to Congress also? Such an amendment was most favored for a number of years (in the time of Senator Capper and Representative Sumners), and it is still the most logical and adequate type, if leaving to future congressional judgment with respect to whether or how much representation in House, Senate, and electoral college without tampering with constitutional powers which should belong to all members of those bodies. Sincerely yours, GEORGE W. HODGKINS. WASHINGTON, D.C., April 3, 1960. Hon. EMANUEL CELLER, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, District-State of Columbia. DEAR CONGRESSMAN CELLER: This is written in application for an opportunity to testify at the public hearing by your committee, concerning improvement of the status of American citizenship in the District-State of Columbia. In case that privilege and honor cannot be granted will you kindly enter this letter on the record of that public hearing, as the expression of my view on the proper way to handle this simple, yet vexing problem, so long mishandled in the past. It happens that the city of Washington is territorially coextensive with the District-State of Columbia, and this simple fact has been long used as an international stumbling block to prevent the right solution of District-State voting franchise. Yet the condition is not too exceptional. Cook County, Ill., and the city of Chicago exemplify the same condition, as does also Brooklyn Borough of New York City, and Kings County, New York State. The simple fact that has been intentionally overlooked in order to prevent or postpone proper solution of the problem, is that only through recognition of the priority of quasi-statehood status of the District-State of Columbia, can its residents be granted national representation. Cities are not represented in Congress, such quasi-statehood status has existed in the District-State of Columbia (although intentionally overlooked or ignored) since the adoption of our Federal Constitution in 1787-when there was no city of Washington. It is a well recognized principle of American jurisprudence that the intent of the lawmakers is the law. Certainly this applies to the Federal Constitution-our basic national law-even more than to any subsidiary legislation under it. With equal certainty, the framers of the Constitution-men of the highest intelligence and integrity-had no intent to deprive citizens of the District-State of Columbia (the Capital of the Nation) of the right to national representation which goes with the duty of taxpaying-a right for which the Revolution had just been fought to success and which was, therefore, uppermost in the minds of these framers of the Constitution. The recorded views of James Madison, father of the Constitution, supply direct documentary evidence that this was not only the logical and ethical, but also the actual intent of himself and his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The practical point thus proven is that representation in both Houses of Congress and in the electoral college was written into the Constitution in 1787 and that no constitutional amendment is necessary in order to provide quasi-statehood status for the District-State of Columbia-the same as the status of every other State of the Union-except that Congress has (and should continue to have) full control over District-State legislation, as provided by article I, section 8, paragraph 17, of the Federal Constitution. This provision was merely a very wise measure in 1787: At present it is nothing less than providential-and for two very important reasons, one highly legitimate, the other considerably contemptible, yet still to be regarded and weighed. In the first place, the population of the District-State of Columbia exceeds that of 12 or 14 other States of the Union. For various causes, it is a highly intelligent population. By reason of the provision of the Constitution, above cited, this large and highly intelligent population is under the immediate and continuous and complete legislative supervision and control of Congress. This same condition exists, and can exist, nowhere else in our Nation. It provides an invaluable, an essential opportunity for legislative experimentation toward an ever-increasing degree of democracy, without danger of serious mishap therefrom. The present world crisis is caused by a struggle between democracy and despotism. Every aid toward higher democracy will be an aid to our Nation in this world struggle. A constitutional amendment giving full statehood to the District-State of Columbia, would destroy this tremendously valuable potential which exists under a quasi-statehood status. We must not weaken our Nation by this stupid and vicious action. Somewhat contemptibly, but still factually, there is fear in some quarters concerning the rising tide of Negro population in the District-State of Columbia. I do not have this undemocratic, un-American, un-Christian fear of Negroes (who are also spiritual children of God), but for those who do have it, the continuous control of Congress over District-State legislation