save that lost at daylight, sufficiently | to urge Sedgwick to evince all possiproves that the ground we conceded ble alacrity, found him, at 3 A. M. of was lost by reason of misfortune or the eventful Sunday, just getting his bad generalship, not by lack of valor corps in motion, and explained to him or endurance in our soldiers. Hooker's critical position and the necessity for prompt action in this quarter. The night was clear; there was a full moon; and it would not have been impossible to march a corps from Sedgwick's pontoons to Chancellorsville between midnight and 6 a. M., had there been nothing in his way. But there was a serious obstacle-to wit, Lee's army; some portion of which was in Sedgwick's immediate front, and opened a straggling fire on the heads of his columns so soon as he commenced his march; and at daylight he was just entering Fredericksburg, instead of approaching Chancellorsville. By this time, Gibbon had laid a pontoon, and was crossing into the city, raising Sedgwick's force to nearly 30,000 men. Meanwhile, the Rebel troops in this quarter had been concentrating on Marye's hill, where they had several guns in position; while a canal covering their left, with the bridges all taken up, increased the difficulty of carrying the hill by assault. Gen. Hooker recovered his consciousness and resumed command by noon; but the fighting on this front was now nearly over: Lee's attention being forcibly drawn to Sedgwick, who was operating on his rear, where Hooker had expected him to strike heavily at an early hour this morning. Sedgwick, whose operations had hitherto been intended only to distract attention from the movement on our right, had been directed" by Hooker to cross at Fredericksburg, and advance forthwith on the road to Chancellorsville, demolishing any force that might attempt to bar his progress, until he should fall upon Lee's rear, simultaneously with an attack by Hooker on his front, and thus crush him between them. How hazardous such attempts at concerted attack on a great army from opposite and distant points are, was not now to be first learned. The order found Sedgwick already across the river, but at a point two or three miles below the city. Gen. Warren, who was sent by Hooker, after the stampede of the 11th corps, line of battle could be made, and was to hold it until I was notified that all the other troops had gotten off. This necessitated my fighting for a time both ways. I had two lines of battle; one facing toward Fredericksburg, and the other line behind that. And I had to face about the troops in the rear line, so as to be ready for the enemy in that direction, who were coming on. I had a good deal of artillery; and, although the enemy massed their infantry in the woods very near me, and attempted to advance, and always held a very threatening attitude, I judge they had exhausted their troops so much that they dared not attack me, although I remained there for some time alone in this position, very heavily engaged with artillery all the time, and some of my men of the rear line occasionally being shot by their One attempt to clear the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the hill was repulsed; and it was nearly 11 A. M., infantry at a distance of several hundred yards. There was no forcible attack on me; and, when the time came, I marched off to my new position, probably three-quarters of a mile from the old position, toward Untied States ford, where the new line of battle was laid out. "We immediately commenced to fortify that position by throwing up rifle-pits, and held it until we recrossed the river. In the mean time, we had given up all those great roads connecting with Fredericksburg. The enemy took possession of the belt of woods between us and those roads, and held us in the open space, and commenced using the roads we had abandoned, and marched down and attacked Sedgwick, as it proved afterward." "By order dated May 2, 9 r. M.: received at 11. SEDGWICK ADVANCES ON LEE'S REAR. 363 greater number; and our men lay down on their arms, with little hope of forcing their way through to Hooker on that line, especially since he gave no signs of vitality, and afforded no promise of vigorous cooperation. before Sedgwick had completed such | assailants, we of course lost the dispositions as he deemed requisite to storm the heights; when, advancing resolutely, those heights were quickly carried; Gen. Howe's (2d) division forming three storming columns, under Gen. Neill and Cols. Grant and Seaver, and carrying Cemetery hill under a heavy fire of artillery, pushing thence to Marye's hill, which was likewise carried with little loss; our columns having scarcely been checked in their advance: the Rebel force (the 19th and 20th Mississippi, under Barksdale) being too light. Among the trophies of this success were 200 prisoners, some guns, camp equipage, &c. Having reformed his brigades, Sedgwick, leaving Gibbon at Fredericksburg, moved out on the Chancellorsville road on the track of Barksdale, following him three or four miles to Salem church, where the Rebels halted and began to fight in earnest; being joined by Wilcox, who had fallen back from Banks's ford. The position was strong, its flanks well covered by woods, and repeated attempts to carry it proved abortive. By this time (5 P. M.), Lee-the fighting around Chancellorsville being over-had thrown McLaws this way, with orders and men to stop Sedgwick's progress; and they did it. The fight continued till dark; but the enemy were on high ground, and