honorable towards them, and which, as a member of a rival state at war with them, consists in the duty of vigilance which I owe towards the honor and interests of my own country. I am not conscious of a word or thought which on the point of honor I would wish to have concealed from a French minister. In the mode which I have proposed of unravelling the present subjects of jealousy and contest, I would make my proposals openly to France herself. Let America be free, and enjoy happiness and peace for ever. If France and Great Britain have jealousies or rivalships between themselves as European nations, I then say to France, Let us settle these points between ourselves, if unfortunately we shall not be able by honorable negotiation to compromise the indispensable points of national honor and safety. This would be my language to France, open and undisguised. In the mean while I desire you to observe that it would not be with reluctance that I should offer eternal freedom, happiness, and peace to America. You know my thoughts too well to suspect that. I speak only as in a state of war desirous to arrange the complicated interests and to secure the respective honor of nations. My wishes are and always have been for the peace, liberty, and safety of mankind. In the pursuit of those blessed objects not only this country and America, but France herself and the house of Bourbon, may justly claim the conspiring exertions of every free and liberal mind, even among their temporary enemies and rivals. I am, &c. D. HARTLEY.

[Enclosed in the Letter of DAVID HARTLEY, ESQ. of May 1, 1782.]

Breviate, Feb. 7, 1782.

It is stated that America is disposed to enter into a negotiation of peace with Great Britain without requiring any formal recognition of Independence; always understood that they are to act in conjunction with their allies, conformable to treaties.

It is therefore recommended to give for reply that the ministers of Great Britain are likewise disposed to enter into a negotiation for peace, and that they are ready to open a general treaty for that purpose.

If the British ministers should see any objection to a general treaty, but should still be disposed to enter into a separate treaty with America, it is then recommended to them to offer such terms to America as shall induce her to apply to her allies for their consent that she should be permitted to enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain. The condition of which being the consent of allies, no proposition of any breach of faith can be understood to be required by them by the requisition of a separate treaty.

The British ministers are free to make any propositions to America which they may think proper, provided they be not dishonorable in themselves, which in the present case is barred by the supposition of consent being obtained. In this case, therefore, if they should be inclined to offer a separate treaty, it is recommended to them to offer such terms to America, as should induce her to be desirous of closing with the proposal of a separate treaty on the grounds of national security and interests, and likewise such as may constitute

to them a case of reason and justice upon which they may make requisition to their allies for their consent. It is suggested that the offer to America of a truce of sufficient length, together with the removal of the British troops, would be equivalent to that case which is provided for in the treaty of February 6, 1778, between America and France, viz. tacit independence; and the declared ends of that alliance being accomplished, it would not be reasonable that America should be dragged on by their allies in a war, the continuance of which between France and Great Britain could only be caused by separate European jealousies and resentments (if unfortunately for the public peace any such should arise) between. themselves, independent and unconnected with the American cause. It is to be presumed that France would not in point of honor to their allies refuse their consent so requested, as any rivalship or punctilios between her and Great Britain, as European nations (principles which too frequently disturb the peace mankind) could not be considered as casus fœderis of the American alliance; and their pride as a belligerent power would not permit them to claim the assistance of America as necessary to their support, thereby proclaiming their nation unequal to the contest in case of the continuance of a war with Great Britain after the settlement and pacification with America. Their consent therefore is to be presumed. But if they should demur on this point, if Great Britain should be disposed to concede tacit independence to America by a long truce and the removal of the troops, and if the obstruction should evidently occur on the part of France, under any equivocal or captious construction of a defensive treaty of alliance

of

between America and France, Great Britain would from thenceforward stand upon advantage ground, either in any negotiation with America, or in the continuance of a war including America, but not arising from any farther resentments of Great Britain towards America, but imposed reluctantly upon both parties by the conduct of the Court of France.

These thoughts are not suggested with any view of giving any preference in favor of a separate treaty above a general treaty, or above any plans of separate but concomitant treaties, like the treaties of Munster and Osnaburgh, but only to draw out the line of negotiating a separate treaty in case the British ministry should think it necessary to adhere to that mode. But in all cases it should seem indispensable to express some disposition on the part of Great Britain to adopt either one mode or the other. An absolute refusal to treat at all must necessarily drive America into the closest connexion with France and all other foreign hostile powers, who would take advantage for making every possible stipulation to the future disadvantage of British interests, and, above all things, would probably stipulate that America should never make peace with Great Britain without the most formal and explicit recognition of their independence, absolute and unlimited.

PRIVATE JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, as kept by DR. FRANKLIN, relative to the Negotiations for Peace between Great Britain and the United States of America, in the period between the 21st of March and the 1st of July, 1782.

Passy, May 9, 1782. As, since the change of ministry in England, some serious professions have been made of their dis

position to peace, and of their readiness to enter into a general treaty for that purpose; and as the concerns and claims of five nations are to be discussed in that treaty, which must therefore be interesting to the present age and to posterity, I am inclined to keep a journal of the proceedings as far as they come to my knowledge, and, to make it more complete, will first endeavour to recollect what has already passed.

Great affairs sometimes take their rise from small circumstances. My good friend and neighbour Madame Brillon being at Nice all last winter for her health, with her very amiable family, wrote to me that she had met with some English gentry there whose acquaintance proved agreeable; among them she named Lord Cholmondeley, who she said had promised to call, on his return to England, and drink tea with us at Passy. He left Nice sooner than she supposed, and came to Paris long before her. On the 21st of March I received the following

note :

"Lord Cholmondeley's compliments to Dr. Franklin; he sets out for London to-morrow evening, and should be glad to see him for five minutes before he went. Lord C. will call upon him at any time in the morning he shall please to appoint.

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Thursday Evening, Hotel de Chartres."

I wrote for answer that I should be at home all the next morning, and glad to see his Lordship, if he did me the honor of calling upon me. He came accordingly. I had before no personal knowledge of this nobleman. We talked of our friends whom he left at Nice, then of affairs in England, and the late

VOL. II.

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