Trial of Judge Chase. of which the defence may depend; some within | of the papers to which he alluded, (and which the knowledge of one man, some within that were understood to be those published under of another. Was it ever heard of before, that, the title of Mirror of the Times and General because one witness could not prove the exist- Advertiser,') and, by a strict examination of ence of all those facts, that, therefore, such them, to find some passage which might furnish witness should not be examined as to what he the groundwork of a prosecution against the did know? Or, if some of the facts depended printer of the said paper; thereby degrading his upon written testimony, was it ever heard of high judicial functions, and tending to impair the before, that, therefore, a witness should not be public confidence in, and respect for, the tribunals examined as to those resting on oral testimony? of justice, so essential to the general welfare. To these questions no man will answer in the The respondent stands here charged with a affirmative. Why, then, was an unheard-of and conduct, than which, in my opinion, nothing palpably absurd doctrine brought to bear in could be more at war with his official dutyCallender's case? Was the defence of justifica- nothing more tarnish his official character. The tion, under the sedition law of the United constitution and laws of this country certainly States, such an anomaly in its nature, that none intended in erecting high judicial tribunals, that of the established rules of jurisprudence would those who might be appointed to minister thereapply to it? Was it a thing so entire in its na-in, should be impartial dispensers of justice beture, that it could not consist of different parts? tween such as might resort thither for an I have always been taught, and the respondent's answer confirms the principle, that a defence must apply to the whole of a charge. If, then, a charge consist of different parts, surely, so must the defence. But, according to Judge Chase, be the parts ever so many, they shall not be proven, unless the proof can all be made by one witness, or unless it appear that the defendant has proof in reserve to establish all. adjustment of their differences. In public prosecutions more especially was it intended that such dispensation should be made without respect to persons. In these, above all other cases, ought a judge to stand aloof from influence, free from predilection towards one, or prejudice against the other. Most peculiarly here is it his duty to stand firm at his post, resisting the overbearing influence of a powerful The fifth and sixth articles rest upon grounds public, and protecting the rights of the accused so extremely simple, and so easily comprehend-in so unequal a contest. But Judge Chase, dised, that it appears totally unnecessary to fatigue the patience of the honorable Court by dwelling upon them. regarding these principles, always held sacred in a land of laws, converts himself into a hunter after accusations. He who, in the humane language of the laws, should be counsel for the accused, becomes himself an accuser. He, whose duty it is impartially to decide between the prosecutor and prosecuted, becomes himself the procurer of prosecutions. The eighth article charges the respondent with prostituting the judicial character by making a political speech to the grand jury at Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, against the Government of the United States and the Government of Maryland. The seventh article is as follows: "That at a circuit court of the United States, for the district of Delaware, held at Newcastle, in the month of June, one thousand eight hundred, whereat the said Samuel Chase presided, the said Samuel Chase, disregarding the duties of his office, did descend from the dignity of a judge, and stoop to the level of an informer, by refusing to discharge the grand jury, although entreated by several of the said jury so to do; and after the said grand jury had regularly declared, through their foreman, that they had found no bills of indictment, nor had any preThere are features in that part of the judge's sentments to make, by observing to the said official conduct, charged in this article, which grand jury that he, the said Samuel Chase, un-place him in a point of view awfully grand. derstood that a highly seditious temper had We have heretofore been viewing him as bringmanifested itself in the State of Delaware, ing his talents to bear upon individuals. Here among a certain class of people, particularly in we see his genius rising, in the majesty of its Newcastle County, and more especially in the strength, to far higher objects. Here we see town of Wilmington, where lived a most sedi-him consigning over whole governments to the tious printer, unrestrained by any principle of virtue, and regardless of social order; that the name of this printer was '-but checking himself, as if sensible of the indecorum which he was committing, added,' that it might be assuming too much to mention the name of this M. CAMPBELL then rose and spoke as follows: person, but it becomes your duty, gentlemen, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Senate: to inquire diligently into this matter,' or words The scene, presented to the nation by this to that effect; and that with intention to