duct on the part of a tradesman, and he would have been glad if the defendant's counsel had offered to discontinue the practice until after the case had been tried. But the defendants made no such offer, and the Court was unable to see that there was any legal ground on which a tradesman could be denied the right to send out a puff of his own goods with similar goods of another manufacturer, either in a separate envelope or on a separate sheet of paper in the same envelope; and if he could do that, why could be not lawfully attach a label to the cover of the goods themselves? It would seem that if the plaintiff in such a case has any right to relief in the courts, it must arise from the fact that the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's trade-mark, and the familiarity of the public with it, for the purpose of attracting attention to his own and a different commodity. But so long as there is no deception of the customer, and merely an assertion of the superiority of another article than that to which the trade-mark belongs, it is a little difficult to perceive any basis for the application of a legal remedy.New York Sun. JUSTICE HARLAN IN PARIS, THE American judges did not simply say "ditto" to their advocates. Mr. Justice Harlan for the most part gave his vote on the side on which Lord Hannen gave his, and joined with the majority of the court in virtually upholding the contentions put forward by England. It would be the height of bad taste to praise Mr. Justice Harlan for thus discharging a plain duty honorably and well. No one who knows the character of the great tribunal to which he belongs would suppose for a moment that one of its members would decide a point of law except as his conscience and honor directed him. Rather it must be a matter of envy that it should have fallen to the lot of a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, rather than to one of our own judges, to prove to the world that the judges of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, when it is their duty to do equal justice, not between party and party in a civil suit, but between two great and sovereign Nations, will do it absolutely uninfluenced by consideration of nationality. Mr. Justice Harlan has shown that he would no more lean toward America when sitting on a court of arbitration than he would lean toward the side of his own State in a case argued before him in the Supreme Court at Washington. London Spectator. JUDG SETTING ASIDE THE VERDICT. UDGE FURSMAN paralyzed the Greene county Circuit Court, Friday, by a most startling proceeding. The case of August Schmidt against Brown & Tiel of Coxsackie, had been tried and given to the jury. It was an action for damages claimed for the faulty construction of a building erected by the defendants for the plaintiff. The case was tried with minuteness, both sides introducing expert testimony, and the jury were out all night deliberating. Finally they brought in a verdict for the defendants of "no cause of action." It was in writing, and the judge, after reading it, handed it to the clerk, with the remark: "You may enter that verdict, Mr. Clerk, and you may also enter an order setting aside the verdict and directing a new trial. It takes thirteen to beat a man out of his rights in this court." To say the counsel were paralyzed hardly expresses it. No motion had been made for such proceeding, and it was as startling as it was unexpected. Lawyers say they have read of such action by judges, but have heretofore looked upon the stories as fairy tales.-Hudson Republican, Sept. 11. Clerk-James H. McKenney, 1523 Rhode Island avenue, N. W. COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Richard H. Alvey, Chief Justice; Martin F. Morris, Associate Justice; Seth Shepard, Associate Justice. CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. First Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Gray. Districts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Circuit Judges-Le Baron B. Colt, Bristol, R. I.; William L. Putnam, Portland, Me. Second Judicial Circuit.—Mr. Justice Blatchford. Districts of Vermont, Connecticut, Northern New York, Southern New York and Eastern New York. Circuit Judges--William J. Wallace, Syracuse, N. Y.; E. H. Lacombe, Brooklyn, N. Y., and Nathaniel Shipman, Hartford, Conn. Third Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Shiras. Districts of New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania, Western Pennsylvania and Delaware. Circuit Judges-Marcus W. Acheson, Pittsburgh, Penn.; George M. Dallas, Philadelphia, Penn. Fourth Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Chief Justice Fuller. Districts of Maryland, West Virginia, Eastern Virginia, Western Virginia, Eastern North Carolina, Western North Carolina and South Carolina. Circuit Judges-Hugh L. Bond, of Baltimore, Md.; Nathan Goff, of Clarksburgh, W. Va. Fifth Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Howell E. Jackson. Districts of North Georgia, South Georgia, Northern Florida, Southern Florida, Northern Alabama, Middle Alabama, Southern Alabama, Northern Mississippi, Southern Mississippi, Eastern Louisiana, Western Louisiana, Northern Texas, Eastern Texas and Western Texas. Circuit Judges-Don A. Pardee, of New Orleans, La.; A. P. McCormick, of Graham, Texas. Sixth Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Brown. Districts of Northern Ohio, Southern Ohio, Eastern Michigan, Western Michigan, Kentucky, Eastern Tennessee, Middle