ath from thence to Axheim; and, at the fame time, prince Lewis went another way, and bent his march directly to Newberg, in order to invest Ignoldstadt. The fame day, the duke of Marlborough received advice, that the enemy had paffed part of their army over the Danube, at Lewingen: Whereupon he ordered general Churchill to march with a ftrong detachment over that river at Schonevelt; to reinforce prince Eugene, who lay encamped at Donawert. The 10th, they marched to Schonevelt; and, the day following, intelligence was brought, that the enemy's troops had all got over the Danube; fo that the duke of Marlborough immediately ordered his army to march by break of day, and pass that river likewife; which was performed accordingly, and, at night, the whole army, being rejoined, incamped at Munster. On the 12th, very early in the morning, the generals of the allies went to view the enemy's army, taking with them all the picquet guard, which confifted of twenty-eight squadrons. The duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene went up to the top of a tower called Thiffingen, that they might the better obferve the posture of the enemy; and they took notice, that their advanced fquadrons, which were in motion towards the allies, stopped fhort, after they had perceived them. They were poffeffed of a very advantageous poft, on a hill near Hochftet (a), their right flank being covered by the Danube, and the village of Blenheim (b), and the left by the village of Lutzengen; and they had a rivulet before them, whose banks were very high, and the bottom marshy. However, after fome confultation, it was thought proper to fall upon the enemy, before they had time to fortify themselves in that poft. The duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene saw (a) Hochftet is a pretty large town in Germany, in the circle of Suabia, rendered famous to all pofterity by the glorious victory obtained in its neighbourhood over the joint forces of France and Bavaria, by the English, Dutch, and imperial arms, under the conduct of the duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene of Savoy. It lies upon the Danube on the northfide, twenty nine miles fouthwe of Ulm, and ten miles the weft-by-fouth of Donawert. (b) Blenheim (alias Plentheym) a village in Germany in the circle of Bavaria, upon the confines of Suabia. It stands on the north-fide of the Danube, and has, on the north-east fide of it a very fmall rivulet called the Meul Weyer. It is three miles almoft eaft from Hochstet, nine weft-fouth-weft from Donawert, thirty north-eaft from Ulm, and thirty one north-west from Augsburg. 1704. 1704. the danger of being forced to lie idle in their own camp, till their forage fhould be confumed, and their provifions fpent. They had alfo intercepted letters from marshal Villeroy to the elector of Bavaria, by which it appeared, that he had orders to march into Wirtemberg, to destroy that country, and to cut off the communication with the Rhine, which must have been fatal to the allies. The neceffary difpofitions were therefore made for the next morning's action. Many of the general officers came and represented to the duke of Marlborough the difficulties of the defign; he answered, that he faw thefe well, but the thing was abfolutely neceffary; fo they were fent to give orders every where, which were received all over the army with an alacrity that gave a happy prefage of the fuccefs which followed. Battle of On the 13th of August, a day which decided the elector's Hochftet. fate by the lofs of all his country, early in the morning, the Brodrick. whole confederate army marched from Munfter, leaving their tents flanding; and the duke of Marlborough and com command of major general Wood. The five English bat 1704. talions, led on by brigadier Rowe, who charged on foot at the head of his own regiment with unparalleled intrepidity, affaulted the village of Blenheim, advancing to the very muzzels of the enemy's mufkets, and fome of the officers exchanging thrufts of fwords with the French thro' the palifadoes. But, being expofed to a fire much fuperior to their own, they were foon obliged to retire, leaving behind them one third part of their men either killed or mortally wounded, the brigadier who commanded them, being among the laft. In this retreat, they were purfued by thirteen fquadrons of the French gendarmerie and carabineers, who would have intirely cut them to pieces, had not the Heffian infantry ftopped their career, by the great fire they made upon them. The French being repulfed, and forced to fly in their turn, were chaced by five fquadrons of English horfe, who, by this time had paffed the rivulet; but whilft the enemy rallied themselves, fome frefh brigades, fuperior in number, came to their affiftance, charged the affailants with great vigour, and obliged many of them to repafs the rivulet with great precipitation. Here again the Heffian foot performed fignal fervice, putting the French to the rout by their continual fire, and regaining the colours, which they had taken from Rowe's regiment. While Rowe's brigade rallied themselves, that of Fergufon, commanded by himself, attacked the village of Blenheim, on the left, but with no better fuccefs; and, though both returned three or four times to the charge with equal vigour, yet they were both ftill repulfed with like difadvantage, fo that it was found impoffible to force the enemy in that poft, without intirely facrificing the confederate infantry. The English foot having thus begun the engagement on the left, the horfe of the fame wing paffed the rivulet, with great bravery, over against the center or main battalia of the enemy; as did likewife that of the right wing, having made feveral paffages with divers pieces of wood. After which they drew up in order of battle, the French and Bavarians giving them all the time that could be defired for that purpose, keeping themselves