pro- trial, is more than usually interesting and imcure the prosecution of the printer in question, portant. One of the highest officers of the Govthe said Samuel Chase did, moreover, author-ernment, called upon by the voice of the people, itatively enjoin on the District Attorney of the through their representatives, before the highest United States, the necessity of procuring a file tribunal known to our constitution-that same scourge of his own avenging wrath. Whithersoever he turned his eyes, whether to the State constitution and laws, or to the laws and constitution of the whole Union, they were equally exposed to the whip and the rack. DEBATES OF CONGRESS. Trial of Judge Chase. tribunal that sanctioned his elevation to an- | swer for the abuse of the power with which he had been intrusted! It is a melancholy truth, that derogates much from the dignity of human nature, but it is a truth that has been for ages established by experience, that high and important powers have a tendency to corrupt those on whom they are conferred. Few minds are possessed of sufficient integrity and independence, when elevated above the ordinary level of the great mass of their fellow-citizens, to resist the impulse their high station gives them, to grasp at still greater powers, and prostitute those which they already possess. and most enlightened tribunal in the nation is No, The next provision in the constitution declares that judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. Hence it has been the great exertion of all governments, who regard the rights and liberties of the people, and still must continue to be so, to watch over the conduct of the high and confidential officers of State, and guard against their abusing the powers reposed in them. For this purpose the mode of trial by impeachment was resorted to in very early times in that country from which we have derived most of our laws and usages. Near five hundred years ago, the representatives of the people in that Here the constitution seems to make an evination felt themselves clothed with sufficient authority to check the abuses of power, in the highest officers under the Crown, by calling upon dent distinction between such misdemeanors as them by impeachment to answer before the would authorize a removal from office, and disHouse of Lords for their conduct, and punish-qualification to hold any office, and such as are ing them for such acts as were unauthorized, illegal, or oppressive. courts of common law, and punishable by indictcriminal, in the ordinary sense of the word, in It was a wise and politic measure to have ment. So far as the offence committed is injucharges of this nature tried by the highest tri-rious to society, only in consequence of the powbunal in the nation, that would not be awed by the great powers and elevated standing of the accused, nor influenced by the popular voice of the accusers, further than a strict regard to impartial justice would require. As I conceive, therefore, that pure and unstained impartiality ought to be the characteristic feature in the trial by impeachment, I shall for myself, and I conceive I may in the name of the representatives of the people, utterly disclaim any design or wish that party considerations, or difference in political sentiments, should, in the remotest degree, enter into the investigation, or affect the decision of this question. Yet, in order to ascertain the motives that actuated the respondent, it may become necessary to notice the difference of political sentiments, so far as regarded the accused, and those who are stated Lo have been injured by his conduct, at the time those transactions took place, that gave origin to this prosecution. In the view which I propose taking on this subject, I shall in the first place notice the provisions in the constitution relative to impeachment, and endeavor to ascertain the precise object and extent of such provision, so far as the same may relate to the present case. The first provision in the constitution on this subject, (art. 1st, sec. 3,) declares, that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. Here we discover the great wisdom of the framers of the constitution. The highest er reposed in the officer being abused in the THURSDAY, February 21. Mr. CAMPBELL, in continuation. Trial of Judge Chase. I will now proceed, as well as my indisposition will permit, to examine in a brief manner the second part of the subject, containing the several charges founded on the trial of Callender, at Richmond, as stated in the second, third, and fourth articles of the impeachment. I will consider these several articles in the order in which the transactions on which they are founded took place in court. In order to ascertain the motives that actuated the judge in this whole transaction, it will only be necessary to view his conduct as proved, so far as the same relates to this subject, previous to the trial. The first account we have of the intended prosecution, or I might say persecution, of Callender, is at Annapolis. Here the judge received the famous book called the "Prospect before Us," and upon which the prosecution was founded, and here the determination was formed to convict and punish Callender. The respondent said he would take the book with him to Richmond; that the libellous parts had been marked by Mr. Martin, and that before