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VOLUME II.

CONTENTS*

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No. LXIII.-THE SENATE CONTINUED

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Prevents a want of a due sense of national character, of a
due responsibility, and of a defense against temporary errors
and delusions- History shows no long-lived republic without
a senate-Difference between the ancient republics and the
United States — Athens, Carthage, Sparta, Rome, Crete - Ob-
jection that the Senate will acquire a dangerous pre-eminence
considered - Such a result impossible - Senate of Maryland —
British Parliament-Sparta, Rome, Carthage- The controll-
ing influence of the House of Representatives.

No. LXIV. THE POWERS OF THE SENATE .

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The treaty-making power-Importance of this power-
Property vested in the Senate - A popular body not fit for this
power-Reasons — Objections to this power in the Senate con-
sidered, and reasons for their rejection enumerated-The re-
sponsibility of Senators.

No. LXV. THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED

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The appointment of public officers - The authority to sit as
a court in the trial of impeachments - Difficulty of forming
such a court―The Senate most fit for such a trust — The plan
of delegating this authority to the Supreme Court considered
and rejected - The propriety of uniting the Supreme Court
in this power with the Senate considered and denied - The
propriety of giving this authority to other persons disconnected
with any department of the government considered and denied
- Even if this power in the Senate is not desirable the Con-
stitution should not be rejected.

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No. LXVI. — OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO SIT
AS A COURT FOR IMPEACHMENTS FURTHER CONSIDERED 23
Objection that it unites legislative and judicial functions
-This same provision in constitution of New York which
* For Index, see p. 209.

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No. LXVIII. - THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
The only part of the Constitution not condemned by its
opponents-It is well guarded- Desirable to have the sense
of the people in the choice-Desirable that the choice should
be made by competent persons, as in the Electoral College:
to avoid tumult and disorder; to avoid intrigue and corrup-
tion; to maintain the President independent of all but the
people-All these advantages here combined-Choice will
seldom fall on one not qualified-The choice of a Vice-
President by the people considered and approved.

No. LXIX. THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE

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No. LXXI.-THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE.
It affects his firmness in action- More interest in what
is permanent-The Executive should not be subservient to
popular impulses or to those of the legislature — Independ-
ence of departments of government necessary - Shortness of
term will lessen independence-The proposed term of four
years considered.

No. LXXII.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND RE-ELIGIBIL-
ITY OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED

Duration in office affects stability of administration - Heads
of department dependent on Executive and will change with
him-Re-eligibility of Executive-The opposition to it con-
sidered — A limit of a single term would diminish induce-
ments to good behavior, increase temptations to misconduct,
prevent experience in the office, deprive the country in
emergencies of the services of the best men, and act as a
constitutional barrier to stability of administration— The
supposed advantages of a single term considered - The peo-
ple should not be prevented from choosing men of experience.
No. LXXIII.-THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE EXECU-
TIVE, AND THE VETO POWER

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No. LXXIV. THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL

Forces, and the Pardoning Power of THE EXECUTIVE 77

No. LXXV.-THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 80

One of the best features of the Constitution - Objection

that it combines the executive and legislative departments
considered — It is a proper combination-Reasons for this—
House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted-Ob-
jection to requiring only two-thirds of Senators present.
No. LXXVI.-THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE

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that the President may thus control Senate considered -
Whole body of Senate cannot be corrupted - Protection of
Constitution.

No. LXXVII.-THE APPOINTING POWER CONTINUED AND OTHER
POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED

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The concurrence of the Senate necessary to displace as
well as to appoint - Objections as to undue control of the
Senate by the President, or the reverse, considered-Com-
pared with system of appointment in New York-Appoint-
ing power should be delegated to a council or shared in by
the House-Power to communicate information to Congress;
to recommend measures to Congress; to convene one or
both branches of Congress; to adjourn Congress; to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers; to execute the laws
of the Union; to commission all officers of the United
States Concluding remarks on the Executive.

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No. LXXVIII.—THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT

Mode of appointment-Tenure-Need of complete inde-
pendence-Authority pronounced on the constitutionality of
the laws-The legislature should be the judge of its own
powers-Interpretation of the laws the peculiar province of
the judiciary-Need of independence on this account-In-
dependence required for judiciary as guardians of the Con-
stitution and of private rights as well-Wisdom of requiring
good behavior as the tenure.

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A fixed provision for the support of the judiciary neces-
sary to their independence - Responsibility of the judiciary
-Judges liable to impeachment Cannot be made remova-
ble for inability - Reasons for this- Comparison with Con-
stitution of New York.

No. LXXX. THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY

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To what cases the judicial authority ought to extend
To all cases which arise from duly enacted laws of the
Union; which concern the execution of the provisions of
the Constitution; in which the United States is a party;
which involve the peace of the Union in foreign relations,
or when two States, or a State and the citizens of another
State, or the citizens of different States, are parties; which
originate on the high seas or are of admiralty jurisdiction;
in which State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impli-
cated-To what cases authority of judiciary will extend

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Propriety of establishing one court of final and supreme
jurisdiction- Propriety of delegating judicial authority to a
distinct department-Objections to this considered-This
delegation of authority secures more completely the separa-
tion of the judiciary from the legislature, recognizes more
fully the principle of good behavior as a tenure, secures
greater legal ability, and removes the judiciary from party
strife- The example of certain of the States - That no legis-
lature can rectify judicial mistakes except as to future action,
and the danger of encroachments by the judiciary on the leg-
islature, considered Propriety of constituting inferior courts
- Relief to Supreme Court-State courts not fit for this-
Advantage of dividing United States into judicial districts—
Manner in which authority should be distributed — Original
jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Original jurisdiction of infe-
rior courts-Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

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No. LXXXIII.-THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED IN RELATION TO

TRIAL BY JURY.

Objection that there is no provision in the proposed Con-
stitution for trial by jury in civil cases considered - True
meaning of maxims on which this objection rests - Impor-
tance of right of trial by jury considered- Criminal and civil
cases- Jury system in different States-Difficulty of estab-
lishing a general rule-Impropriety of such a general rule
in certain cases-The proposition of Massachusetts-The
provisions of the New York constitution - The proposition
that the jury system should be established in all cases what-
ever- Concluding remarks.

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