provides complete assurance against Negroes dominating the District-State government. It will be found that Negroes will have a high score in American citizenship when they are given voting franchise in the District-State of Columbia. It is beneath contempt to deprive white residents of the District-State of this right, in order to penalize Negroes for nothing more vicious than pigmentation of the skin. Such bigotry must have no further control over the status of citizenship in the District-State of Columbia. Coming back to the subject of territorial coextensiveness, the setting up of a quasi-statehood status for the District-State of Columbia (with a Governor and other State executives, with a District-State assembly-strictly subsidiary, yet helpful, to Congress in legislative matters-and with a District-State judiciary entirely separate from the Federal court system, all of these State officials elected by citizens of the District-State)-this setup will provide all necessary home rule for citizens of the District-State. It would be stupid, maybe vicious, to duplicate this State government setup with a Washington city government. That would be sure to set up continuous probability of friction between the District-State government and its needless duplication through a Washington city government. How stupid must we be in coordinating national representation with home rule, when the same setup will provide both. Therefore, I propose that this simple and long-mishandled problem be settled in the optimum and immediate way by an ordinary act of Congress, implementing in detail what the Constitution already provides quasi-statehood status for the District-State of Columbia, and admitting the District-State as the 51st State in the Union. This could be done in the present session of Congress in time to permit District-State residents (bona fide residents, of course, and exclusive residents here) representation in the present session of Congress and in the electoral college of 1960. I have tried to make this as compact a presentation as can be made of this highly important topic. Please accept my thanks for your patience in hearing my views upon it. DAVID DARRIN, All-American Candidate in 1960 for President of the United States. (Boys' High School, Brooklyn, 1901-03; longtime friend of the late Dr. A. A. Tavsk, for many years principal at Boys' High School.) Hon. EMANUEL W. CELLER, ROCKVILLE, MD., April 8, 1960. House Office Building, Washington, D.C.: The delegates' assembly of Montgomery County Education Association, representing over 3,000 teachers in this suburban county, passed a resolution yesterday urging favorable action of the bill now before your committee to grant voting rights in presidential election to residents of the District of Columbia. ARTHUR SIMONDS, Jr., BRIEF REVIEW OF APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING REQUIREMENTS, WITH A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF H.R. 73 AND H.R. 575 (BоTH 86TH CONG., 1ST Sess.), as VIEWED IN THE LIGHT THEREOF AUTHORITY FOR APPORTION MENT The basis for apportioning Representatives in Congress among the several States is set forth in the Constitution (art. I, sec. 2, par. 3, as amended by the 14th amendment, sec. 2): "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers and excluding Indians not taxed. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative." The authority for regulating the election of Representatives to Congress is vested in Congress by the Constitution (art. I, sec. 4): "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." And it is within the power of Congress to establish standards which the States must follow in redistricting congressional districts (Smiley v. Holm, 1931, 285 U.S. 355). The 14th amendment (sec. 2, which affected article I, section 2, above, states: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed." Thus, it can be seen that the Constitution assigns to the legislature of each State the right to choose, the time, place, and manner of holding elections for Representatives to the House subject to congressional standards when enacted. APPORTIONMENT PROCEDURE Under existing law the apportioning of membership in the House is automatic and because of this feature it is often referred to as the Automatic Apportionment Act (1929). The President submits to Congress (on the 5th day, or within 1 week thereafter, of the convening of each 5th Congress after the 82d) a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State (excluding Indians not taxed) as ascertained under the decennial census of population and the number of Representatives each State is entitled to have on the basis of that census apportioned to the States by the method of equal proportions using the existing size of the House' for arriving at the ratio (2 U.S.C. 2a (b)). Then, within 15 days after receipt of the President's statement, the Clerk of the House sends to each Governor a certificate of the number of Representatives that State is entitled to have in the ensuing Congress. This is the method that applies unless Congress enacts a change in the size of the House or the method of computation (2 U.S.C. 2a (b)). Methods used METHODS OF APPORTION MENT 1790: Congress selected constitutional minimum of 30,000 as the size of each district. 