general election.1 If the new Parliament is favourable to the views of the Governor's nominees, he and they have secured a victory. If not, the question remains as before. Practically, therefore, the verdict of Parliament settles the composition of the Cabinet.

What really happens is this. When a Ministry is defeated in Parliament or at the polls, its members tender their resignations to the Governor, whose duty it is to announce his intention of accepting them.2 The outgoing Premier generally suggests to the Governor the name of the most prominent of his opponents, probably the man whose speech has resulted in the vote which has convinced the Premier of the hopelessness of his position. Thereupon the Governor "sends for" the individual suggested, and, if the latter feels himself in a position to take up the reins of government, he endeavours to form a Ministry. If he fails, he informs the Governor of the fact, and the Governor then applies to some one else. Here comes in the most delicate part of a Governor's duty. It is precisely when the claims of two or more parliamentary leaders are nearly equal, that he must decide whether he will follow the suggestions of the unsuccessful aspirants, or use his own discretion. It may seriously damage the reputation of a community to be apparently unable to find a government, and the Governor is bound to use his influence to prevent delay. At the same time, his constitutional position precludes him from giving a shadow of assistance to any party. During the momentous interval, Parliament usually adjourns.

Ultimately, some one succeeds in finding a body of followers with whom he thinks he can conduct the administration of the community, and amongst them he distributes the Cabinet offices. These may now be ten in number, and may be distributed in any way.3 There need not be ten different holders of offices, but no individual may draw the salaries of two or

1 This was the great doctrine settled by the precedent of 1784, when the king, at the request of Pitt, and against the vehement protests of the House of Commons, dissolved Parliament. The result abundantly justified Mr. Pitt's expectations.

2 He does not actually accept the resignations at once, for then there would be vacancies in the offices, and business would be at a standstill. There is appar

3 Constitution Act Amendment Act 1890, §§ 13 and 16. ently no limit to the number of unsalaried offices.

CHAP. XXX

FORMATION OF A CABINET

2

273

more offices.1 The distribution is first arranged by the proposed Ministers themselves, and then submitted to the Governor for approval. Unless the list contains the name of any one against whom very serious objections exist, or proposes a new and revolutionary arrangement, the Governor always adopts it, and proceeds to carry it into effect by appointing the persons named to their various offices. Immediately before this he accepts the resignations of the outgoing Ministers, which have been previously tendered. He also appoints to seats in the Executive Council such members of the new Ministry as do not already hold them. The outgoing Ministers still nominally hold seats in the Executive Council, but they never attend its meetings, and it is, in fact, of the essence of Cabinet Government that they should not do so, except on purely formal occasions. If need be, they can be dismissed, but such an extreme measure is, practically, never resorted to.5

Now begins the testing of the new Ministry. Their seats in Parliament being vacated by their acceptance of office, they go before their constituencies, and, if their opponents see a chance, opposition candidates are run. The result of these elections usually decides the attitude of the Opposition in Parliament. But it may decline to adopt the verdict of the elections, and may succeed in seriously embarrassing the Government, even though the Ministers are returned. In such

a case, the Ministry may ask for a dissolution. The principle which decides a Governor in granting or refusing such a request is the probability of success for the Ministry in the event of its being granted. This of course depends on many circumstances, the chief of which is the age of the Parliament. If the Assembly has quite recently been elected, there is, usually, no claim for a dissolution; the Ministry must resign, and another must be formed. If a dissolution is granted, the result decides absolutely the fate of the Ministry.

1 § 21.

3 Cf. ibid.

2 Cf. e.g. Gov. Gazette, 18th Feb. 1886.
Ibid.

5 The power of removal was expressly conferred on Governor Sir Henry Barkly by sign-manual of the 10th March 1859 (Original in Treasury Buildings, Melbourne). And it was publicly stated by Sir Henry Barkly in his message to the Legislative Assembly of 11th Jan. 1859, that it was the intention of the Colonial Office that Executive Councillors who had lost the confidence of the local legislature should resign (V. and P. (L. A.), 11th Jan. 1858-9). See the whole process worked out in G. G., 1890, 5th and 11th Nov.

T

We have thus seen how the apparent liberty of the Governor in choosing his Executive Council is practically limited by constitutional machinery. We have now to consider how the power of the Executive Council, in disposing of the other patronage of the Crown, is controlled.