very quiet on the hills, which they were poffeffed of, without defcending into the meadows towards the rivulet, so that even the second line, of the horse had time to form themselves: And to this capital fault of the French, the confederates were thought to have owed principally their victory. This neglect is faid to 1704. have proceeded from an ill-timed haughtiness and prefumption of marfhal de Tallard, who, being informed that the allies were laying bridges on the rivulet, used this expreffion," If they have not bridges enough, I will lend them "fome;" and when they told him that our troops were actually coming over the rivulet, he is reported to have said, "Let them país; the more comes over, the more we shall "have to kill and make prifoners." But, on the other hand, it is alledged by fome that he had given pofitive orders not to let the enemy pafs the rivulet, but to charge them as they paffed; which orders were not executed (a). (a) Monfieur de Fequieres in his memoirs obferves, that the lofs of that battle was owing to the inattention of the French generals to thofe maxims of war, which ought to guide men, when they confider, whether they have fufficient reafons either to give or receive battle, or whether they can derive, from the particular difpofition of their troops, any reasonable hopes of defeating the enemy. In examining this fubject, the marquis points out firft the errors, that were committed with reference to the general state of the war in Germany previous to the battle, and then thofe errors, which appeared in the particular difpofition of the French army. With regard to the first point, he afferts, that it was abfolutely improper at that time, to trust the decifion of the war in Germany to the event of a fingle battle; and this truth was the lefs doubtful, because it appeared that the English and Dutch had almost abandoned the war in Flanders in that campaign, to make a decifive effort in Germany, without which the emperor could no longer have fupported himself, At nor could they have drawn any fupplies of men from Germany. The French ought therefore to have avoided this battle, fince they could have maintained their fituation, if they had only compelled the English and Dutch, either to withdraw from that country, or intirely to difcontinue the war in Flanders. The elector of Bavaria was mafter of the whole courfe of the Danube, almost from its fource to the frontiers of Auftria, into which he could penetrate when he pleased; and therefore the emperor, whose attention was then employed by the malecontents in Hungary, was likewife obliged to have a watchful eye on Austria and Tirol, as well for the prefervation of these provinces, as the fecurity of a free communication with his army in Italy. The bridges, which the elector of Bavaria had on the Danube, opened to him a free communication with the Upper-Palatinate. The emperor confequently must be always apprehenfive, that he would pour a body of troops into Bohemia, where the people were exceed At length the duke's cavalry moving towards the hill, that of marshal de Tallard came down, and charged them exceeding exafperated at the feverity of the imperial govern ment, and where their fears were the only motives to their fubmiffion: which made it likewife neceffary for the emperor to maintain a body of troops to cover Bohemia and Moravia. Nuremberg, an imperial city, and almoft in the heart of the empire, being the most confiderable city in all the circle of Franconia, it was incumbent on the emperor to preferve it in the intereft of the confederates, left the elector of Bavaria fhould make himself mafter of it, as he had already feized Ulm and Augfberg. Nuremberg therefore could not be preferved by the protection of the confederate army, which confequently could not withdraw to any great diftance from that city, whofe preservation was of the more importance to the emperor, fince the lofs of it would deprive him of all communication with his dominions on the Rhine, except thro' the country on the other fide of the Mein, which the fituation of Nuremberg would have rendered altogether impracticable. It was likewife evident that the confederate army could not retreat to any confiderable diftance from a city, where all their ammunition and provifions were depofited. The allies indeed by forcing the pafs at Schellenberg, and taking Donawert, had obtained a bridge over the Danube, and feparated the fortified places of the French on the upper Danube, from thofe on the Lower. But, as their with provifions were ftill lodged either in Nuremberg or Norlingen, they durit not venture to quit Franconia and Suabia, to advance into Bavaria. This obvions reflection was alone fufficient to convince the French generals, that their inducements to engage the enemy could not poffibly have any weight, but that it was rather their interest to decline a general action, efpecially as this cautious conduct would infallibly have obliged the allies to abandon the parts adjacent to the Danube, when they had confumed all the forage near that river. Marshal de Villeroy was pofted with a confiderable army before the lines of Biel, which prince Eugene had quitted, with the greatcft part of his regular troops, and unperceived by that general. The conjunction of this prince with the duke of Marlborough, was generally known; and marshal de Villeroy might have waked from his inactivity, and forced the lines, which were only guarded by an inconfiderable body of militia; and might afterward have advanced with his army through the duchy of Wirtemberg, to the Neckar, which would have rendered the allies incapable of preferving their communication with the Lower-Neckar for the fecurity of their provisions, which were conveyed to Norlingen, from the Rhine and the Mein. And thus would this fingle motion have limited the fupply of the provisions of the allies to Nuremberg, and confequently they 1704 |