmness, and the most forcible exhortation to assist him with men, arms, and provisions, "every militia man,” he said, "ought to turn out without delay, in a crisis the most alarming since the contest began." He directed that the inhabitants retire from before the enemy, and that every article be brought off or destroyed, that was calculated to assist them-that the roads, causeways, and Wood Creek be rendered impassable. He issued a proclamation to encourage the country, and counteract that of Burgoyne. He assured General Washington, on the 12th of July, that he should retard the enemy's advance by all possible means. "If my countrymen will support me with vigor and dexterity, and do not meanly despond, we shall be able to prevent the enemy from penetrating much further into the country."

St. Clair had not above three thousand five hundred men when he evacuated Ticonderoga, and he joined SCHUYLER with only one thousand five hundred, as the militia, almost to a man, had deserted him, and gone home. Nixon's and Glover's brigades had been ordered by General Washington from Peekskill, to reinforce ScHUYLER, and when the former brigade arrived on the 14th of July, it amounted only to five hundred and seventy-five men, so that Gene

ral SCHUYLER's whole strength did not then exceed four thousand five hundred men, including regulars and militia; and they were without shelter, or artillery, and sickness, distress and desertion prevailed. The enemy whose triumphant progress he had to check, amounted to upwards of six thousand regular troops, with the best equipments in arms and artillery. Fort George was abandoned on the 14th of July, for it was utterly indefensible, being only part of an unfinished bastion holding one hundred and fifty men. On the 24th of July, SCHUYLER retired with his army to More's Creek, four miles below Fort Edward, as the latter was only a heap of ruins, and always commanded by the neighboring hills. The enemy kept pressing upon his advanced posts, but in the midst of unparalleled difficulties, his retreat was slow and safe, and every inch of ground disputed. The distress of the army, in want of artillery and every other military and comfortable equipment, was aggravated by despondency and sickness, and the restlessness and insubordination of the militia. They could not be detained. Almost all the eastern militia had left the army. By the advice of a council of general officers, SCHUYLER was obliged to let one half of the militia go home under a promise of the residue to continue for three weeks. Though the subject of popular calumny, he did not in the least despond or shrink from his duty. "I shall go on," he writes to General Washington, "in doing my duty, and in endeavors to deserve your esteem." He renewed his call on the eastern states for assistance, and told his friend, Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, (whom he always mentioned with the highest esteem, and between whom a mutual confidence and attachment had invariably subsisted,) that "if the eastern militia did not turn out with spirit, and behave better, we should be ruined." The greatest reliance was placed on the efforts of his own more immediate countrymen, and his most pathetic and eloquent appeals were made to the council of safety of the state of New York, for succors to enable him to meet the enemy in the field. By the beginning of August, he was preparing to act on the offensive, and by his orders of the 30th of July and 13th of August. General Lincoln was directed to move with a body of troops to the north of Cambridge, towards Skeensborough, and take command of the troops under General Stark, and Colonel Warner, who had orders to join him; and if he should have force enough, to fall on the enemy in that quarter. As Burgoyne advanced down the Hudson, there was constant skirmishing at the advanced posts, and General SCHUYLER retreated slowly, and in good order down to Saratoga, and then to

and below Stillwater, and in every instance by the unanimous advice of his officers.

During this eventful period, the western branch of SCHUYLER'S military district was in the utmost consternation and peril. The army under St. Leger had besieged Fort Stanwix, and General Herkimer, with eight hundred of the frontier militia, marching to the relief of the fortress, was attacked by a detachment of the enemy, under Sir John Johnson, and defeated at Oriskany, on the 6th of August. On the 16th, General SCHUYLER despatched Arnold with three regiments, amounting in the whole only to five hundred and fifty men, to take charge of the military operations on the Mohawk.

But the period of his eminent services was drawing to a close. Congress, yielding to the clamor and calumny of the people and militia of the eastern states, suspended General SCHUYLER'S command, and on the 19th of August, (three days after the victory at Bennington,) General Gates arrived in camp, and superseded him. General SCHUYLER felt acutely the discredit of being recalled in the most critical period of the campaign, and after the labor and activity of making preparations to repair the disasters of it, had been expended by him, and when he was in vigorous preparation to win, and almost in the act to place the laurels of victory on his brow. "I am sensible," said this great and injured man, in his letter to congress, "of the indignity of being ordered from the command of the army, at a time when an engagement must soon take place;" and when, we may add, he had already commenced offensive operations, and laid the foundation of future and glorious triumphs.

to act.

Though he was directed by the order of congress of the 1st of August, to repair to head-quarters, he was afterwards allowed by the resolution of congress of the 14th November, to attend to his private affairs, "as they had greatly suffered by the barbarous ravages of the British army," until the committee of inquiry were ready This preeminent patriot, statesman, and soldier, rising above all mean resentments, continued his correspondence with congress, and afforded his valuable counsel. He even tendered to them his gratuitous services as a private gentleman, in any way in which he could be useful. As president of the board of commissioners for Indian affairs, he gave specific advice respecting the conduct of the six nations, and he recommended preparations to carry the war into their territories; and his counsel eventually terminated in the expedition under General Sullivan, in 1779.