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But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his manners, he may withal use sentences.

A deliberative oration is more difficult than a judicial, because 'tis of the future, whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the law; and it is easier to prove from principles than without.

Besides, a deliberative oration wants those helps of turning to the adversary; of speaking of himself; of raising passion.

He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise.

And in demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his father, or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves.

He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his manners; but he that has no proof, let him, nevertheless, insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable as an exact oration.

Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the comparison of contraries, namely, truth and falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear.

Confutation is also a part of proof.

And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs, unless the controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before.

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own oration, by removing the objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man, and his oration, that is damned beforehand.

If a man desire his manners should appear well (lest speaking of himself he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous), let him introduce another person.

Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with sentences; but such as have the same force. As here is an enthememe: "If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our fortune is entire.» And this is a sentence of equal force to it: "Wise men make peace, while their fortune is entire.»

XVII. OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS

THE HE times wherein 'tis fit to ask one's adversary a question are chiefly four. 1. The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by interrogation draw him to confess the other. 2. The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question; then the interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred, without adding that proposition which is manifest.

3. The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself.

4. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these; in some sort 'tis so, in some sort 'tis not so.

Out of these cases 'tis not fit to interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not is thought vanquished.

To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.

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To interrogations which we foresee tend to draw from us an answer, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our answer, presently give an answer to the objection which is implied in the question.

And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we must, together with our answer, presently distinguish.

Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave discourse is deluded by jests.

The several kinds of jests are set down in the art of poetry.

Whereof one kind is irony, and tends to please oneself.

The other is scurrility, and tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness; the former may become a man of good breeding.

THE

XVIII. OF THE PERORATION

HE peroration must consist of one of these four things. Inclining the judge to favor yourself, or to disfavor your adversary. For then, when all has been said respecting the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.

Of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said. Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his oration, and how: namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.

Complete. From the text of Bohn.

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JOHN LOCKE

(1632-1704)

OHN LOCKE, one of the greatest thinkers of modern times, was born in the county of Somerset, England, August 29th, 1632. His father was an opponent of royal prerogative, "a strict but genial Puritan," and his influence had much to do, no doubt, with making Locke the champion of the idea that the governed are the true source of all political power, and that government to be just must be representative. He was educated at Westminster School and at Oxford. His essay "Concerning the Human Understanding," which was written during the intervals of nearly twenty years, appeared in 1690. Supplementing the essay on "Toleration» (1689), it exerted a revolutionary influence on the thought of the civilized world. The essay, "On the Conduct of the Understanding," was originally intended to conclude the essay "Concerning the Human Understanding," but Locke withheld it, and it did not appear until after his death, which occurred October 28th, 1704.

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REMEDIES OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS

NO REMEDY the defects of speech to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it. REMEDY TO USE NO WORD WITHOUT AN IDEA.- Firstly, a man should take care to use no word without a signification, no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words, as instinct, sympathy, and antipathy, etc., in the discourse of others, so made use of as he might easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to which they applied them; but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words and any ideas, these, and any other may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men, who have no ideas in their minds to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

TO HAVE DISTINCT IDEAS ANNEXED TO THEM IN MODES.-Secondly, it is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas: those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, i. e., the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind with that sound annexed

to it, as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words; which, having no settled objects in nature from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. Justice is a word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loose signification; which will always be so unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of: and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up; and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or any other. I do not say a man need stand to recollect and make this analysis at large every time the word justice comes in his way; but this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex idea of justice to be such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others.

DISTINCT AND CONFORMABLE IN SUBSTANCES.-In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined ideas. In these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more largely by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about truth. And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to common conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life, yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses; and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs; and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

PROPRIETY. Thirdly, it is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to apply their words, as near as may be, to such ideas as common use has annexed them to. For words, especially of languages already framed, being no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleasure, to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or, at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage; and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in the names of moral words. The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those who in their writings and discourses appear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words, according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be understood, yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him who is so unskillful in the language he speaks as not to understand it when made use of as it ought to be.

TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR MEANING.- Fourthly, but because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for; and because men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new words (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty) or else must use old ones in a new signification; therefore, after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for ascertaining the signification of words, to declare their meaning; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most names of very complex ideas) or where the term, being very material in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.

AND THAT THREE WAYS.-As the ideas men's words stand for are of different sorts, so the way of making known the ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For though defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words, yet there are some words that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise meaning cannot be made known but by definition; and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and substances.

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IN SIMPLE IDEAS, BY SYNONYMOUS TERMS, OR SHOWING.- First, when a makes use of the name of any simple idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged by the laws of ingenuity, and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition; and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. First, sometimes the naming the subject, wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name to be understood by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make a countryman understand what feuille-morte color signifies, it may suffice to tell him it is the color of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple idea is by presenting to his senses that subject which may produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea that word stands for. IN MIXED MODES, BY DEFINITION.-Secondly, mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, being most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing; the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing; but, in recompense thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of several ideas, that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the ideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct.

From the essay "On the Conduct of the Human Understanding."

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