Tennessee and Western Tennessee. Circuit Judges--Howell Edmunds Jackson, of Nashville, Tenn.; William H. Taft, of Cincinnati, O. Seventh Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Harlan. Districts of Indiana, Northern Illinois, Southern Illinois, Eastern Wisconsin aud Western Wisconsin. Circuit Judges-James G. Jenkins, of Chicago, Ill.; William A. Woods, of Indianapolis, Ind. Eighth Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Brewer. District of Minnesota, Northern District of Iowa, Southern District of Iowa, Eastern District of Missouri, Western District of Missouri, Eastern District of Arkansas, Western District of Arkansas, District of Nebraska, District of Colorado and District of Kansas, Wyoming, North Dakota and South Dakota. Circuit Judges -Henry C. Caldwell, of Little Rock, Ark.; Walter H. Sanborne, of St. Paul, Minn. Ninth Judicial Circuit.-Mr. Justice Field. Districts of Northern and Southern California, Oregon, Nevada, Idaho, Montana and Washington. Circuit Judges-Joseph McKenna, of Suisun, Cal.; William B. Gilbert, of Portland, Ore. RETIRED. Circuit Judges--Thomas Drummond, W. McKennan. COURT OF CLAIMS. 1509 Pennsylvania avenue. Chief Justice William A. Richardson, 1739 H street, N. W. Judge Charles C. Nott, 826 Connecticut avenue, N. W. Judge Lawrence Weldon, Hamilton House. Judge Stanton J. Peelle. Judge John Davis, 1211 Connecticut avenue. Chief Clerk-Archibald Hopkins, 1826 Massachusetts avenue, N. W. Assistant Clerk-John Randolph, 28 I street, N. W. RETIRED. Chief Justice Charles D. Drake, 1416 20th street, N. W. A NOTES. N original notice is to be seen in Bochum, Westphalia, issued by order of a court of law. On a pear tree standing in an orchard at the south gate of an estate is posted the notice, attached to which are two formidable seals. It runs: "The fruit upon these trees-pears-has been legally attached." Women lawyers are so plentiful in America, says the Gentlewoman, that one man, Professor Isaac Franklin Russell, has determined to devote himself entirely to lecturing to those of the fair sex who intend to enter the forensic profession. It will soon be as common in America to see "Smith & Daughter" upon the brass plate of a lawyer's office as to note "Jones & Son" inside the doorway of a London house.-London Law Times. It has frequently been proposed in France, as in this country, that victims of an error of the tribunal in criminal trials should be entitled to compensation for the moral torture and punishment undergone; but insuperable obstacles appear to bar the way to the execution of any such plan. It will however be admitted by every one that the case of a Frenchman named Kirail, who was wrongly imprisoned for thirteen years in the hulks, is a very painful one, and that in such cases reparation ought to be made in some form so far as it is possible to do so.-London Law Journal. The judicial or magisterial humorist, says the St. James Gazette, has one advantage-he can always get the last word. It is told of the late Lord Bramwell that while making the usual "Prisoner at the bar" address to a man whom he was preparing to sentence, his sonorous periods were rudely interrupted by the criminal with the question, "Ow much?" "Eight years," replied the judge instantly. Similarly, when a prisoner at the Westminster Police Court told Mr. Shiel that he wouldn't do it again, the worthy magistrate quietly replied: "No; I don't think you willfor six months." Not long ago a Mrs. Vivian obtained a decree nisi for a divorce from her husband, Mr. Richard Glyn Vivian of Eaton Square, London. Before this decree was made absolute a letter for her came to Mr. Vivian's house in Eaton Square, and 'Mr. Vivian gallantly readdressed it in these terms: "Miss L. B. H. CraigieHolkett (late Mrs. Vivian). Marriage dissolved." It was contended that this cast discredit on Mrs. Vivian, as leading people who saw it were led to believe that the marriage had been dissolved in consequence of misconduct on her part. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for £750, including the sum paid into court. was a successor in the affections of the local Jay Gould. "I want to declare now," he said, in concluding his diatribe against the grasping and soulless monopoly that, vampire-like, sucked the life-blood of the people, "that for three years I held my conscience in abey ance, but now it has broke loose." In the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh, before Lord Kyllachy, on August 8, David Hobbs, shipbroker in Dundee, and Joseph Severn, ship captain, were indicted for scuttling four ships off the Scotch coast, and with setting fire to a fifth in Inverkeithing harbor-in each case with intent to defaud insurers. Hobbs pleaded guilty as to two vessels and Severn as to one. Severn appears to have been employed by Hobbs as his tool in effecting his frauds on underwriters, and in consideration of his subordinate position only received five years' penal servitude, whereas Hobbs was sentenced to seven years. No serious danger to life seems to have been involved by their operations, or the punishments would be inadequate. The modus operandi seems to have been the old-fashioned plan of boring holes in the ship's side, plugging them, and drawing the plugs when out at sea. In Switzerland the cantonal boundary between Glarus and the adjoining Canton of Uri is a hurdle fence in the middle of a wide mountain valley, and a touching story is told as to how it came to be fixed there instead of