also from public oppression. Wherever this immunity is wanting, the progress of a nation in wealth will be slow. It is owing rather to the freedom of her institutions and the equity of her laws, than to her physical advantages, that Great Britain has so far outstripped all other European nations in the accumulation of wealth, and in every thing that confers social power. It is almost superfluous, however, to add, that a free constitution is of no value, unless the moral and intellectual character of a people be sufficiently elevated to avail itself of the advantages which it offers. It is merely an instrument of good, which will accomplish nothing, unless there exist the moral disposition to use it aright.

To sum up what has been said: Labor will be applied to capital, in proportion as every man is allowed to gain all that he can; that is, as property is most perfectly divided; and as this division is most strictly enforced; that is, as the right of property is guarded by the most equitable laws; and as there exist the strongest guarantees that these laws will be inviolate, whether they relate to individuals or to society.

II. The second part of the condition mentioned in the beginning of this section is, that the individual be allowed to use his own as he will. To this, is of course to be added the condition, that he use it in such manner, as not to interfere with the rights of his neighbor.

A man's possessions are his talents, faculties, skill, and the wealth and reputation which these have enabled him to acquire; in other words, his industry and his capital. In order that industry be applied to capital with the greatest energy, it is necessary that every man be at liberty to use them both as he will; that is, that both of them be free.

And first, of industry. The aptitudes of men for different employments are very dissimilar. The choice of every man naturally leads him to that employment for which he is best adapted. By allow

ing every man, therefore, to employ his industry as he chooses, every man will be employed about that for which he is best adapted; and hence, the production of all will be greatly increased, because we thus avail ourselves of the peculiar productiveness of every individual. Nor is this all. By allowing every man to labor as he chooses, we very greatly increase the happiness of every individual. And every one knows that a man will labor with better success when his labor is pleasant, than when it is irksome.

The case is the same with respect to capital. Every man is more interested in his own success, than any other man can be interested in it. Hence, every man is likely to ascertain more accurately in what manner he can best employ his capital, than any other man can ascertain it for him. If every man, therefore, be allowed to invest his capital as he will, the whole capital of a country will be more profitably invested, than under any other circumstances whatever. And, since, when he is left thus at liberty, there will be the greatest gain to the capitalist, there will also be the greatest stimulus to his industry; for the stimulus to labor is always in proportion to the rewards of labor. And, on the contrary, in just so far as, by any means, this productiveness is diminished, the stimulus to labor is also diminished with it.

It may be said that men, if left to themselves, will be liable to invest their capital unwisely. Granted. Man is not omniscient, and therefore this liability cannot be avoided. The question, therefore, is, how shall it be rendered as small as possible. Will a man, who reaps the benefit of success and suffers the evils of failure, be less likely to judge correctly, than he whose faculties are quickened by no such responsibility? Nor is this all. Not only are legislators, who generally assume the labor of directing the manner in which labor or capital shall be employed, in no manner peculiarly qualified for this

task; they are, in many respects, peculiarly disqualified for it. The individual is liable to no peculiar biases, in making up his mind in respect to the profitableness of an investment. If he err, it is because the indications deceive him. The legislator, besides being liable to err by mistaking the indications, is liable to be misled by party zeal, by political intrigue, and by sectional prejudice. What individual would succeed in his business, if he allowed himself to be influenced in the manner of conducting it, by such considerations? And. must not like causes always produce like results?

Besides, every man feels, instinctively, that he has a right to use his capital and his industry as he pleases, provided he interfere not with the rights of another; and that, to restrict him in this use, is injustice. We have before said, that nothing paralyzes industry like oppression, and it is as true in this case, as in any other. If this sort of interference be violent or frequently repeated, capital and labor, whose motto like that of Dr. Franklin is, "Where liberty dwells, there is my country," will emigrate to some more congenial social atmosphere. And if the interference be not so intolerable as to produce these results, yet, in just so far as it has any effect, it is all of this kind, and, by its whole operation, must diminish the incitements to industry.

And, on the contrary, just in proportion as every individual is free to employ his industry and capital as he chooses, and thus both to receive a larger compensation for his labor, and also to labor more happily, will be the inducements to industry and to the investment of capital.

If this be so, we see the impolicy of several forms of legislative interference, in relation to this subject. 1. We see what must be the effects of monopolies. A monopoly is an exclusive right granted to a man, or to a company of men, to employ their labor or capital in some particular manner. Such was the exclusive right granted to the East India Company,

to import into the ports of Great Britain, or her territories, the productions of all countries east of the Cape of Good Hope. Such were the privileges granted formerly by Spain, to particular individuals or companies, of importing foreign commodities into the ports of her colonies in South America. The result of this exclusion was to prevent all other persons, except those thus favored, from investing their capital in this manner; and hence, to reduce the value of that capital, by precisely the amount of this effect. Nor is this all. Those who hold this exclusive privilege, being liable to no competition, might charge for their commodities whatever they choose. Here is, therefore, a two-fold injustice; first, the means of the consumer are diminished; and secondly, the price which he must pay, is enhanced at the mere will of his oppressor.

2. Hence we see the impolicy of obliging an individual, or a class of individuals, to engage in any labor, or to make any investment, contrary to their wishes. Thus, we are told that during the French revolution, some individuals were punished, capitally, for raising cattle, instead of wheat. Men may call this legislation, but the true name for it is robbery. To oblige a man to raise a crop worth fifteen dollars per acre, when he would otherwise have raised one worth twenty dollars per acre, is just the same thing as to let him do as he pleases, and then rob him of five dollars an acre afterwards. The wrong is the more intense, in the former case, inasmuch as it is done under the semblance of justice, and by men who claim, as the robber does not, that they have the right to do it. Such legislation as this will, in any country, soon produce a famine.

3. Another form of injury under this class, is seen in the restrictions upon industry, formerly, if not now, existing in many of the countries of Europe. By these regulations, artisans were prohibited the exercise of more than one trade; they were not allowed to exercise that trade, unless they had served

a prescribed apprenticeship; nor unless they joined a particular trade-society, and bound themselves to comply with certain restrictions, as, for instance, to sell at particular prices, and never to employ beyond a certain number of apprentices. The result of all this oppression is most iniquitous. It reduces the value of skill and industry, the sole estate of the laborer; and places him in the power of those whose interest it is to reduce the supply as much as possible, in order to secure to themselves the most exorbitant profit. In such cases, a large amount of available industry must be kept out of employment; and, of course, production is, to this whole amount, diminished.

4. The same effect is partially produced by any mode of legislation, by which, in consequence of favor shown to one party, which of course another party must pay for, men are obliged to exchange an employment, for which they have peculiar facilities, for another which they do not prefer, and for which they have not the same facilities. The manner, in which this would lessen the stimulus to industry, has already been illustrated. Thus, should our government, believing that commerce was more valuable to this country than manufactures, lay a tax, sufficient to meet the expenses of the government, upon all American manufactures, in order to increase the amount of foreign importation, this would drive manufacturers out of business and oblige them to become merchants and agriculturists. I think that every one must see that this would diminish the stimulus to industry throughout the whole country. Men would not voluntarily engage in manufactures in preference to commerce, unless they found manufactures to be more profitable; and to oblige them to exchange the one for the other, is, therefore, to oblige them to leave a more productive for a less productive mode of employment. By all this difference is the country the loser, and the incitement to industry diminished.

5. Hence, we also see the impolicy of laws regu