he returned he would teach the lawyers of Virginia to know the difference between the liberty and licentiousness of the press; and that, if the Commonwealth of Virginia was not totally depraved, if there was a jury of honest men to be found in the State, he would punish Callender before he returned from Richmond. This is the evidence of Mr. Mason, nearly in his own words, and no person will pretend to doubt its correctness. What language could be used that would more clearly show the partiality and predetermination of the judge to punish Callender, and the spirit of persecution by which he was actuated? Again: on his way to Richmond, according to the evidence of Mr. Triplett, the judge reviles the object of his intended vengeance; states his surprise and regret that he had not been hanged in Virginia; remarks that the United States had shown too much lenity to such renegadoes; and after arriving at Richmond, informs the deponent he was afraid they would not be able to get the damned rascal at that court. Thus evincing in every stage of this business that intolerant spirit of oppression and vengeance that seems to have given spring to all his actions. After the indictment is found against Callender, the panel of the petit jury is presented to the judge; he inquires if he had any of the creatures called Democrats on that panel, directs the marshal to examine it, and if there were any such on it, to strike them off. This is the evidence of Mr. Heath, whose character and standing in society are known to many of the members of this honorable Court. And, though his evidence is opposed to the negative declarations of Mr. Randolph, who affirms that he did not present the panel of the jury to the judge, or receive such directions, yet I conceive the Court will give more weight to the affirmative declarations of Mr. Heath, with regard to these facts, than to the negative assertions of Mr. Randolph, who may have forgotten the transaction. This point rests upon the integrity and veracity of Mr. Heath. He could not receive the impression of these facts, unless the transaction had taken place; he could not reasonably be mistaken; the affair was new and extraordinary, and must have arrested his attention; and in this case there is no ground to make allowance for a treacherous memory, for it is not pretended that the witness, Mr. Heath, has forgot the facts, but that they never existed. If you do not, therefore, believe the statement he makes, it must follow that you admit the witness has wilfully and corruptly stated a falsehood. This, I presume, will not be admitted. But, on the other hand, Mr. Randolph may have forgotten the transaction in the bustle of business, and this will account for the difference in the evidence of the witnesses without impeaching the veracity of either. This mode of reconciling the evidence is agreeable to the rules of law. I take the facts, therefore, as stated by Mr. Heath, to be correct, and they afford an instance of judicial depravity hitherto unequalled and unknown in our country-a direct attempt to pack a jury of the same political sentiments with the judge to try the defendant. This is a faint representation of the previous conduct of the judge relative to this subject, before whom the defendant was about to be tried, or rather before whom he was to be called for certain conviction and punishment, for it ought not to be dignified with the name of a trial. With this view, therefore, of the temper and disposition of the judge, and of his previous conduct on this occasion, we will examine the first important step taken in the trial, in which the designs of the judge begin more clearly to unfold themselves, viz: his refusal to postpone or continue the trial until the next term, on an affidavit regularly filed, stating the absence of material witnesses and the places of their residence, being the second charge in the fourth article. The next charge which I propose to examine is contained in the second article of the impeachment, and consists in the judge's overruling the objection of John Basset, one of the jury, who wished to be excused from serving on the trial of Callender, because he had made up his mind as to the book from which the words charged to be libellous in the indictment had been drawn. The constitution secures to defendants charged with crimes, the right of a trial by an impartial jury; any thing, therefore, that goes to show that a man has made up an opinion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or with regard to the matter in question, or decided it in his own mind, proves him to be disqualified to serve as a juror, because it proves he is not impartial, has a bias upon his mind, and cannot be said to be indifferent. The same doctrine is supported by the laws of England. In order to show this, I will refer the Court to 3 Bac. Ab. (new ed.) 756, and DEBATES OF CONGRESS. Trial of Judge Chase. also Co. Litt. 158; where it is stated, if a juror | kind, if they should be brought forward and suphas declared his opinion, touching the matter ported against him hereafter. No ground of exin question, &c., or has done any thing by which cuse therefore can arise from the circumstance it appears that he cannot be indifferent or im- of Judge Griffin not having been called upon to I will now proceed to notice very briefly the partial, &c., these are