at some natural boundary. There had been many disputes as to the occupation of this valley, which lies on the Glarus side of the range; to end the controversy it was agreed that at cockcrow one man should start from Altdorf in Uri and another from Glarus, and that where the runners met the boundary should be fixed. The Glarus cock was overfed, and crowed late, so the runner from Altdorf got a long start (the distance is about twenty miles over a range eight thousand feet high). He had passed the valley in dispute and had arrived at the last steep descent when he met the rival runner. The Glarus man, overwhelmed with shame at his Canton's loss, begged the other to give him back as much ground as he could cover carrying him on his shoulders; the Altdorfer having won far more ground than he expected, agreed. The Glarus man, with his rival on his back, climbed the steep ascent, traversed half the valley, and then fell dead where the fence now stands, having won a barren pasture for his Canton at the cost of his life. Ah Wing is probably the sharpest heathen Chinee now in America. Actually, Ah Wing is a celestial bird whose wings have been clipped by the judgment of a court of justice in Montana, condemning him to imprisonment during his natural life. But, unlike Sterne's starling, that passed the time exclaiming “I can't get out!" Ah Wing, when be heard that the Geary law had been held valid, gave thanks to the tablets of his ancestors and cried, sotto voce: "Ah Wing! now, by the great Je Jing! we'll see if we can't get out!" And straightway Ah Wing sent for a lawyer and instructed him as follows, to-wit: The Geary law is the supreme law of the land, any thing in the Constitution or laws of Montana notwithstanding. The Geary law provides that every Chinaman in this land who does not register shall be deported to China. Ah Wing has not registered! Therefore Ah Wing is liable, under the supreme law of the land, to be deported to China. Proceed you to prosecute Ah Wing in the National courts for violation of the Geary law, and thus enable him to get out of this cage and wing his way, at public expense, across the broad Pacific to the flowery realm of his ancestors. Ah if only Ah Wing had been a police court lawyer in Chicago, or a "Tombs shyster" in New York, what a reputation for juridical shrewdness would not Ah Wing have made!-Chicago A lawyer down in Florida had been retained to protect a local railroad against farmers whose animals were desiccated by the trains. For three years he appeared before the County and District Courts in advocacy of the wrongs of his clients. Finally he was discharged by the railway company, and at once became a Populist. Hired one day to represent a man whose long-horned cow had become a thoroughbred Jersey by cross with the locomotive, he faced a lawyer who | Legal Adviser. A The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1893. CURRENT TOPICS. obviously a natural law. By the time one party has been in power during the period of the life of a Parliament, its government has, in the nature of things, made sufficient mistakes, or done a sufficient number of acts which subject it to criticism, to overturn it at a succeeding election, unless exceptional circumstances intervene. The opposition of the dominant party in the House of Lords is not the only obstacle to the passage of the Home Rule Bill for Ireland, for, as the London Law Times points out, the crown still possesses an absolute right of veto upon all legislation whatsoever. Although this right has sunk into desuctude and has become a shadow, yet it still exists. Not only has the House of Lords co-ordinate power with the Commons over all legislation (subject to restrictions as to money bills), but behind both there stands the power of the crown. The second Parliament of Charles II. declared that there was no truth in the "opinion that both Houses of Parliament, or either of them, have a legislative power without the king." And by the same statute it was enacted that any one holding or expressing an opinion to the contrary was liable to the now obsolete penalties of a pramunire. By way of enforcing this proposition, the Law Times draws attention to the utterance of the latest publicist, who speaks with authority, and in presence of all the re MERICAN opinion of the Irish Home Rule Bill is no doubt correctly expressed by the Law Review when it says that nine out of ten intelligent Americans are in sympathy, in a general way, in the effort which Mr. Gladstone and his followers are making to establish in Ireland what we call local self-government. It cannot understand why local autonomy in that country is not as consistent with the integrity of the general government as with us. It cannot understand why the establishment of a Parliament at Dublin should threaten the disruption of the British empire, in view of the fact that the Isle of Man has its own local Legislature and is one of the most loyal portions of that empire. It believes that home rule in Ireland would largely do away with the present sources of irritation, and would conduce to loyalty and patriotism on the part of the Irish people. But it perceives that this measure, if ever carried, will work a great constituent change in the character of the United Kingdom, and that this constituent change will be wrought by a small majority of the House of Commons, forc-sults of the English political authorities. In his ing its opinion upon the House of Lords, which is nine-tenths