VOLUME II.

CONTENTS*

No. LXIII. - THE SENATE CONTINUED

Prevents a want of a due sense of national character, of a
due responsibility, and of a defense against temporary errors
and delusions - History shows no long-lived republic without
a senate - Difference between the ancient republics and the
United States - Athens, Carthage, Sparta, Rome, Crete - Ob-
jection that the Senate will acquire a dangerous pre-eminence
considered - Such a result impossible - Senate of Maryland -
British Parliament - Sparta, Rome, Carthage - The controll-
ing influence of the House of Representatives.

No. LXIV. - THE POWERS OF THE SENATE

The treaty-making power-Importance of this power -

Property vested in the Senate A popular body not fit for this

power-Reasons - Objections to this power in the Senate con-

sidered, and reasons for their rejection enumerated - The re-

sponsibility of Senators.

No. LXV.- THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED

The appointment of public officers - The authority to sit as

a court in the trial of impeachments - Difficulty of forming
such a court-The Senate most fit for such a trust - The plan
of delegating this authority to the Supreme Court considered
and rejected - The propriety of uniting the Supreme Court
in this power with the Senate considered and denied - The
propriety of giving this authority to other persons disconnected
with any department of the government considered and denied
- Even if this power in the Senate is not desirable the Con-
stitution should not be rejected.

PAOR

I

10

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No. LXVI. - OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO SIT

AS A COURT FOR IMPEACHMENTS FURTHER CONSIDERED 23

Objection that it unites legislative and judicial functions
-This same provision in constitution of New York which

* For Index, see p. 209.

opposition admire - That it unduly accumulates power in the

Senate, and tends to the establishment of an aristocracy -

That the Senate will judge too leniently officers for whose con-

firmation it has voted - That the senators may be called upon

to try themselves for a corrupt use of the treaty-making

power.

No. LXVII. - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Misrepresentations on this point considered and answered.

No. LXVIII. - THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT

The only part of the Constitution not condemned by its

opponents - It is well guarded - Desirable to have the sense
of the people in the choice - Desirable that the choice should
be made by competent persons, as in the Electoral College:
to avoid tumult and disorder; to avoid intrigue and corrup-
tion; to maintain the President independent of all but the
people-All these advantages here combined - Choice will
seldom fall on one not qualified - The choice of a Vice
President by the people considered and approved.

No. LXIX. - THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE

A single person - Compared with the king of Great Britain

and the governor of New York - Elected for four years, and

is re-eligible - Further comparison with the same executives-

Liable to impeachment, removal from office, and punishment

by civil law - Compared again as above, and also with gov-

ernors of Maryland and Delaware - Veto power - Compared

again as above, and also with governor of Massachusetts-

Commander-in-chief of militia in federal service - Compared

again as above - Commander-in-chief of the army and navy

of the United States - Compared again as above, and also

with governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts - Par-

doning power - Compared as above - Treaty-making power

- Compared as above - General review and comparison of

executive powers.

No. LXX. - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CONSIDERED

A vigorous Executive consistent with republican govern-

ment-What constitutes a proper Executive - Unity - Rea-
sons for this - Vesting executive authority in two or more
magistrates - Restraining the Executive by a council - Ob-
jections to plurality and control by council enumerated.

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No. LXXI. - THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE

It affects his firmness in action - More interest in what
is permanent - The Executive should not be subservient to
popular impulses or to those of the legislature - Independ-
ence of departments of government necessary - Shortness of
term will lessen independence - The proposed term of four
years considered.

No. LXXII.- THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND RE-ELIGIBIL-
ITY OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED

Duration in office affects stability of administration - Heads
of department dependent on Executive and will change with
him-Re-eligibility of Executive - The opposition to it con-
sidered - A limit of a single term would diminish induce-
ments to good behavior, increase temptations to misconduct,
prevent experience in the office, deprive the country in
emergencies of the services of the best men, and act as a
constitutional barrier to stability of administration - The
supposed advantages of a single term considered - The peo-
ple should not be prevented from choosing men of experience.

No. LXXIII. - THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE EXECU-
TIVE, AND THE VETO POWER

Without suitable provision the Executive will be at the
mercy of the legislature, and the independence of the Ex-
ecutive should not be impaired - The veto power-Reasons
for and against enumerated and considered - The veto power
not absolute - It already exists in New York and Mas-
sachusetts.

