trifling is, indeed, too much the fashion in these days of sciolism and sentimentalism, under the garb too of a strict philosophy, too much the fashion in respect to all the profounder questions of religion, whether natural or revealed. It behoves writers on natural theology to beware, lest by absurd suppositions and shallow reasoning they emperil, not the existence of Him who is God over all, but their own faith and that of their fellow-creatures in this great fact. Concede materialism, and all argument is gone. You have not then an inch of ground on which you can stand, and, engulphed in the abyss of scepticism, you will in vain call out dós o Tov TÓTOV, There is no intermediate position. Pantheism is a mere dream, a frivolous imagination. Atheism-dark, withering, horrible atheism-is the only alternative to theism. There is either the living God, or there is no God at all. But the soul of man exists, and its existence as a spiritual being is revealed to man in consciousness, and from the knowledge of his own soul's existence and spirituality man rises, not indeed by a logical syllogism, but by a necessary judgment of his reason, to the awfully sublime and yet transcendently consoling belief, that there must be one who is altogether spiritual-the living, personal God, from whom we have derived our existence, and to whom we owe the homage of our spirits.

Look now at our author's reasoning. Examine his parallel case, which he exhibits with such a parade of scientific words, and which even persons not familiar with the mysteries of optical science may easily see through. In this case there are two supposed rays of light; the one the ordinary ray, having no consciousness, but following the course prescribed by physical laws; the other is an imaginary ray, endowed with consciousness, and therefore choosing by an act of volition the same course. Look now at what this case is brought forward to illustrate. We have a brain, an organised brain, producing thought, and therefore consciousness, by the mere action of determinate physical causes. This brain is by hypothesis the agent of thought; but observe, it is as such the agent also of consciousness, for the one implies the other, and consciousness of thought is a fact which the materialist must allow. We have, then, a brain, the agent of thought, and conscious of thought, and a supposed immaterial agent, who of course is also conscious. Here are two conscious agents, the material brain and the immaterial soul, paralleled to two rays, the one of which alone is conscious. Consciousness is the distinguishing feature, whether as a product or as an essential power of each of the first pair. The parallel pair is distinguished for the absence of consciousness on the part of the one ray, and the session of it by the other. Is this a scientific parallel? And

pos

is it by such strict philosophical reasoning" as this that we are to be persuaded, that had the all-wise Creator only not made us "living souls," not made us conscious spirits though dwelling in these material frames, we should have had less difficulty than we now experience in ascertaining his own existence, and ascribing to Him a spiritual nature?

The great fallacy which pervades the whole reasoning of Professor Powell, on the physical branch of the argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, consists in his not discriminating between the provinces of physical and mental science. Physical science is solely concerned with physical phenomena, and has for its end the discovery of physical causes and laws. For this purpose it observes, classifies, and generalises facts; it traces the connection among the successive changes which the external world presents, and endeavours to ascertain the physical causes which, though themselves only facts, are sufficient to account for the physical production of these changes. Beyond the sphere of physical phenomena, the student of physical science is not entitled to proceed. He may discover order, arrangement, harmony, and the adaptations of means to ends, as features characterising the system of external nature; he may advance from one generalisation to a higher; he may carry forward this process to the utmost extent, and thus more and more distinctly exhibit the unity which binds together all parts of nature, and confirms the native impression of the human mind that all these parts form one harmonious system of things. But the moment that he contemplates this order, arrangement, and harmony, as indications of mind, reason, intelligence, he ceases to be the mere observer of physical phenomena, and becomes the interpreter of nature in another and higher aspect. He now enters the domain of mental science; and since he now beholds the operation of intelligence, he is bound by the laws of mental science to ascribe this intelligence, not to the system of nature itself, in which there can be no thought, but to an intelligent Being, who alone is capable of thought,-to a Being, therefore, distinct from nature, and who is its Author and Governor. To trace indications of intelligence, and not to ascribe this intelligence to an intelligent Being, is a manifest contradiction. To represent the intelligence of which the order in nature is the result as inseparable from this order, as indeed identical with it, so that we cannot strictly infer the operation of an intelligent Being, but must refer this operation to nature itself, is really to confound things which differ, and to regard reason, mind, intelligence, as physical properties or causes; whereas these are qualities which strict philosophy, as applicable to mind as to matter, compels us to ascribe solely to an intelli

gent Being. Such a mode of procedure is not to philosophise, but to do violence to all the laws of a sound philosophy. "It is not augmentation, but disfiguration of the sciences," says Kant, "when we allow their boundaries to run into one another." Bacon before him had said that religion and philosophy (physical science) had received extreme prejudice by being commixed together, "as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy." By the very constitution of our minds, we must refer signs of power, intelligence, goodness, ultimately to a Being possessed of power, intelligence, and goodness. Signs of these attributes meet us everywhere in nature; and, therefore, unless we would do violence to our own mental constitution, we must ultimately refer these to an intelligent Being, who presides over nature and directs all its operations. Professor Powell would reduce natural theology to a mere branch, or rather to a sort of advanced department of physical science. He confounds, in short, two sciences which are essentially distinct, having each its own separate basis, are constructed by different processes, and aim at different ends. They are indeed closely allied in this one respect, that physical science bears its clear and decided testimony to the existence and attributes of an almighty and intelligent Creator. It exhibits the various departments of external nature as composing a system, whose origin, laws, and harmonious arrangement, must be traced to one possessed of power to create, of intelligence to devise, and of wisdom to adapt means to the production of an end. As we formerly stated, we regard the a posteriori argument, as it is usually termed, as only a detailed exposition of that great argument which rests on a primitive judgment of the mind, and which enables us, finite and imperfect as we are, to rise from the contemplation of conditioned Being to the knowledge and the belief of an unconditioned Being, of one who alone is Eternal, Infinite, and All Perfect.

