the work of internal improvement, is, however, not so clear. On this subject, it may be suggested:

1. If it will not be profitable; that is, if capital thus invested will not be as productive as that invested in other employments, it ought not to be undertaken by the public, because the capital thus invested must be taken from other employments; that is, it must be taken by force from a more productive, to be invested in a less productive employment. If it be said, though it be not itself productive, it may enrich the district in which it is constructed; the answer to this is, then let that district pay for it, unless it can be shown to be either wise or just, to impoverish one district, for the purpose of enriching another.

2. If it will be productive, private associations, in an intelligent community, will, with proper encouragement, be ready to undertake it. And of the question of profitableness, private individuals will judge much more accurately than a government, because the facts are equally known to both; the degree of intelligence is likely to be as great in the one case as in the other; and the one party can be influenced by no motive but self-interest, which is here also the interest of the public; while the other party may be influenced by party politics, sectional jealousy, love of power, and a thousand disturbing

causes.

3. A work of this sort will be executed at much less expense by private individuals, than by a government. The costliness of all public works is every where proverbial. The greater the number of intermediate agencies by which any work is performed, the more imperfectly is the work done, and the greater is the unnecessary expenditure. Now, government is itself an agent. It must perform the work by means of another set of agents. Under these may be half a dozen others, in the form of contractors and sub-contractors. All these unnecessary agencies must be paid out of the public purse,

and their accounts adjusted by those who have no special motive to encourage economy. All this is reversed, when those, who conduct the work, pay for it themselves, and whose profits, in the end, must depend upon the goodness of the work and the cheapness of its execution.

4. A work of this kind, when completed, will be more faithfully superintended by private, than by public owners. The private owner knows that he must conduct his operation economically, and maintain the favor of the public, or else he will gain nothing by his investment. A government is under no such salutary check.

5. But a still stronger objection to the confiding of such works to the public, is, the amount of patronage which it must, of necessity, place in the hands of a government. The power to make roads and canals whenever it pleased, and to employ upon them whomsoever it pleased, once placed in the hands of a party, would perpetuate it in office forever, in spite of any violation of right which it might perpetrate, or any corruption of which it might be guilty. There can be but little doubt that a large portion of the investment in internal improvement made by our state authorities will prove an almost total loss.

For these reasons, it seems to me that the safer rule would be to leave works of this kind to be executed by private incorporations. This, however, is only a general, and not an universal rule. Works may be of such magnitude, or they may be of so great national importance, that they must be executed and controlled by the public at large. These cases are, however, I apprehend, the exceptions. The rule I suppose to be as above stated.

There are, however, other improvements, of very great importance, the superintendence of which belongs, of necessity, to a government; it is that class of improvements which reduce the expense, and lessen the risk of external commerce. Among these,

the most important are the removal of obstructions from harbors; the location of buoys and the erection of light-houses; the execution of accurate surveys; and the publication of accurate charts of the whole coast of a country. The more perfect these become, the less is the risk of shipwreck, in leaving and approaching a coast; of course, the less is the cost of insurance, and the less the price of every thing imported and exported. Hence, a nation, of fering these advantages, becomes a better market for all other nations, and they will the more readily resort to her for exchanges. Improvements of this sort are one of the most economical forms of national investment; they frequently save, in a single year, the whole cost of their erection. The loss of property and life, by shipwreck, on almost every coast, is enormously great. The greater part of this loss might probably be saved, by judicious expenditure upon improvements on the coast, and proper regulations for the government of pilots.

3. I have said, above, that exchanges will be effected by the security or insecurity of the right of property. Hence, legislators can do much to promote the prosperity of a country, by the enactment of wholesome laws, by which contracts shall be enforced, wrongs redressed, and injuries prevented. And they should be specially careful that they are not guilty, in their social character, of what they forbid to others in their individual character. They should be scrupulous in the observance of individual right, and should remember, that a single individual is as important as a nation, when the question of justice is concerned.

And the same principles apply to the treatment of foreigners. No foreigner can traffic with another country, without placing his property in the power of the citizens of that country. If his rights be respected, and he be assured of the benefit of equal laws, he will invest his property abroad as freely as at home; and will, with confidence, and on the

most moderate terms, effect exchanges to as great an extent as he is able. Hence, under these circumstances, exchanges will be effected to the greatest advantage of both countries, and they will naturally flow from other countries to such an one as this. And the reverse will be the case, if the rights of foreigners are disregarded. Other nations will desire their custom, if we do not. Commerce will leave our shores, and we shall be left in the well-known condition of the dog in the manger. The fable, I believe, informs us that he was starved to death.

17*

CHAPTER SECOND.

OF EXCHANGE BY MEANS OF A METALLIC CURRENCY.

SECTION I.

OF THE USE OF A CIRCULATING MEDIUM.

In the preceding chapter, I have endeavored to illustrate the general principles of exchange, and the conditions by which it is regulated. Exchange, however, like every other benefit which we enjoy in this life, can only be accomplished by labor. But in this, as in every other case, it holds true, that a great advantage is gained by increasing the productiveness of labor; that is by enabling the same individuals, by the same labor, to accomplish a greater amount of exchange. And it holds true in this, as in other cases, that the result of labor is more perfect, just in proportion as the productiveness of labor is increased.

But in order to accomplish this, an intermediate instrument or tool must be used. A man who cannot split a log by the direct use of his hands, will find no difficulty in splitting it with a beetle and wedges. So, also, he who would find it impossible to effect a dozen exchanges in a day, if he insisted on exchanging the products themselves, will find no difficulty in doing it in a few minutes, by means of the instrument which has been invented for this purpose, and he will not only thus do it in a shorter time, but also on better terms, and with much greater exactitude.

This instrument, of so much importance in ex