principal causes of chal- answer for his conduct in this respect. lenge; and therefore such juror would be disqualified. Here it is manifest, that though conduct of the judge in the subsequent part of declaring an opinion is good cause of challenge this trial. Compelling the defendant's counsel to a juror, if it is not necessary he should de- to reduce to writing all questions to be asked clare such opinion in order to disqualify him; the witness, was a direct innovation on the it is sufficient that he has done something, practice in our courts of justice, and tended to whether making up an opinion, or doing any embarrass the management of and weaken the the witnesses, that no such practice ever preact whatever, by which it appears he is not in- defence. It is proved by the testimony of all different, is not perfectly impartial. The next charge to be inquired into, is that vailed in our courts of justice, for such a purpose stated in the third article, in rejecting the evi- as that avowed in this instance; the only cases dence of Colonel Taylor, a material witness in in which it is required to reduce to writing cases in which it can be proper or consistent favor of the defendant, on the pretence that he questions to be asked a witness, and the only could not prove the truth of the whole of one charge. In this instance the judge acted con- with reason and justice to do so, are those in' trary to all former precedents in courts of justice, which an objection is made to a question proand without the shadow of law or reason to posed to be asked, on the ground of its being justify his conduct. Not a solitary case could improper and contrary to the rules of evidence; be stated by any of the witnesses of a similar and in order to ascertain the precise meaning conduct in a judge. The rule here adopted, with and effect of the question, so as to decide on the regard to the admissibility of evidence, would objection made to it, it may be proper to require deprive the jury of their undoubted right to it to be reduced to writing, but it never was bedecide on the credibility and weight of evidence, fore done, so far as we can discover, for the puras well as on the extent to which it proved the pose of ascertaining how far the witness could matter in question; would transfer in substance prove the matter in question, and whether he this right to the Court, and thereby shake to its could prove the whole of one charge or not, and very centre the fabric so justly admired, and thereby decide whether the witness should or held so sacred, of trial by jury. It would make should not be examined. According to this it necessary for the party to present to the Court rule the judge would first try the cause himself all the evidence relied upon to make out his case. upon the evidence offered, by the questions This evidence, the Court or judge would first thus reduced to writing, and if he did not condeliberately examine, compare it with the sider such evidence fully sufficient to support charges or case to be supported, and if it did the whole of the charge or case to which it was not, in his opinion, prove the whole of one offered, he would reject it, and not permit the charge, or go the whole extent of the case to be jury to hear a word of it, lest they might conestablished by it, he would reject it, and not per-sider it stronger than he did, and give it sufficient mit the jury to hear it. This would strip the jury of the very prerogative that renders this kind of trial so much superior to all others, that of deciding on the weight and credit of evidence. But it is stated that Judge Griffin concurred weight to support the case to which it was offered. This mode of proceeding was left to be discovered and adopted by Judge Chase. Barely to notice the conduct of the respondent, at Newcastle in Delaware, as charged in the seventh article, is sufficient to show that he was there actuated by the same spirit of persecution and oppression that has, as already stated, marked the whole of his conduct during the course of these transactions. That he should descend from the elevated and dignified station in which he was placed as a judge, to hunt for crimes as a common informer against his fellowcitizens; urge the jury to take notice of, and present certain persons sufficiently designated though not named; and press the attorney for the district to search for evidence among the files of newspapers to support a prosecution, was degrading to the sacred character of a judge, and was perverting the judicial authority to a mere engine of persecution to answer party purposes. Of the same complexion with this is the conduct of the respondent in delivering an inflammatory and disorganizing charge to the grand jury at Baltimore, as stated in the eighth Trial of Judge Chase. By another act of Virginia, passed in the same year, it is enacted that, "upon presentment made by the grand jury of an offence not capital, the Court shall order the clerk to issue a summons or other proper process against the person or persons so presented, to appear and answer such presentment at the next Court, and thereupon hear and determine the same according to law." article of the impeachment. This proceeding | provides that the grand jury "shall present all evinced a mind inflamed by party spirit and treasons, murders, felonies, or other misdemeanpolitical