We regret that we cannot enter into the remaining portions of this essay, especially into that part which has reference to moral and physical evil as affecting the argument for the Divine goodness; not that we have aught to say which can in the least degree lessen the difficulties surrounding this question, but because we regard it as the important point in all such questions clearly to perceive where it is that these difficulties really do lie. In concluding, then, our imperfect remarks, we would express our deep regret at having found it necessary to differ so much from the views of the distinguished author of this essay. We believe him to be sincere in his convictions; but we are satisfied from the perusal of this and his other productious, that certain theories of the physical consti

tution of the world (including man) have warped his philosophic judgment; and that he is on the subject before us, led away from the true path of sound philosophy, by an hypothesis which seems at least to refer all existences, and the whole progression of beings and things, to the mere operation of physical causes. He states towards the conclusion of his essay, that the great source of evil as respects the discussions in which we have been engaged, is "the prevalent want of any really adequate appreciation of the nature, value, and use, mental and moral, of a sound acquaintance with the true inductive principles of natural philosophy." We agree so far in this opinion; but we must express our deep conviction that the principal source of the evil is to be found in the prevalent want of a thorough acquaintance with the principles of mental science, and with the relation which both the mental and the physical sciences bear to that of natural theology. And we cherish the assurance, that the time is approaching when this last science, though presenting to our contemplation Him whose being and perfections are utterly incomprehensible, will yet be seen to rest on an immoveable basis, laid not by any power of direct intuition, not by any logical syllogism, not by a process of mere induction, but by a necessary judgment of the human mind, which neither Atheism nor Pantheism can overturn, without at the same time overturning our mental constitution itself,-a necessary judgment spontaneously pronounced by every mind, learned and unlearned, on the contemplation of our own conditioned existence as finite, dependent, intelligent, and moral beings, and of the conditioned existence of this marvellous scene with which we are surrounded, and of which we also form a part. Resting on this basis, Natural Theology will then, freed from all preliminary contest, proceed in its own sublime task to ascertain, so far as reason is able, the attributes of that all-glorious Being who is thus partially revealed to us in His works and providence, and to deduce from this revelation conclusions to be rectified, enlarged, and elevated, by that higher Revelation which has been graciously bestowed upon us to dispel our darkness, and to lay open to our view the unsearchable riches of His grace. Difficulties, insuperable speculative difficulties will ever remain; for how is it possible for man to "find out God unto perfection?" But these will not be allowed to disturb our faith; they will only increase our longing for that promised time, when, instead of our present obscure and imperfect knowledge, we shall, so far as finite beings can, “know even as we are known."

ART. II.--The Gospel according to St John, after the Authorised Version, newly compared with the Original Greek, and Revised by Five Clergymen. Parker & Son, West Strand. 1857.*

London: John W.

THERE are few questions of the present day more practically important than the question of the revision of our authorised version of the Scriptures.

Some may say-Why make it a question at all? Why not remain satisfied with a version of acknowledged excellence? Our fathers loved and valued it. They handed it down to us as a rich bequest. Can we do better than transmit it to the generation that follows us, untouched, unmutilated, whole and entire, as we received it?

Some would

These questions admit of various answers. answer them as the proposers may wish, and say-Better leave our English Bible as we received it; not perfect, it is true, but good for all ordinary purposes. It might be marred rather than mended by alterations. Emendations might not be improvements; and the suspicions, and murmurings, and controversies to which any attempted revision would certainly give rise, might more than counterbalance any real good effected by the change.

Others, again, might plead that these evils would be but temporary, while the advantages of a really improved version would be permanent. A single generation might exhaust the controversies on the subject, and then for ages to come, there would be the ever-brightening, and ever-spreading enjoyment of a Bible, the best version of the inspired writings existing in any language.

These are, in few words, the views for and against a revision of our English version; but, in order to our forming a correct estimate of the argument on either side, we must enter into a more detailed examination of the whole matter.

That our authorised version admits of improvement, it is impossible for any one, not extremely ignorant, to deny. The desirableness or practicability of making a revision, is a different question. That such a work must be attended with serious difficulties is no proof that the attempt should not be made. Some impediments to the successful accomplishment of a version may be but temporary, and the objections to the undertaking may in time disappear. Even opponents to the work admit the importance of it, but deny the practicability of it-at least at present. But, not further to anticipate,

We shall, first, endeavour to state candidly the merits and

We agree in the main with the author of this article as to the necessity and desirableness of a revision of the English Bible, but we are not so sanguine as to its practicability. We have received another article upon the same subject which we intend to publish.-Ed. B. & F. E. R.