opposed to it, as the aristocratic and educated classes of England generally are. The Review noting the difference between the majority required to effect a constitutional change in Great Britain and in the United States, observes that the American Constitution cannot be amended except with the concurrence of three-fourths of the States, expressed through their Legislatures. This, on the one hand, secures our Constitution from frequent tinkering, and, on the other hand, it puts it in a strait-jacket and prevents its reformation when we have outlived many of its provisions — notably that prescribing the mode of electing the President and Vice-President. On the other hand, the most profound constitutional change may take place in Great Britain through the action of a bare majority of a Parliament that happens to be assembled at any one election, and under conditions which may be more or less peculiar to the period of that election. And what can be done by this Parliament, by a bare majority, can be repealed by the next Parliament, and by a majority equally bare. This points to the hopelessness of the immediate establishment of what is called "home rule" in Ireland. All experience shows that when extreme measures or profound changes are forced through by a bare majority, especially against the opinion of the educated classes, the pendulum swings backward at the next election. The political history of the English people also shows that the pendulum is continually swinging backward and forward between the two leading political parties, and in accordance with what is VOL. 48 No. 13. Law and Custom of the Constitution, published at Oxford in 1892, volume 1, page 32, Sir William Anson says: "Legislation is effected by the crown in Parliament; it is the queen who makes laws with the assent of Lords and Commons, and by the authority of the same. But in fact the Commons have an exclusive initiative and control over one branch of legislation, the laws by which taxes are imposed; they have a preponderating influence over all other legislation; and the enacting power of the crown has, since the reign of Henry VI., been reduced to a right to express assent or dissent when measures are submitted by Lords and Commons; even the veto, which is all that custom has left to the crown, has not been exercised for nearly two hundred years.' But it exists all the same. The old formula, whereby the royal assent was given to an act passed by both Houses of Parliament, and which may nowadays be heard in the House of Lords, was le Roy or la Reyne le veult; the Royal dissent was le Roy s'avisera. The latter phrase was used by William III on several occasions, notably in the cases of the Place Bill and the Triennial Parliaments Bill. It was last used by a British sovereign in 1707, when Queen Anne exercised her right of veto on a Scotch Militia Bill. But, so far as legality goes, that phrase may be heard again. Of course modern practice is different. Now the sovereign takes counsel with her ministers. She may express distaste for a proposed measure; she can dismiss recalcitrant ministers and find others more pliant; she may even dissolve Parliament and herself appeal to the country. If the country is against the sovereign, it remains, as Lord Macaulay said, to yield, to abdicate, or to fight. But it is an oversight not to observe that the royal veto in England is not yet dead. And what it might become, if circumstances altered, may be seen by any one who cares to examine how the right exists and is exercised in modern Constitutions, as, for example, by the President of the United States. A biographical sketch of the gentleman whom President Cleveland has nominated to succeed the late Justice Blatchford is given this week in our Washington correspondence, but the New York Times supplies something more in regard to his political views, which will be read with interest. The Times says: "Mr. Hornblower comes of Republican ancestry, his grandfather baving been one of the electors for Lincoln and Hamlin in 1860 in New Jersey and a stalwart anti The Some excellent suggestions are made in the recent report of the grand jury in Baltimore, Md. grand jury finds that the difficulty of properly enforcing the Sunday liquor law is due to a prevalent disregard for truth on the part of witnesses to violations of the law. Experience shows that men who obtain surreptitious and illegal drinks on Sunday feel themselves bound by some principle of honor, or dishonor, to shield the dealer who has assisted them to quench their thirst. It may be that the hope of similar privileges in the future has as much to do with their generosity and their disregard of the obligations of an oath as their gratitude for past favors. At all events, the grand jury thinks that the law as it stands "is an educator to perjury — a debasing crime, and as far-reaching in its evil effects as the ills sought to be remedied." It suggests that the law should be so amended "as to require all slavery man. His father, also, was a strong Republican houses selling liquor to have a window so located throughout the war period. as to command a full view of the bar and of the room in which the bar is situated, the window to be free from curtains and obstructions of all kinds "While still in college, however, Mr. Hornblower became deeply interested in the subject of constitutional law, his attention having been drawn to the subject by the stormy discussions then raging over the impeach-during the hours which