of the human countenance. Nor is the power in the hand of the artist, which, as in the former example, obeys the will; nor in his eye, though it be the chief organ on which the correctness of the likeness depends; and it resides not in the mirror, which takes no part in the operation of painting; but the source of motion in the eye and in the hand, is in the mind, which, by an act of the will, exerts the eye in viewing one object, and in conveying back to the mind its view of another object, that the hand delineates.

16. It is said above, that the terms faculty and power have nearly the same radical meaning. The term power is used in relation both to material and mental objects. Thus a stone has the power of falling to the ground. The term faculty is used in reference to the understanding and volition of the human mind. The terms, now defined are not applied to the passions of the soul of man; for to those active energies, or principles, as desire, hatred, joy, love, anger, revenge, &c. we never use such expressions as the "faculty of desire," or the " power of hatred."

17. There is a distinction between things in the mind and things external to the mind. The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. Every thing is said to be in the mind of which the mind is the subject.

18. It is evident, that there are some things which cannot exist without a subject to which they belong, or of which they are attributes.

Illus. Thus, colour must be in something coloured; figure in something figured; thought being an act of mind, can only belong to something that acts or thinks; and volition cannot exist but in some being that wills. When, therefore, we speak of things in the mind, we understand by this, things of which the mind is the subject.

19. Excepting the mind itself, and things within the mind, all other things are said to be external, or without the mind. 20. There is a figurative sense in which things are said to be in the mind.

Illus. Thus we say, such a thing is not in our mind, meaning no more than that we had not the least thought of it. For, by a figure, we put the thing for the thought of it. In this sense, external things are in the mind as often as they are objects of thought.

21. Thinking is a very general word, that includes all the operations of our minds.

22. To perceive, to remember, to be conscious, and to conceive or imagine, are words that signify different operations of mind, which are distinguished in all languages, and by all men that think.

Illus. 1. We are never said to perceive things, of the existence of which we have not a full conviction. We may conceive or imagine a mountain of gold, or a winged-horse; but no man says that he perceives such a creature of imagination as a winged horse. Thus, perception is distinguished from conception, or imagination.

2. Perception is applied only to external objects, not to those that are in the mind itself. When I am pained, I do not say, that I perceive pain, but that I feel it, or that I am conscious of it. Thus, perception is distinguished from consciousness.

3. The immediate object of perception must be something present, and not what is past. We may remember what is past, but we do not perceive it. I may say, I perceive such a person has had the small pox; but this phrase is figurative, although the figure is so familiar that it is not observed. The meaning of it is, that I perceive the pits in his face, which are certain signs of his having had the small-pox. We say that we perceive the thing signified, when we perceive only the sign. But when the word perception is used properly, and without any figure, it is never applied to things past; and thus it is distinguished from remembrance.

23. Perception is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of external objects by our senses. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that express the operations proper to each sense; perceiving expresses that which is common to them all.

24. Consciousness signifies that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. To apply consciousness, therefore, to things past, is to confound it with memory.

Consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of things external, or without the mind.

25. Conceiving, imagining, and apprehending, are commonly used as synonymous in our language, and signify the same thing which the logicians call simple apprehension.

Illus. Simple apprehension is an operation of mind different from all those we have mentioned. Whatever we perceive, whatever we remember, whatever we are conscious of, we have a full persuasion or conviction of its existence. But we may conceive or imagine what has no existence, and what we firmly believe to have no existence. What never had an existence cannot be remembered; what has no existence at present cannot be the object of perception or of consciousness; but that which never had existence, or that which has no existence, may be conceived. Every man knows, that it is as easy to conceive a winged-horse, or a centaur, as it is to conceive a horse, or a man.

Corol. Let it be observed, therefore, that to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all. It is an act of the mind by which nothing is affirmed or denied, and which therefore can be neither true nor false.

26. When these words are used as above, to express simple apprehension, they are followed by a noun in the accusative or objective case, which signifies the object conceived; as I conceive an Egyptian pyramid. This implies no judg

ment.

27. But there is another and a very different meaning of those words, so common and so well authorised in language, that it cannot easily be avoided; and, on that account, we ought to be the more on our guard, that we be not misled by the ambiguity.

Illus. Politeness and good-breeding lead men, on most occasions, to express their opinions with modesty, especially when they differ from others whom they respect. Therefore, when a man would express his opinion modestly, instead of saying, "This is my opinion," or, " This is my judgment," which has the air of dogmaticalness; he says, "I conceive it to be thus, I imagine, or I apprehend, it to be thus," which is understood as a modest judgment. In like manner, when any thing is said which we take to be impossible, we say, "We cannot conceive how it could be," thereby intimating, that we cannot believe it.

28. But when the words conceive, imagine, or apprehend, are used to express opinion or judgment, they are commonly followed by a verb in the infinitive mood; as, I conceive the Egyptian pyramids to be the most ancient monuments of human art.

