afforded, by a course of accidents and oversights, room for intrigue, it would be preferable to leave it to the care and discretion of the States at large to prevent the recurrence of the danger, than put into the hands of four of the large States the perpetual choice of President, to the exclusion of the other thirteen States. It was a reasonable principle that every State should, in turn, have the choice of the Chief Magistrate made from anong its citizens. The jealousy of the small States was natural; and he would not tire the House by bringing to their ears arguments from the history of Greece, because the subject must be familiar to every member of that House, and, indeed, to every school-boy. He would not weary them with the painful history of the conflicts of Athens and Sparta, for the supremacy of Greece, and the fatal effects of their quarrels and ambition on the smaller States of that inveterate confederacy of Republics. Their history is that of all nations in similar circumstances; for man is man in every clime, and passion mingles in all his actions. If the smaller States were to agree to this amendment, it would fix for ever the combination of the larger States, and they would not only choose the President but the Vice President also in spite of the smaller States. It would ill become him who had been a member of that convention which had the honor of forming the present constitution to let a measure such as the present pass without the most deliberate investigation of its effects. Before the present constitution was adopted all the States held an equal vote on all national questions; by the constitution their sovereignty was guarantied, and the instrument of guarantee and right, he had subscribed his name to as a Representative from South Carolina, and had used all the zeal and influence of which he was possessed to promote its adoption. To give his assent to any violation of it, or any unnecessary innovation on its principles, would be a deviation from morality. The question was immediately taken on the report and carried-yeas 20, nays 11. Mr. ADAMS said, that though he had voted for the amendment, he disapproved of the alteration from five to three. He felt, however, though a representative of a large State, a deep interest in this question. Was there no champion of the small States to stand up in that House and vindicate their rights? Mr. DAYTON was not here as champion of the small States; but, as the representative of one of them, he was ready to enter his protest against being delivered over bound hand and foot to four or five of the large States. The gentleman from South Carolina had offered arguments on the subject irrefutable. The little portion of influence left us he has demonstrated to be now about to be taken away, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. ADAMS,) after aiding the effort with his vote, has taken mercy upon us, and after he has helped to knock us down, asks us why we do not stand up for ourselves. [NOVEMBER, 1803. Mr. S. SMITH was not surprised to find those who were members of the old Congress, in which the subject of large and small States was frequently agitated, familiar with the subject of those days. Under the present constitution he had been ten years in Congress and had never heard the subject agitated, nor the least ground given for any apprehension on this subject; he had seen the small States possess all the advantages secured to them without even a moment's jealousy. The State he represented was once considered a large State; the increase of others in population, however, had rendered it properly belonging to neither class; it was an interme diate State; but from the natural progression of the Union it must be ranked among the small States. In this view then he could speak dispassionately, and the small States could not with reason be apprehensive that a State, which must speedily take rank among them, could be indifferent to their rights if there were the least cause for apprehension. He had moved for the insertion of three instead of five, with this precise and special intention, that the people themselves should have the power of electing the President and Vice President; and that intrigues should be thereby for ever frustrated. The intention of the convention was that the election of the chief officers of the Government should come as immediately from the people as was practicable, and that the Legislature should possess the power only in such an exigency as accident might give birth to, but which they had considered as likely to occur. Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made the last resort, he would undertake to say, that four times out of five the choice would devolve upon them. Mr. HILLHOUSE.—In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive we know not. The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in republics. You are called upon to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war! When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent throne. The First Magistracy of this na NOVEMBER, 1803.] Amendment to the Constitution. [SENATE. tion is an object capable of exciting ambition; | the time may, it will come when the small will and no doubt it would one day or other be wrestle with the large States for their rights. sought after by dangerous and enterprising men. Each State has felt that though its limits were It was to place a check upon this ambition that not so extensive as others, its rights were not the constitution provided a competitor for the disregarded. Suffer this confidence to be done Chief Magistrate, and declared that both should away, and you may bid adieu to it; three or not be chosen from the same State. Here also four large States will take upon them in rotawas a guard against State pride, and this guard tion to nominate the Executive, and the second you wish to take away; and what will be the officer also. This will be felt. A fanciful difconsequence? Instead of two or three or five, ference in politics is the bugbear of party now, you will have as many candidates as there are because no other, no real cause of difference has States in the Union. By voting for two per- subsisted. But remedy will