the law now says it is un ment of President Johnson and the various measures passed by Congress during the reconstruction period. As a result of his studies and investigations he became a Democrat, and coming of age during the Liberal Republican movement in 1872, he joined the Democratic party, with which he has ever since been allied. "While a Democrat in principle, he is in no respect an extreme man, inheriting from his father and grandfather the conservative tendencies of a natural lawyer. His father, although a clergymau, had a legal tendency of mind, and was opposed to the extremists in all ecclesiastical legislation. He was one of the handful of men who in the General Assembly of 1863 had the moral courage to vote against and protest against the passage by that Assembly of the extreme and violent resolutions denouncing rebellion as a crime, and declaring that any one participating in the rebellion thereby forfeited his right to church membership, and that any minister of the Presbyterian church aiding or abetting the rebellion thereby forfeited his right to the office of minister. "Dr. Hornblower, while an intense Unionist and a strong Republican, protested against these resolutions as a usurpation of ecclesiastical authority over the consciences of individuals in political matters. His wisdom in this matter has been vindicated by time, as the Southern Presbyterian Church has refused to reunite with the Northern Church, notwithstanding repeated invitations, because of these resolutions standing on the record, although the Northern Church has attempted to explain them away by other resolutions. "From his father, as well as his grandfather, Mr. Hornblower thus inherits strong convictions and independence of judgment, combined with moderate and conservative views, going to make up the judicial turn of mind. "Mr. Hornblower's writings and public addresses have met with the highest commendation. Among them are his Conflict between Federal and State Decisions' in the American Law Review for March, 1880; an address before the American Social Science Association in 1888, entitled 'Is Codification of the Law Expedient?' an address before the American Bar Association in August, 1891, on The Legal Status of the Indian,' and a lecture before the Columbia College Law School on The Appellate Courts.' "He is a prominent member of the New York City Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the Society of Medical Jurisprudence." lawful to sell liquor." It might be well also to require the bar and the room to be lighted Sunday nights, for men who will commit perjury to get a drink would not mind taking it in the dark on faith, if they could not get it in any other way. It is late in the day to say any thing fresh about Daniel Webster, late, even, to place his 7th of March speech in a kindlier light to the new generation of Americans, but Judge Mellen Chamberlain has said a fresh word about Webster in the September Century, and said it with a brevity and a strength of statement that is like the crack of a whip. He gives the root principle that was behind Webster's work. He is commonly spoken of as our greatest New Englander, and the fact that some of his earliest and greatest orations dwelt upon New England character and principles has caused it to be assumed that he was a political descendant of Governor Winthrop and one who inherited New England ideas. Judge Chamberlain reminds us that Daniel Webster was not a Puritan, and never pretended to be one, that his ancestors came from the north of England, that his education was beyond the skirmish line of civilization, and that he shared neither in the glory nor in the shame of the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay. He' was never a southern man or a northern man, but to the end of his life he was a National Federalist, and it is pointed out that he could not have been the large-minded Unionist that he was if he had sprung from a Puritan ancestry. This is an instance where blood tells, and Webster was a son of the soil of northern England almost as truly as Robert Burns was a son of Scotland. There was nothing Puritanical in his thought, in his style of expression, in the swing of his mind, and Judge Chamberlain aptly says that "his work was crowned only when the great reply to Hayne became wisdom to Lincoln and valor to Grant." It is not often that a magazine article contains a whole volume in a nut shell, but Judge Chamberlain has accomplished this feat in these pages of the September Century. The Supreme Court of the United States was recently called upon to say whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable. The question arose under the Tariff Act, the importer insisting that it was a fruit and not subject to duty, while the collector of customs claimed that it was a vegetable and subject to a duty of ten per cent ad valorem. The case is reported in the Supreme Court Reporter, volume 13, No. 25. What difficulty there was in the matter arose from the fact that "fruit" and "vegetable" are not botanical terms, so that, scientifically speaking, there is no classification of plants corresponding to them. The court was therefore compelled to look to the popular meaning of the words. Speaking generally, it may be said that the words "fruit" and " vegetable" are used in four places in the garden, in the market place, in the kitchen, and at the table-and it would seem that a thorough opinion should notice their use in all those places. But the