1790-1830: Method of rejected fractions; population of each State divided by "fixed ratio" of 33,000 (1792). 1832: Method of rejected fractions attacked by Daniel Webster who also pointed out that the apportionment clause of the Constitution did not require absolute relative equality but merely as near as may be equal. 1840: Method of 1840 adopted; ratio of 1 Representative for every 70,680 persons fixed by Congress. (This method was never used again.) 1 The present size of the House, 435 seats, was established in 1911. Membership gradually increased from the original 65 to 105 (1792), 141 (1803), 181 (1811), 212 (1822), 240 (1832), 223 (1842), 233 (1850), 234 (1852), 233 (1860), 241 (1862), 242 (1862), 283 (1872), 292 (1872), 325 (1882), 356 (1891), 386 (1901). It should be here noted that with the admission of Alaska the House now has 436 seats and with the effective date, the House will be increased to 437 for Hawaii, and unless there is legislation concerning the size of the House it will automatically revert to 435 following the 1960 census with at least 1 Representative for Alaska and at least 1 for Hawaii and the remaining 433 Representatives will be apportioned as above described. 1850-90: Vinton method; Congress fixed size of House desired and then distributed the seats by this method. 1881: "Alabama paradox" first appeared resulting from use of Vinton method. 1911: Method of major fractions adopted by Congress. 1941: Method of equal proportions adopted by Congress (by amendment to the act of 1929). Description of methods As soon as the census of 1790 had been taken Congress selected the constitutional minimum of 30,000 as the size of each district for the basis of redistributing seats in the House. If the population of each State had been an exact multiple of 30,000 the task would have been easy, but what should be done if Vermont had 85,532; New Jersey 179,556; Virginia 630,558; etc.? What should be done with these variations from exact equality? Three different solutions were tried before 1910: (a) Method of rejected frac tions, (b) method of 1840, and (c) Vinton method. (a) Method of rejected fractions.-This method disregarded fractions entirely and applied to the apportionments based on the census of 1790-1830, inclusive. The population of each State was divided by a fixed ratio (33,000 in 1792 and 1802, 35,000 in 1811, 40,000 in 1822, and 47,700 in 1832) and gave to that State the number of Representatives expressed by the integer in its quotient without reference to fractions. Thus, with a ratio of 33,000, Vermont received 2 Members for an exact quotient of 2.592, New Jersey 5 for 5.441, and Virginia 19 for 19.108, except that each State with a quotient below 1.00 received 1 Representative. This resulted in great inequality between States and congressional districts were very unequal (in 1792, a Vermont district contained 42,766 inhabitants, a New Jersey district 35,911, and a Virginia district only 33,187) and the whole population of a State with relatively large districts was underrepresented. The great inequalities of this method were vigorously attacked by Daniel Webster in 1832, and he urged a method which would assign an additional Representative to each State with a large fraction. His plan fixed a size for the House in advance, divided this into the total national "representative population" and used the quotient as his fixed ratio. He started the principle for interpreting the apportionment clause of the Constitution as not enjoining an absolute relative equality—because that would be demanding an impossibility— but as requiring Congress to make the apportionment of Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers as near may be. (This lead to the insertion of "as nearly as may be" in many State apportionment provisions and is much cited in State decisions.) (b) Method of 1840.-The 1840 census was followed by the adoption of this method which somewhat resembled Webster's plan. After fixing a ratio of 1 Representative for every 70,680 persons, Congress provided that each State having in its quotient a fraction greater than one-half of the ratio should be assigned an additional Representative; and in accordance with this calculation specified the number of Representatives for each State. This method was never used again. Criticism of methods: Besides failing to measure inequalities scientifically, the two methods above described were open to two serious objections. First: they were subject to a defect called the "population paradox”—that is, startling fluctuations in the size of the House might occur without relation to any change in the total population of the country and with no alteration in the "fixed ratio of population per Representative." The size of the House might even decrease considerably, although the total population had largely increased. Secondly: they left the size of the House undetermined until the whole calculation had been completed. As the rapidly increasing population of the country produced a larger and larger membership, the physical limits of the Chamber, the inconvenience of discussion in a large group and other reasons created a strong desire to maintain in successive reapportionments an approximate maximum of membership for the entire country. Consequently the emphasis has shifted from the size of an ideal district to the size of an ideal House, and the problem of apportionment is thereby greatly complicated. (c) Vinton method.