intolerance; it was calculated to disturb ors whatsoever, which shall have been committhe peace of the community, and alarm the peo-ted or done within the district for which they ple at the measures of Government: to force are impanelled." them by the terror of judicial denunciation to relinquish their own political sentiments and adopt those of the judge. This was the favorite object of this whole proceeding, and to obtain it no means were left untried. It was attempted to excite the fears of the public mind, to destroy the confidence of the people in the administration of their Government. The judicial authority was prostituted to party purposes, and the fountains of justice were corrupted by this In this last provision, the words, "or other poisonous spirit of persecution, that seemed de-proper process," have a direct application to the termined to bear down all opposition in order previous provision, which enacts that the grand to succeed in a favorite object. Citizens of all jury shall present all treasons, murders, felodescriptions felt alarmed at this new and unusual nies, "or other misdemeanors." For treasons, conduct. All the counsel at the bar, wherever murders, and felonies, we admit that a capias is the respondent went, though consisting of the the proper process; and when the law directs ablest and most enlightened in the nation, were other proper process, it had reference to a class agitated into a general ferment, and the whole of crimes where a capias was required. It is in community seemed shocked at such outrages vain alleged, that the counsel for Callender upon common sense; for to go to trial was to made no objection to the process issued. They go to certain conviction. Is this, Mr. President, were not at that time to be considered as his the character that ought to distinguish the Ju- counsel; it was only after he was brought into diciary of the United States? No, sir. The court that their duty commenced. streams of justice that flow from the American bench ought to be as pure as the sunbeams that light up the morning. The accused should come before the Court, with a well-founded confidence that the law will be administered to him with justice, impartiality, and in mercy. When this is the case, he submits without a murmur to his fate, and hears the sentence of condemnation pronounced against him, with a mind that must approve the justice of the law and the impartiality of those who administer it. Further, whether the proper process was a capias or summons, the law of Virginia requires that it shall be returnable to the next Court; and I contend that this point is established by the English practice. To show which I refer to Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown, where it is stated that a venire facias, which is in the nature of a summons, is the proper process, and that it is returnable to the next Court. It was surely, then, the duty of the judge to be acquainted with the laws of England, howThe decision of this cause may form an im- ever unacquainted he may have been with the portant era in the annals of our country. Future laws of Virginia. He cannot, therefore, on this generations are interested in the event. It may ground, attempt a justification from ignorance. determine a question all-important to the Ameri- In his answer he informs us that ignorance of can people; whether the laws of our coun- the law is no excuse. If it is no excuse in an try are to govern, or the arbitrary will of unlettered individual, shall it constitute the those who are intrusted with their administra- apology of him who was expressly appointed to tion. Mr. President, we, on this important oc- expound the law and administer justice? And casion, behold the rights and liberties of the if, on this occasion, he was not acquainted with American people hover round this honorable the law, did it, therefore, become him to proceed tribunal, about to be established on a firm basis with such fatal precipitancy? No sooner was by the decision you will make, or sent afloat on the presentment made than the marshal, before the ocean of uncertainty, to be tossed to and fro any indictment was brought in, was despatched by the capricious breath of usurped power and after Callender. We can only account for this innovation. by supposing that it was the intention of the Mr. CLARK addressed the Chair as follows-judge to act in conformity to his previous deMr. President: I rise only to make a few remarks on two of the articles, the fifth and sixth, that the counsel for the respondent may be possessed of all the points we mean to make. I will endeavor, in a few words, to state the practice which we think ought to have been pursued in the case of Callender. The practice in the federal courts is regulated by that in each State. If this posi-prosecution. tion be correct, we contend, that the proper process in the case of Callender was a summons. An act of Virginia, passed in the year 1792, claration, however jocularly it may have seemed to have been made; and that this was one of the means he had determined to pursue in order to convict Callender, regardless of the dignity of his station or the innocence of the man. Having offered these remarks, I am instructed to say that the case is fully opened on the part of the Argument for the Defence. Mr. HOPKINSON.-Mr. President: We cannot |