The Proclamation at Clarksville.

235

ments shall be surrendered, no part of them being withheld or destroyed; and further, that no Secession flag, or manifestation of Secession feeling, shall be exhibited; and for the faithful observance of these conditions I shall hold the authorities of the city responsible.

"ANDREW H. FOOTE,

"Flag-Officer, commanding Naval Forces, Western Waters.

"U. S. FLAG-SHIP CONESTOGA,' February 20, 1862."

This document is, we think, a model of its kind, exhibiting kindness and firmness, brief, modest, positive, and reminding us of the sharp-cut though courteous letters written by our hero in his diplomatic correspondence on the African coast. He refers with considerable self-satisfaction to his Clarksville visit in a letter of the same date to his wife:

"I have just returned from Clarksville-a beautiful city-where I issued the inclosed proclamation. Old Cave Johnson, who knew my father so well, came to me. The Clarksville affair will do me credit. Give one of the proclamations to Dr. Bacon. I am off to Cairo to-night to procure more gun-boats for Nashville. They are held in terror, and we will easily take it."

He assuredly had reason to feel chagrined at not being permitted to carry into execution his feasible plan in regard to East Tennessee and Nashville. He was, in fact, deeply injured in his feelings at what seemed to be a robbery of that opportunity for fair fame that justly belonged to him; and, more than all, for the injury done to the cause. General Halleck's peremptory telegram was as follows:

"TO GENERAL GRANT:

"Don't let the gun-boats go higher than Clarksville; even then they must limit their operations to the destruction of the bridge, and return immediately to Cairo, leaving one at Fort Donelson. Mortar-boats to be sent back to Cairo as soon as possible.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

"Official.-S. A. Hurlbut, Brigadier-General U. S. A.”

The exact truth of the matter is, when Commodore Foote

returned from Clarksville to Fort Donelson (after taking possession of the former place on the 20th of February), an arrangement was made between him and General Grant for a joint movement upon Nashville, and all the troops that could be transported were to have been embarked and ready to leave at 4 A.M. on the 21st, under convoy of the gun-boats. This would have placed them in Nashville by or before noon of the 21st of February-four days before the Cairo reached Nashville with Nelson's command. At midnight on the 20th the commodore and General Grant were together-part of the troops had already embarked-when the general received a telegram from Halleck positively ordering him not to push his forces beyond Clarksville, nor to permit the gun-boats to go higher up the river than that place. On receiving the telegram, the general handed it to the commodore without remark; the latter read it, and said, "I suppose this ends our movement." General Grant himself was severely annoyed that the full fruit of his victory at Donelson should not have been gathered. Had it not been for the great number of prisoners to be sent away to places where they could be cared for, and for his limited means of transportation, he would have gone on to Nashville in twenty-four hours after the capitulation of Fort Donelson; and the delay to follow up the victory was of immense value to the rebels. We might say that if it had not been for this unexpected and unfortunate check, Grant's future operations would have been by the way of Nashville, and a wholly different and undoubtedly more advantageous turn would have been given to the war in the Southwest.

At Nashville itself it was confidently expected that Foote would be up immediately with his whole flotilla, and there was great excitement there, and a rapid clearing out of obnoxious Secession leaders. Floyd, on hearing that Foote's gunboats were coming, gave orders on Monday (it was supposed by the Confederates that the Nationals would push on toward

Foote expected at Nashville.

237

East Tennessee, and it was for the purpose of opposing such a movement that Johnston took position at Murfreesboro) for the Confederate stores to be thrown open to the public; two steam-packets, which were being changed into gun-boats, to be burned; and the two bridges at Nashville to be destroyed. Against the last act the citizens most vehemently protested, and it was postponed until Tuesday night, when they were both burned by Floyd's order; and he and Pillow literally scampered away southward by the light of the conflagration. During the remainder of the week Nashville was the theatre of the wildest anarchy, and neither public nor private property was safe for an hour. Happily for the well-disposed inhabitants, Colonel Keaner, of the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, of Mitchell's division, entered the city on Sunday evening, the 23d, and endeavored to restore order. He was immediately followed by the remainder of his commander's force, who encamped at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and there awaited the arrival of General Buell. That officer came on the 25th, and on the same morning the Cairo arrived from Clarksville, as a convoy to transports bearing a considerable body of troops under General Nelson. These had not been opposed in their passage up the river, for the only battery on its banks between the two cities was Fort Zollicoffer, on a bluff, four or five miles below Nashville, which was unfinished, and was then abandoned. Pursuant to previous arrangement, the mayor of Nashville (R. B. Cheatham), and a small delegation of citizens, crossed over to Buell's quarters at Edgefield, and there made a formal surrender of the city. General Buell at once issued an order congratulating the troops "that it had been their privilege to restore the national banner to the capitol of Tennessee." On the following day, General Grant and staff arrived, and he and General Buell held a consultation about future movements.*