-From 1850 through 1900 Congress first fixed a desired size for the House, and then distributed the seats according to the Vinton method,. named for the Congressman who presented it. The method was applied as follows: First: Compute the ratio of population to Representatives or average congressional district by dividing the total representative population of the country by the total desired number of Representatives. Then: Divide the population of each State by this ratio and assign to each State a number of Representatives equal to the whole number in the quotient for that State. States with a quotient less than one are treated specially and each given one Representative. Third: To make up the required size of the House, assign additional Representatives for fractions in the quotient beginning with the State which has the largest fraction. Criticism of method: This method had the distinct advantage of making it possible to fix the size of the House in advance and to regard at least the largest fractions. But-it suffered from a fatal defect called the Alabama paradox. That is, with no corresponding change in population, an increase in the total size of the House might be accompanied by an actual loss of one seat by some State. This paradox first came to the attention of Congress in tables prepared in 1881, which gave Alabama 8 members in a House of 299 and only 7 members in a House of 300, although the population of Alabama had actually increased. In 1900, by this method Maine retained 4 members in a House of 383, 384 and 385. When 386 were apportioned Maine dropped to 3, but came back to 4 for 387 and 388. It dropped back to 3 for 389 and 390, but rose to 4 for 391 and stayed there. "Now you see it, now you don't. (Representative Littlefield, Maine)-Colorado got 2 members in a House of 357 or 358 and 3 members in both smaller and larger Houses. It might even happen that the State which lost a seat in this way was the one State which expanded in population, while all other States had shrunk. (In a House of 100 members, three States having populations of 453,320; 443,310; and, 103,370 would have respectively 45, 44 and 11 Representatives. In a House of 101 members three States having populations of 452,170; 442,260; 105,570 would have respectively 46, 45 and 10 Representatives. Thus, the two States which had lost in population would have gained a Representative, whereas the State which had gained in population would have lost one.) The following is a list of method which are subject to the "Alabama paradox" (reasons are omitted for sake of brevity): Vinton method. Modified Vinton method. Method of alternate ratios. Method of minimum range. Method of minimum inverse range. To avoid the paradoxes shown above only 5 known methods offered a workable solution: Method of equal proportions. Method of harmonic means. Method of major fractions. Method of smallest divisors. Method of greatest divisors. The method of equal proportions was first published in 1921 by Prof. Huntington and was unanimously endorsed by the advisory committee to the Director of Census and by a specially appointed committee of the National Academy of Sciences. It provides a direct and simple test which shows at once whether each State is as nearly as possible on a parity with each other State with respect both to size of districts and to representation per million inhabitants. In measuring inequality of districts, the disparity between two States is defined as the percentage by which the congressional district in one State exceeds the district in another State. Similarly, the inequality in representation per million inhabitants is measured by the percentage by which that representation in one State exceeds the representation in another. An apportionment made by method of equal proportions is one which cannot be improved by any transfer of a seat from any State to any other State; because any such transfer will be found to increase rather than decrease the amount of disparity between the two States; this will be true whether equality of districts is considered or equality of representation per million inhabitants. In applying several tests to the foregoing five methods to measure "inequality" it was found that the method of equal proportions survived more tests than the other methods. Furthermore it was recommended by the Census Advisory Committee in 1921 which studied the mathematical aspects of apportionment as consistent with the literal meaning of the words of the Constitution. A com |