held it; McLaws now taking command against us, with his force continually augmenting. Being the Morning broke;" and Sedgwick's position was fast becoming critical. The enemy were not only in force on his front, but were feeling around his left, and even back to the heights above Fredericksburg. He was not strong enough to fight the whole Rebel army; yet, should Hooker remain torpid, that luxury was just ahead. He received several dispatches from his chief during the day, evincing a very unsettled frame of mind: one, written early in the morning, saying, "You must not try to force the position you attacked at 5 P. M. Look to the safety of your corps ;" another, dated 11 A. M., saying, "If it is practicable for you to maintain a position on the south side of the Rappahannock, near Banks's ford, do so ;" and another, dated fifty minutes later: "If the necessary information can be ob tained to-day, and, if it shall be of the char it is his intention to advance upon the enemy to-morrow. In this event, the position of your corps on the south bank of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the General could desire. It is for this reason that he desires that your corps should not cross the Rappahannock.' acter the commanding General anticipates, While Hooker was thus hesitating and vacillating," the Rebels were acting. No longer dreading an offen of his force, under a heavy fire of shell; when, at 3:20 A. M., he received this dispatch, dated 20 minutes later than the foregoing, but of course based on one intermediately received from him, (S.) saying that he could hold on south of the river if required: lows: Sedgwick's (6th) Corps, 4,601 | Sickles's (3d) corps, 4,089 sive from his side, they concentrated loss, while across the Rappahannock, largely upon his isolated lieuten- of no less than 17,197 men—as folant; reoccupying the Fredericksburg heights, and, striking him in flank, pushed him down toward the river, and, during the night, over it, at Banks's ford, with heavy loss-hardly less than 5,000 men." Sedgwick being now out of the way, Lee was at liberty to turn with all his force on Hooker, who still remained within his hasty earthworks between Chancellorsville and the Rappahannock. But the Rebels had been marched and fought till they were exhausted, and had been fearfully slaughtered in their reckless rushes on our batteries on Sunday. They may have been willing to repeat that madness; but Lee manifestly was not. The day passed with little skirmishing and no serious fighting; and, at evening, Hooker called a council of corps commanders, which decided nothing; but he determined to recross that night, and did so, utterly unmolested. He states that he brought back one gun more than he took over, and judges that he inflicted greater injury than he received. That is probably an overestimate: since he admits a total "Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both." When this came to hand, it is needless to add that its execution was impossible. Pollard gives the following account of this movement from the Rebel side; which must serve for want of a better: "The enemy. however, was not yet defeated. One more struggle remained; and, to make that, the enemy during the night massed a heavy force against McLaws's left, in order to establish communication with Hooker along the river road. Anderson moved rapidly to the support of McLaws, and reached the church about 12 M, having marched 15 miles. Gen. Lee having arrived on the field, ordered Anderson to move round the church and establish his right on Early's left (Early having come up from Hamil Slocum's (12th) Couch's (24) Reynolds's (1st) 2,883 Howard's (11th) * 2,508 66 2,025 Meade's (5th) 66 292 Cavalry, &c. 66 699 150 He adds that a Rebel surgeon at Richmond stated the loss of their side in these struggles at 18,000;" and it is significant that no official statement of their losses was ever made, and that Pollard is silent on the subject. It is quite probable that, while the prestige of success was wholly with the Rebels, their losses were actually more exhausting than ours. And the violent storm and consequent flood which attended and covered Hooker's rëcrossing, setting some of his pontoons adrift and threatening to separate him from his resources, is cited on one side to explain his retreat, and on the other to excuse Lee's failure to molest it. Hooker, his army having returned to their familiar camping-ground on the north of the Rappahannock, issued “a congratulatory order, wherein he says: 44 "The Major-General commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, ton's crossing, in rear of the enemy). The enemy having weakened his left, in order to force McLaws and gain the river road, Gen. Lee massed a heavy force upon this weakened part of the enemy, and, at a concerted signal, Anderson and Early rushed upon the enemy's left. "The signal for the general attack was not given until just before sunset, when our men rushed upon the enemy like a hurricane. little resistance was made: the beaten foe having fled in wild confusion in the direction of Banks's But ford. At dark, a short pause ensued; but, as soon as the moon rose, the enemy was speedily driven to Banks's ford, and on that night of the 4th of May ended this remarkable series of battles on the lines of the Rappahan nock." LEE'S ORDER-STONEMAN'S RAID. 365 the reasons are well known to the army. | to return our grateful thanks to the only It is sufficient to say they were of a charac- Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance ter not to be foreseen nor prevented by hu- He has wrought. inan sagacity or resources. "In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents. In fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interest or honor may demand. It will also be the guardian of its own history and its own honor. "By our celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers was undisputed, and, on our withdrawal, not a Rebel ventured to follow. "The events of last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army. We have added new luster to its former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have inflicted heavier blows than we have received. We have taken from the enemy 5,000 prisoners, 15 colors; captured and brought off 7 pieces of artil: lery; placed hors de combat 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his dépôts filled with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle." Lee issued a kindred order next day; in which, with at least equal justice and modesty, he says: "With heartfelt gratification, the General commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men, during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged. Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon May 2. 46 | "It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the troops unite on Sunday next_in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name. "Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defense of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example. The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one [Jackson] to whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success." The operations of our cavalry, under Stoneman and Averill, had been ill-judged, feeble, and inefficient as well could be. Averill, who was on the right, went out to Culpepper Court House, and thence to the Rapidan; where he remained, attempting nothing and achieving it, till an order from Hooker reached" him, directing his return to the north side of the Rappahannock; which was obeyed with alacrity. Stoneman himself pushed down by Louisa Court House and Yanceyville to Thompson's Cross-Roads, on the South Anna; having meantime sent Col. Wyndham with a detachment to Columbia, on the James, where a little damage was done and more attempted to the James and Kanawha Canal. Gen. Gregg, with the 1st Maine and 10th New York, was impelled eastward, to destroy the railroad bridge on the Fredericksburg road at Ashland; but proved unequal to the task, and contented himself with burning two or three turnpike bridges; falling back upon Stoneman. Col. Judson Kilpatrick was sent, with the Harris Light, to cut the railroads leading northward from Richmond still nearer that city, and struck" the Fredericksburg road at sent against it, and cutting the Fredericksburg road at or above its junction with the Central; as, below that Hungary, cut it, pressing thence to the Virginia Central road, near Meadow Bridge, doing there a little mischief, and thence pushing north-east-point, cutting one of those roads, ward across the Pamunkey near Han- even permanently, was of little use; over, and the Mattapony at Aylett's, since communication between Richto King and Queen Court House, and mond and Fredericksburg might be thence south-eastwardly to our lines" maintained by either. By keeping at Gloucester Point, on York river. his entire force in hand, and thus goLt.-Col. B. F. Davis, 12th Illinois, had ing where and as he would, Stonemeantime passed" down the South man might have destroyed the prinAnna to Ashland, where he tore up cipal bridges on both roads, rendersome rails and captured a train of ing them impassable for weeks; and sick, whom he paroled, and crossed brought away thousands of able-bodthence to Hanover Station on the ied negroes, mounted on as many Central, which was fractured, and serviceable horses. As it was, by considerable Confederate property de- dissipating his forces, he rendered stroyed. Davis then pushed down them too weak at most points to effect to within seven miles of Richmond, any thing, and kept them running where he bivouacked that night, and from the enemy instead of running set his face next morning toward after them; thus giving to his expeWilliamsburg on the Peninsula; but dition the appearance rather of a furwas stopped and turned aside by a tive raid on smoke-houses and henRebel force at Tunstall's Station, roosts than that of an important near White House; moving thence movement in a great war. The few northward until he fell in with Kil- little gaps made in the railroads patrick near King and Queen Court by his detachments were easily and House, and escaped with him to Gen. quickly closed; while the 300 horses King's outpost at Gloucester Point. and mules he brought away would Stoneman, with Gregg and Buford, not half replace the horses broken turned back" from Yanceyville, re- down by his men-mainly in keepcrossing the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, ing out of the enemy's way. and the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford." While Hooker was preparing for and executing his movement across the Rappahannock, Longstreet, with a large force, was aiming a similar blow at the extreme left of our position in Virginia; where Gen. John J. Peck held the little village of SUFFOLK, with a force ultimately increased to 14,000 men, aided by three gunboats on the Blackwater. Suffolk being an important railroad junction, covering the landward ap49 May 5. 20 May 8. |