* Lossing's "Civil War in America," vol. ii., p. 233.

On reading the above, a sensible person would be struck by the fact that there was a totally uncalled for delay in capturing the city, and that if Foote, as he desired, had gone up at once, much property would have been saved, much disorder prevented, and extensive movements of National troops rendered unnecessary. This certainly is the appearance on the face of things, whatever occult reasons there might have existed for a contrary course. These reasons have never transpired.

The final settling up of the Cumberland and Tennessee war matters, as far as Foote and his fleet were concerned, seems to be contained in this general telegraphic order from Halleck:

"TO COMMODORE FOOTE, Cairo:

"ST. LOUIS, February 25, 1862.

"The possession of Nashville by General Buell renders it necessary to countermand the instructions sent to Foote and Sherman yesterday morning, dated 23d. Grant will send no more forces to Clarksville; General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry, or to a point higher up on the Tennessee River; transports will be collected at Paducah and above; all the mortar-boats to be immediately brought back to Cairo; two gun-boats to be left at Clarksville, to precede Nelson's division up the river to Nashville-having done this, they will return to Cairo; two gun-boats to be left in the Tennessee River with General Grant; the latter will immediately have small garrisons detailed for forts Donelson and Henry, and all other forces made ready for the field.

may

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General."

It be that the following letter, being that of a warm personal friend, and for that reason, perhaps, somewhat prejudiced, should remain unpublished; but, after due consideration, we have concluded to make it public, although in this biography we have no desire to rake up old jealousies and disputes, which, in the peculiar relations of the Army and Navy at the West, where both were striving to do the most gallant deeds, were unavoidable, and which, among brave men, are

now either laid to rest in their silent graves, or are buried in

noble and patriotic hearts:

"FLAG-OFFICER A. H. FOOTE:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 1, 1862.

"MY DEAR SIR,-As we are just receiving your letters of the 31st of December, 1861, I fancy you never get any of my notes. I observed that you were taken down from Clarksville when bound to Nashville, and I imagined the reason at once. I also noticed your proposition about first going to Fort Henry. I will take care that these matters shall be placed publicly to your credit. Carter has raised you one hundred men at Erie, and fifty seamen go from New York. We do this for five ships waiting for crews, and for the Narragansett, not yet relieved, though their time is up. Please keep us posted with official documents and copies of telegrams, as in the Henry and Donelson affairs, so that I can have copies in the hands of naval friends. Your reputation is that of the Navy and the cause, and well you have sustained it under difficulties that placed the entire credit on your head. I wish some trophy of your noble fight at Fort Henry. With the warmest wishes for your health and safety. Success you will win. Yours most truly, G. V. Fox."

Commodore Smith, still more plain-spoken, writes:

"March 1, 1862.

"MY DEAR FOOTE,-I have yours of the 24th ult., with its inclosures. Mrs. "Jesse" Benton will be elated, I think, at your notice of her by naming the Benton's tender for her.

"I had hoped the excitement would keep away the headache from you; but active brains like yours must have a safety-valve. You are cut out of a dash upon Nashville; but enough is left for you to do yet. I infer you were on better terms with Fremont than with Halleck; but you quarrel with nobody unless the party play foul, and then the 'black-stain' perseverance will be brought to bear on your opponents. Gregory says you 'pray like a saint and fight like a devil.' It seems to me the Army, or some portions of it, are jealous of you. Why should they send such riff-raff to you, that are only in your way. I would not take them, or, if I did, I would place them where David put Uriah. I have no doubt the gun-boats hurt Fort Donelson and created a panic; pity you could not have had your mortar and other boats there. What we have apprehended as a defect in iron-clad boats has been demon