With difficulty I refrain from putting her to death: "The wretch has murdered my infant : "the ought to be torn to pieces." When I turn calm the matter appears to me in a very different light. The poor woman is inconfolable, and can fcarce believe that he is innocent: fhe bitterly reproaches herself for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both fhe and I become sensible, that no perfon in found fleep has any self-command, and that we cannot be answerable for any action of which we are not conscious.— Thus, upon the whole, we discover, that any impreffion we occafionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the result of paffion, not of found judgement.

The reader will obferve, that this fection is copied from Effays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the fame: the alterations are only in the fuperftructure; and the fubject is abridged in order to adapt it to its prefent place. The preceding parts of the sketch were published in the second edition of Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publishing the whole in one effay, will not, I hope, be thought improper.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Upon Chance and Contingency.

I HOLD it to be an intuitive propofition, That

the Deity is the primary cause of all things; that with confummate wifdom he formed the great plan of government, which he carries on by laws fuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that thefe laws, produce a regular chain of caufes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan (a). Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the effay quoted; and, in my apprehenfion, well founded.

But I cannot fubfcribe to what follows, "That we "have an impreffion of chance and contingency, "which confequently must be delufive." I would not willingly admit any delufion in the nature of man, unless it were made evident beyond contradiction; and I now fee clearly, that the impreffion we have of chance and contingency, is not delufive, but perfectly confiftent with the eftablished plan.

The explanation of chance and contingency in the faid effay, fhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reafon upon. "In our "ordinary train of thinking, it is certain that all " events appear not to us as neceffary. A mul" titude

(a) See Effays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1. effay 3.

❝titude of events feem to be under our power "to caufe or to prevent; and we readily make "a diftinction betwixt events that are neceffary, i. e. that muft be; and events that are contingent, i. e. that may be, or may not be. This distinction is void of truth for all things that "fall out either in the material or moral world, are, as we have feen, alike neceffary, and a"like the refult of fixed laws. Yet, whatever "conviction a philofopher may have of this, the "diftinction betwixt things neceffary and things " contingent, poffeffes his ordinary train of thought, as much as it poffeffes the moft illi"terate. We act univerfally upon that distincti"on: nay it is in truth the caufe of all the la"bour, care, and induftry, of mankind. I il"luftrate this doctrine by an example. Conftant

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experience hath taught us, that death is a ne' ceffary event. The human frame is not made "to laft for ever in its prefent condition; and no "man thinks of more than a temporary existence upon this globe. But the pasticular time of "our death appears a contingent event. However certain it be, that the time and manner of "the death of each individual is determined by a "train of preceding caufes, and is no lefs fixed than the hour of the fun's rifing or fetting;

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yet no person is affected by this doctrine. In "the care of prolonging life, we are directed "by the fuppofed contingency of the time of death, which, to a certain term of years, we confider as depending in a great measure on ourselves, by "caution against accidents, due use of food, exer"cife, &c. Thefe means are profecuted with the "fame diligence as if there were in fact no neceflary "train of caufes to fix the period of life. In fhort, whoever attends to his own practical ideas, whoever reflects upon the meaning of

** the

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"the following words which occur in all languages, "of things poffible, contingent, that are in our power "to cause or prevent; whoever, I fay, reflects upon these words, will clearly fee, that they fuggeft certain perceptions or notions repug"nant to the doctrine above established of uni"verfal neceffity."

In order to fhow that there is no repugnance, I begin with defining chance and contingency. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we fay a thing has happened by chance, we furely do not mean that chance was the caufe; for no perfon ever imagined that chance is a thing that can act, and by acting produce events: we only mean, that we are ignorant of the cause, and that for aught we fee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened differently. Aiming at a bird, I fhoot by chance a favourite fpaniel : the meaning is not, that chance killed the dog, but that as to me the dog's death was accidental. With respect to contingency, future events that are variable and the caufe unknown, are faid to be contingent; changes of the weather, for example, whether it will be froft or thaw to-morrow, whether fair or foul. In a word, chance and contingency applied to events, mean not that fuch events happen without any caufe, but only that we are ignorant of the cause.

It appears to me, that there is no fuch thing in human nature as a fenfe that any thing happens without a cause: fuch a fense would be grofsly delufive. It is indeed true, that our sense of a cause is not always equally diftinct with refpect to an event that happens regularly, fuch as fummer, winter, rifing or fetting of the fun, we have a diftinct fenfe of a caufe: our fenfe is lefs diftinct with respect to events lefs regular, fuch as alterations of the weather; and extremely indiftin&t

with respect to events that feldom happen, and that happen without any known caufe. But with respect to no event whatever does our fenfe of a caufe vanish altogether, and give place to a fenfe of things happening without a caufe.

Chance and contingency thus explained, fuggeft not any perception or notion repugnant to the doctrine of univerfal neceffity; for my ignorance of a caufe, does not even in my own apprehenfion, exclude a claufe. Defcending to particulars, I take the example mentioned in the text, namely, the uncertainty of the time of my death. Knowing that my life depends in fome measure on myfelf, I ufe all means to preferve it, by proper food, exercife, and care to prevent accidents. Nor is there any delufion here. I am moved to use these means by the defire I have to live: these means accordingly prove, effectual to carry on my prefent existence to the appointed period; and in that view are fo many links in the great chain of caufes and effects. A burning coal falling from the grate upon the floor, wakes me from a found fleep. I ftart up to extinguifh the fire.

The motive is irrefiftible: nor have I reafon to refift, were it in my power; for I confider the extinction of the fire by my hand, to be one of the means chofen by Providence for prolonging my life to its defined period.

Were there a chain of caufes and effects eftablished entirely independent on me, and were my life in no measure under my own power, it would indeed be fruitlefs for me to act; and the abfurdity of knowingly acting in vain, would be a prevailing motive for remaining at reft. Upon that fuppofition, the ignava ratio of Chryfippus might take place; cui fi pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita *. But I act neceffarily when inVOL. II. fluenced

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*«The indolent principle; which if we were to follow, we should "do nothing in life."