create a real dissons without designation, the States stood a ease. States like individuals may say we will double chance of a majority, besides the chance be of no party, and whenever this shall happen of a majority of all the States in the House of blood will follow. Representatives. For once or twice there may be such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field will be to range in. Mr. BRADLEY moved an adjournment. The motion was agreed to. THURSDAY, November 24. Amendment to the Constitution. The consideration of the report on the amendamendment as directed to be printed on the preceding day, was taken up, and read, as fol lows: Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the followthe several States as an amendment to the constituing amendment be proposed to the Legislatures of tion of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said constitution, viz: In all future elections of President and Vice Presi He hoped this amendment would not be hast-ment to the constitution being taken up, the ily adopted. The subsisting mode was the result of much deliberation and solemn compromise, after having long agitated the convention. It is now attacked by party, whatever gentlemen may say to the contrary; the gentleman from South Carolina has confessed it. If gentlemen will suffer themselves to look forward without passion, great good may come from the present mode; men of each of the parties may hold the two principal offices of the Government; they will be checks upon each other; our Government is composed of checks; and let us preserve it from party spirit, which has been tyrannical in all ages. These checks take off the fiery edge of persecution. Would not one of a different party placed in that chair tend to check and preserve in temper the overheated zeal of party? he would conduct himself with firmness because of the minor party; he would take care that the majority should have justice, but he would also guard the minority from oppression. If we cannot destroy party we ought to place every check upon it. If the present amendment pass, nine out of ten times the election will go to the other House, and then the only difference will be that you had a comedy the last time, and you'll have a tragedy the next. Though it was impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it was prudent to preserve as many checks against it as was practicable. He had been long in Congress and saw the conflicting interests of large and small States operate; the time may not be remote when party will adopt new designations; federal and republican parties have had their day, their designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. There has not yet been a rotation of offices in which the small States could look for their share, but dent, the Electors shall name in their ballots the per- The person Mr. BRADLEY did not approve of the amendment as it now stood; he could not see why the Vice President should not be chosen by a majority, as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice President becoming President by any casualty, as a good reason for both being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried as the amendment now stands, the office of Vice President would be hawked about at market, and given as change for votes for the Presidency. And what would be the effect?-that it might so happen that a citizen chosen only for the of fice of Vice President, might by the death of the President, though chosen only by a plurality, become President, and hold the office for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of many arguments which he had heard on the preceding day, and however disposed to concur in the principle of designation for the two offices, he could not give it his vote in the present shape. He would, in order to render the report more congenial with his wishes, move to strike out the following words beginning with the words shall, in the thirteenth line, to constitution, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded. [NOVEMBER, 1803. than take it in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms. Mr. JACKSON said, that though coming from a small State he had not been instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the best of his judgment; though his State was now, in regard to population, small, and though it were to remain so, he could have but one opinion on this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five. The constitution under the present form has directed the choice to be made from five. But the reason of this was consistent with the result to be Mr. TRACY opposed the striking out, as not produced; the electors were to vote for two in order, it being an amendment to an amend-persons indiscriminately, but with the restricment already received by the House. He thought, however, it would be in order to reconcile the whole, and then any part might be amended. The PRESIDENT said that the motion for amending the amendment was not in order; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the majority on the question yesterday chose to move for a recommittal, or even to refer the report to a select committee, it would be in order. Mr. BRADLEY then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the constitution as it now stands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be equally respectable, or that there should be none-that at least he should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle, without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assu rance. Mr. HILLHOUSE accorded with the gentleman's amendment, as it naturally grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is given for such an office; the alteration to designation alters the whole thing; and as the gentleman has expressed, will send the Vice President's office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States tion of voting for one only belonging to the State where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though in each case the fifth had but one vote; he alluded to the vote for Mr. Jay. In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each office, and there can be little apprehension of having more than two or three principal candidates; and for twenty years to come he had no apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails. Mr. WRIGHT.