No. LXXIV. - THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL

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64

70

FORCES, AND THE PARDONING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 77

No. LXXV. - THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 80
One of the best features of the Constitution - Objection
that it combines the executive and legislative departments
considered - It is a proper combination - Reasons for this-
House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted-Ob-
jection to requiring only two-thirds of Senators present.

No. LXXVI. - THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE

This an excellent feature - This power cannot be exer-
cised by the people at large - It will cause a livelier sense
of duty in the Executive - Objection to its being intrusted
to the President alone - He may be overruled by Senate-
Concurrence of Senate a check on favoritism - Objection

86

that the President may thus control Senate considered -
Whole body of Senate cannot be corrupted - Protection of
Constitution.

No. LXXVII. - THE APPOINTING POWER CONTINUED AND OTHER
POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED

The concurrence of the Senate necessary to displace as
well as to appoint - Objections as to undue control of the
Senate by the President, or the reverse, considered - Com-
pared with system of appointment in New York - Appoint-
ing power should be delegated to a council or shared in by
the House - Power to communicate information to Congress;
to recommend measures to Congress; to convene one or
both branches of Congress; to adjourn Congress; to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers; to execute the laws
of the Union; to commission all officers of the United
States - Concluding remarks on the Executive.

No. LXXVIII. - THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT

Mode of appointment - Tenure - Need of complete inde-
pendence - Authority pronounced on the constitutionality of
the laws-The legislature should be the judge of its own
powers - Interpretation of the laws the peculiar province of
the judiciary - Need of independence on this account - In-
dependence required for judiciary as guardians of the Con-
stitution and of private rights as well - Wisdom of requiring
good behavior as the tenure.

No. LXXIX.- THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED

A fixed provision for the support of the judiciary neces-
sary to their independence - Responsibility of the judiciary
-Judges liable to impeachment Cannot be made remova-
ble for inability - Reasons for this - Comparison with Con-
stitution of New York.

No. LXXX.- THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY

To what cases the judicial authority ought to extend -
To all cases which arise from duly enacted laws of the
Union; which concern the execution of the provisions of
the Constitution; in which the United States is a party;
which involve the peace of the Union in foreign relations,
or when two States, or a State and the citizens of another
State, or the citizens of different States, are parties; which
originate on the high seas or are of admiralty jurisdiction;
in which State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impli-
cated-To what cases authority of judiciary will extend

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under proposed Constitution - Statement of constitutional provi-

sions - These provisions conform to what the powers of the

judiciary ought to be - Propriety of delegating equity

jurisdiction.

No. LXXXI. - THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED, AND THE DISTRIBU-

TION OF THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Propriety of establishing one court of final and supreme
jurisdiction - Propriety of delegating judicial authority to a
distinct department - Objections to this considered - This
delegation of authority secures more completely the separa-
tion of the judiciary from the legislature, recognizes more
fully the principle of good behavior as a tenure, secures
greater legal ability, and removes the judiciary from party
strife-The example of certain of the States - That no legis-
lature can rectify judicial mistakes except as to future action,
and the danger of encroachments by the judiciary on the leg-
islature, considered - Propriety of constituting inferior courts
-Relief to Supreme Court - State courts not fit for this-
Advantage of dividing United States into judicial districts -
Manner in which authority should be distributed - Original
jurisdiction of Supreme Court - Original jurisdiction of infe-
rior courts - Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

No. LXXXII. - THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED

The jurisdiction of the State courts on federal questions

-The State courts will retain all that is not exclusively dele-

gated - Decision of causes arising from a particular regula-

tion may be delegated by Congress exclusively to Supreme

Court - Relation between State and federal courts when they

have concurrent jurisdiction - An appeal will lie from State

courts to the Supreme Court - The appellate jurisdiction of

the inferior federal courts.

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130

No. LXXXIII. - THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED IN RELATION TO

TRIAL BY JURY.

135

Objection that there is no provision in the proposed Con-
stitution for trial by jury in civil cases considered - True
meaning of maxims on which this objection rests - Impor-
tance of right of trial by jury considered - Criminal and civil
cases-Jury system in different States - Difficulty of estab-
lishing a general rule - Impropriety of such a general rule
in certain cases - The proposition of Massachusetts - The
provisions of the New York constitution - The proposition
that the jury system should be established in all cases what-
ever - Concluding remarks.