Briefly, there are two aspects of the question, dismissal and appointment. With regard to the first, the power of the Cabinet was at one time practically omnipotent. Subject only to the odium which such a course involved, a Cabinet could dismiss at a moment's notice almost the whole executive of the colony, from the heads of departments down to the telegraph boys. All held their appointments during the pleasure of the Crown, and the pleasure of the Crown meant, in such a case, the pleasure of the Cabinet. As a matter of fact, the power of dismissal was at least once in Victoria used as a powerful weapon in a party conflict.

But the effectiveness of the weapon has been greatly diminished by alterations recently introduced. Appointments and dismissals are still made by the Executive Council, but they must follow precisely defined rules. No appointment can be made except upon the request of a permanent head of a department and upon the certificate of the Public Service Board (a "non-political" body), which, in giving its certificate, names the person entitled to the appointment by strict statutory provisions; and no official can be dismissed or punished (save for proved misconduct) except by the Public Service Board with the consent of the Executive Council.1 is these rules, and the consequences which follow from them, which make the politics of Victoria so different from those of America. In America the famous "Spoils" system makes every official, down to the bow oar of the pilot's boat, a keen partisan and a determined supporter of the Government. knows that if his party is defeated he must lose his post, and he will strain every nerve to prevent defeat. In Victoria the holders of official positions, at least the younger members of the service, are largely indifferent to the rise and fall of Governments. One very obvious result of the fact is that the party system is dying a natural death in Victoria.

He

Before leaving the Executive Council, we may say a word

1 Public Service Act 1890, §§ 32 and 121.

CHAP. XXX THE TWO PHASES OF THE COUNCIL

275

or two as to its methods of doing business. We have already discussed its legislative functions, we have now to consider it in its purely executive capacity.

It will have been observed that the Executive Council has an ideal and an actual existence. Ideally, it contains all the persons who have ever been appointed to it, except those who have died or been deprived of their seats.1 In this form the Executive Council never meets. It has been suggested that it should assemble on great ceremonial occasions, such as the arrival of a new Governor, and that its ranks should be recruited from the most distinguished members of the community, irrespective of their political importance. This is the practice followed in England with the Privy Council, but the suggestion does not seem to find much favour in Victoria.

Even in its active phase, however, that of the existing Ministry, the Executive Council has two shapes, the formal and the informal. The latter, which is usually spoken of as the Cabinet," is the real core and essence of the Government. In its private meetings at the Premier's offices no one is admitted but the actual Ministry of the day, no records of the meetings transpire, and no official notice is ever taken of the proceedings. (This was the type of meeting so distasteful to the English patriots of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the meeting stigmatised as "Junto" and "Cabal," but which has proved so necessary that it has become the pivot of the Imperial system of government.) The former is the "Executive Council" proper, presided over by the Governor, and attended by the clerk, who keeps a formal record of its proceedings. Though strangers are not admitted, the records of its deliberations are frequently published, with the names of its members prefixed.2 Here the decisions of the Cabinet are put into official form, appointments confirmed, resignations accepted, proceedings ordered, and notices published. It is the formal organ of the executive of the colony.

1 There were, at the close of the year 1889, 74 members (Blue Book for 1889). The appointments to the Executive Council make the tenure of seats dependent on the occupant's residence in the colony. Apparently, however, this condition is not insisted on except in the case of active members.

2 Cf. e.g. Gov. Gazette, 19th Feb. 1886, for numerous examples. As before pointed out, the individual names of members present, and not the titles of their offices, are now published.

It is hoped that the foregoing sketch has made clear the true position of the Cabinet in the modern English system, for it is emphatically an English system, of politics. The Cabinet, composed almost entirely of the highest officials in the administration,' wields the whole executive force of the community. Being also composed of parliamentary leaders, it controls the bent of legislation. No new departure in financial or other policy can take place without its sanction. It is, as nearly as possible, the sovereign power of the community.

It

On the other hand, its tenure of office is uncertain. lives on the popular credit, and can be got rid of by a change of popular feeling. This change usually manifests itself through Parliament, but the Cabinet, should it be disposed to take the risk, may appeal from Parliament to the constituencies. If the verdict of the constituencies be against it, it must retire from administration and legislation alike. There is no further appeal.

1 There is no legal objection to the appointment of non-official members, and, as a matter of fact, one or two are usually appointed by each government (cf. Gov. Gazette, 5th Nov. 1889, Mr. Stuart and Mr. Peacock). The practice is open to abuse.