-We need not be told in this house, that the constitution was the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know. But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual interest and security, this compromise was made, that we are precluded from effecting any greater good? No man would accuse him of a wish to see the interest of any State impaired. But we can preserve the spirit and intention of the constitution in full vigor, without impairing any interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle; it fulfills the intention, and it forefends the recurrence of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be three or five. For the latter number he was disposed, because already adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any number so much as on the discriminating principle. Mr. NICHOLAS.--Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the constitution; he would make no such profession; and though he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Govern NOVEMBER, 1803.] Amendment to the Constitution. [SENATE. Every member who had spoken on this subject seemed to have admitted, by the very course and pointing of their arguments, even though they may have denied it in words, that this was really a question between great and small States, and disguise it as they would, the question would be so considered out of doors. The privilege given by the constitution extend should be made; and why should the smaller, for whose benefit and security that number was given, now wantonly throw it away without an equivalent? As to the Vice President, his election had no influence upon the number, because the choice of President in the House of Repre ment, he would not hesitate to make any altera- | himself indebted to the member from Tennessee tion calculated to promote, or secure the public for renewing the subject. He was grateful, also, liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be to the member from Maryland (Mr. WRIGHT) made better he would expunge the whole book. for declaring he would support it, as well as for Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely to giving the assurance that he was disposed to the constitution, appear not to consider that a consider and spare the interests of the small choice of President from the number three, is States as far as possible, consistently with the more in the spirit of the constitution than from great object of discrimination. five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would rendered to five, out of which the choice of President the Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent of any party or any State interest. The people held the sovereign power, and it was intended by the constitution that they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an ex-sentatives was as free and unqualified as if that treme case, that the election should go to the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that station? He did not mean any thing disrespectful or invidious towards the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked, what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that constitution which could ad-plex themselves with the distinctions; but he mit of an investiture in a case so important, in could tell that gentleman, that it was not in the known opposition to the wishes of the people? old Congress he had learnt them, for there he The effect would be fatal to the constitution had seen all the votes of the States equal, and itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, had known the comparatively little State of and the affectation, if alone for the small States, Maryland controlling the will of the Ancient would not have been heard of in the deep mur-Dominion. It was in the Federal Convention mur of discontent. An adjournment was now called for and carried. TUESDAY, November 29. Amendment to the Constitution. The order of the day being called up on the amendments to the constitution, a considerable time elapsed, when subordinate office did not exist. Nay, he said, he would venture to assert that, even if the number five were continued, and the Vice Presidency entirely abolished, there would not be as great a latitude of choice as under the present mode, because those five out of whom the choice must eventually be made, were much more likely hereafter to be nominated by the great States, inasmuch as their electors would no longer be compelled to vote for a man of a different State. The honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) has said, he was not surprised that those who had seats in the old Congress, should per that distinction was made and acknowledged; and he defied that member to do, what had been before requested of the honorable gentleman of Virginia, viz: to open the constitution, and point out a single article, if he could, that had not evidently been framed upon a presumption of diversity (he had almost said, adversity) of interest between the great and small States. Mr. ADAMS in a former debate had stated that he had not a wish to avoid or seek for the yeas Mr. DAYTON rose and said, that since no and nays on any question; on the present occaother gentleman thought proper to address the sion, however, he would, when the question was Chair, although laboring himself under a very taken, call for the yeas and nays. But his own severe cold, which rendered speaking painful, vote on the final question would be governed he could not suffer the question to pass without by the decision of the number five, and he wished an effort to arrest it in its progress; and should to have some record of his vote, that he might consider his last breath well expended in endeav-be hereafter able to defend himself against any oring to prevent the degradation which the State he represented would suffer if the amendment were to prevail. As to the question immediately before the Senate for filling the blank with five, he felt charge of inconsistency. On the principle of the amendment he had formed his opinion, and he was free to confess, that