court was evidently more familiar with them at the table than elsewhere. "Vegetables," says the court, "are such things as are eaten after the soup and fish, along with the meats, while fruits are eaten after the meats as dessert. Therefore, because tomatoes are eaten after the soup and fish, along with the meats, they are vegetables." Thereupon the Omaha Mercury ventures to remark: "This reasoning shows that the court is composed of persons who are at least judges of good dinners. But it is submitted that the court's premises are not universally true. Perhaps at the aristocratic tables where the members of the court eat, pork and apple sauce have no place; but at the tables of the people, that In combination of meat and fruit is a favorite dish. deed, the love of the masses for it is so great that it is feared they will continue to eat it, notwithstanding they thereby violate legal definitions and practically, if not technically, put themselves in contempt of court. So on the other hand, pumpkin and squash, which every one knows to be vegetables, are by plebeian folk made into pies and eaten as dessert. "Going still further, it is conjectured that even at the court's own table its judgment on this question of fruit and vegetable must often be sorely tried. If we mistake not, it is customary at fashionable tables to serve sliced lemous and raw oysters together, and then there is roast mutton with jelly, and on Thanksgiving day there is turkey with cranberries, and for that matter there is a kind of tomato marmalade which may be eaten after the dinner with the cake. Other instances will suggest themselves. "All things considered, the opinion of the court stands upon an extremely narrow basis. Let it be understood that we are not finding fault with the court's conclusion in the case before it. On the contrary, we are inclined to think with the court that the tomato is a vegetable. But we observe with regret that the court has taken its illustrations, not from the daily walk and conversation of common people, but from the ways of fashionable society at swell dinners. It is not the law that we complain of; but that French chefs and imported head waiters should make it. Vegetables are such things as are eaten after the soup and fish.' Had the court added that they are never eaten after the second course of wine, our humiliation would have been complete." Recognizing that there are honest differences of opinion as to the expediency of allowing lawyers to stipulate for contingent fees, the New York Law Journal says that the practice while recognized by the Federal courts and those of our own State, is not to be indiscriminately encouraged. It unquestionably leads to some abuses - in the bringing of blackmail ejectment suits, for instance. It probably tends to stimulate undue zeal of advocacy, and tempts lawyers to engage in unprofessional conduct, in court and out of it, which they would not be guilty of if their own remuneration was not staked on the result. But the matter has two sides. Actions for damages for personal injuries are among those which in the State courts most frequently involve questions of contingent fees. On the one hand, it is notorious that there are lawyers who make a specialty of cases of this character, systematically keeping themselves informed of casualties as they occur, and soliciting accident suits to prosecute. On Such practitioners certainly have little regard for professional dignity, and some of them are alike indifferent to professional morality and decency. the other hand, there is elaborate organization for the defense of such cases. Besides the well equipped legal departments which the great corporations maintain, companies exist whose business is the indemnifying of persons against damages occasioned by negligence of themselves or their employees. Institutions of this kind, like all insurers, naturally endeavor to get out of all losses as cheaply as possible. It follows that, what with skilled counsel for defense, and elaborate machinery for preparing cases for trial and waging dilatory warfare, an indigent person with a meritorious claim often has no opportunity of obtaining justice except through the persistent effort of a lawyer who is willing to take the case on a contingent fee. The increasing systemization of their legal work by corporations and large capitalists would seem to indicate even a wider necessity for professional services on contingent fees in the future. The temptations to abuse this right of contract are, of course, manifold, but we believe that it is possible for a lawyer to occasionally accept business on this basis without doing violence to conscience or sacrificing self-respect. The general election to be held in this State on the 7th of November next is of exceptional importance by reason of the fact that the members of a convention to revise and amend the Constitution are then to be chosen. A constitutional convention is to assemble in Albany on the second Tuesday of May, 1894. There are to be one hundred and seventy-five delegates. Of these, one hundred and sixty are to be elected by senate districts, five deleThere are also to be fifteen gates to each district. delegates elected for the State at large. One peculiarity of the law under which the convention is called is that it permits the election of women as delegates. "The electors may elect as a delegate," says the statute, "any male or female citizen of this State above the age of twenty-one years." This |