Illus. This implies judgment. When the words are used in this last sense, the thing conceived must be a proposition, because judgment cannot be expressed but by a proposition. When they are used in the first sense (26.), the thing conceived may be no proposition, but a simple term only; as a pyramid, an obelisk. Yet even a proposition may be simply apprehended, without forming any judgment of its truth or falsehood; for it is one thing to conceive the meaning of a proposition; it is another thing to judge it to be true or false.

29. Most of the operations of mind, from their very nature, must have objects to which they are directed, and about which they are employed. He that perceives, must perceive something; and that which he perceives is called the object of his perception.

Corol. It is, therefore, impossible to perceive without having some object of perception. The mind that perceives, the object perceived, and the operation of perceiving that object, are distinct things, and are distinguished in the structure of all languages.

30. In this sentence, I see, or perceive the moon; I is the person or mind; the active verb see, denotes the operation of that mind; and the moon denotes the object.

31. What we have said of perceiving, is equally applicable to most operations of mind, which are, in all languages, expressed by active transitive verbs; and such verbs require an agent and an object.

Corol. Whence it is evident, that all mankind, both those who have contrived language, and those who use it with understanding, have distinguished these three things as different; to wit, the operations of the mind, which are expressed by active verbs, the mind itself, which is the nominative to those verbs; and the object, which is the oblique case governed by them.

32. The word idea, in popular language, signifies precisely the same thing that we commonly express by the active participles conceiving or apprehending.

Illus. 1. Thus, to have an idea of a thing, is to conceive it. To have a distinct idea of it, is to conceive it distinctly. To have no idea of it, is not to conceive it at all.

2. Idea, therefore, signifies the same thing as conception, apprehension, notion.

33. When the word idea is taken in this popular sense, no man can possibly doubt whether he has ideas; for he that doubts must think, and to think is to have ideas.

34. The term idea, coming from the Greek verb idav, properly signifies a thought, representative of such objects as have been perceived by the sense of sight.

Obs. It is solely owing to the poverty of language that this word is also used for the notions which we have of things, received by means of the other senses; and, farther still, to those primary notions or elements of abstract thought, which compose trains of argument and chains of reasoning, in the mind of the philosopher or the statesman.

35. When, therefore, in common language, we speak of having an idea of any thing, we mean no more by that expression than to conceive of it.

This. But as we cannot conceive, or have a notion of any thing without thinking of it, to constitute an idea implies a mind that thinks; an act of the mind which we call thinking; and an object about which we think.

36. The word idea, however, in a philosophical sense, means some image, or representative of an external object present to the mind.

Пlus. 1. The idea is in the mind itself, and can have no existence but in a mind that thinks; but the remote or mediate object may be something external, as the sun or moon; it may be something past or future; it may be something which never existed; and we may observe that this meaning is built upon a philosophical opinion.

2. For, if philosophers had not believed that there are such im

mediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they would never have used the word idea to express them.

3. But the term idea taken in this sense, is to be considered a mere fiction of philosophers; and use, the arbiter of language, hath now, in all popular discussions, authorized as synonyma the words thought, notion, apprehension, and idea.

37. When a figure is stamped upon a body by pressure, that figure is called an impression, as the impression of a seal on wax, or of printing-types, or of a copper-plate, on paper. This seems now to be the literal sense of the word; the effect borrowing its name from the cause.

Obs. But by metaphor or analogy, like most other words, its meaning is extended, to signify any change produced in a body by the operation of some external cause. A blow of the hand makes no impression on a stone-wall; but a battery of cannon may. The moon raises a tide in the ocean, but makes no perceptible impression on rivers and lakes.

38. When we speak of making an impression on the mind, the word is carried still farther from its literal meaning; use, however, which, as we have observed above, is the arbiter of language, authorizes this application of it; as when we say that admonition and reproof make little impression on those who are confirmed in bad habits. same discourse delivered in one way makes a strong impression on the hearers; delivered in another way it makes no impression at all.

The

Illus. 1. Now, in such examples, an impression made on the mind always implies some change of purpose or will; some new habit produced, or some former habit weakened; some passion raised or allayed. When such changes are produced by persuasion, example, or any external cause, we say that such causes make an impression upon the mind. But when things are seen, or heard, or apprehended, without producing any passion, or emotion, we say that they make no impression.

2. In the most extensive sense, an impression is a change produçed in some passive subject by the operation of an external cause. If we suppose an active being to produce any change in itself by its own active power, this is never called an impression. It is the act or operation of the being itself, not an impression upon it. From this it appears, that to give the name of an impression to any effect produced in the mind, is to suppose that the mind does not act at all in the production of that effect.

3. If seeing, hearing, desiring, willing, be operations of the mind, they cannot be impressions. If they be impressions, they cannot be operations of the mind. In the structure of all languages, they are considered as acts or operations of the mind itself, and the names given them imply this. To call them impressions, therefore, is to trespass against the structure, not of a particular language only, but of all languages,