notwithstanding the many able productions which he had seen against it, he thought it calculated to produce more good SENATE.] Amendment to the Constitution. [NOVEMBER, 1803. than evil. He was not, however, influenced in most deliberate consideration of the theory and this opinion by the instructions which had been the principles of the constitution; which, if he read in a preceding debate from a former Legis-understood it right, intended that the election lature of Massachusetts to their Senators; he of the Executive should be in the people, or as presumed these were not read by way of intimi- nearly as was possible, consistent with public dation. To the instructions of those to whom order and security to the right of suffrage. The he owed his seat in that House he would pay provision admitting the choice by the House of every respect that was due, but he did not think Representatives, was itself intended only for an that the resolutions of a Legislature passed in extreme case, where great inconvenience might March 1799 or 1800 ought to have the same result from sending a defective election back to weight. Since that time four total and com- the people, as is customary in Massachusetts, plete changes had taken place, and probably not where, if the majority is deficient, a new election one third of those who gave those instructions is required. Our object in the amendment is or now remained. He held a seat in the Legisla- should be to make the election more certain by ture himself three years since, but did not per- the people. This was to be done most effectuceive any particular anxiety on the subject, and ally by leaving it to them to designate the perhe did not think that the present Legislature sons whom they preferred for each office. As would be extremely offended if he were to give under the present form there was an extreme a direct vote against what was recommended case, so there might be when the change of four years ago. number should take place; for, although even with the number three, there was a possibility of the choice devolving on the House of Representatives, yet the adoption of the designating principle and the number three, would render the case less probable. It never was the intention of the framers of the constitution that the election should go to the House of Representatives but in the extreme case; nor was it ever contemplated that about one-fifth of the people should choose a President for the rest, which certainly would be the case if what some gentlemen contended for were to take place. When gentlemen contend for such a power as would transfer the choice from the people, and place it in the hands of a minority so small, how happens it that gentlemen will not bear to hear of the efforts which such arguments or such measures would produce on the larger States? It was not the interest of the small States to combine against the large. Suppose it were possible that the four large States should combine-and a combination of the small States alone could produce such an effect-nine States in the Union have but thirty-two votes out of one hundred and forty-two, yet nine States, with one vote each, make a majority of seventeen, though in relation to population they contain only about one-fifth of the whole; and by such a proceeding the one-fifth might choose a President and Vice President in defiance of the other four-fifths. What would be the consequence of such an election? At a subsequent election the large States would combine, and by the use of their votes they would frustrate every object which the small States might use their efforts to accomplish. The constitution was a combination of federative and popular principles. When you argue upon, or wish to change any of its federative principles, you must use analogies as arguments; popular arguments will not apply to federative principles. The House of Representatives was founded on popular principles; in this House the representation is federative, and not popular; it is in its nature aristocratic. The foundation of all popular representation is equality of votes; but even the ratio of representation is different in different States; the numbers in Massachusetts and Virginia, in Vermont and Delaware, are different in their proportions; but still an equality of representation is preserved, and the only difference is in the details. But if you argue upon the principles of the Senate, this equality of popular representation, or by an equal or relatively equal number, will not apply; you must discuss it upon another species of equality, of sovereignties, and the independence of several States federatively connected. Applying principles then to the election of President, if you reduce the number from which the House of Representatives is authorized to choose, do you not attack the principles of the federal compact, rather than the rights of the small States? The Executive, it had been said, is the man of the people; true, and he is also, as was said, though upon different grounds, the man of the Legislature-it was here a combined principle, federative and popular. Virginia had in that House twenty-two popular representatives, in this she has two federative; Delaware has one popular and two federative representatives. And even in the operation of election in the popular branch of Congress, the federative principle is pursued, Notwithstanding what had been said concernand the State which has only one popular repre-ing the jealousy of States, he could see nothing sentative has an equal voice in that instance in it but the leaven of the old Congress, thrown with the State that has twenty-two popular in to work up feelings that had been long still. representatives. It was therefore evident that It was the forlorn hope, the last stratagem of the attempt to alter the number from five to three, party; and he was the more disposed to think is an attack upon the federative principle, and so, when he saw gentlemen from the large not upon the small States. States coming forward as the champions of the small-this might, to be sure, be magnanimity; but if his discernment did not deceive him, it Mr. S. SMITH, when he made the motion for filling up the blank with three, did it after the |