primitive races, and their great vitality unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated instead of superficial' ('First Principles,' p. 14.) But concerning religious history, we shall have more to say elsewhere.

Distinguish now between the spheres of science and religion. Science deals with phenomenal facts, or the relations which exist between various phenomena; but it does not deal with the essence of these phenomena. When science has explained as it will explain more and more of this world, there will yet have to come the explanation of the last explanation, the mystery of all life, that which makes it what it is and not otherwise; and that is what will never be explained, for it lies outside the limits of thought, and that is a confession common to both science and religion.

We have then, by the light common to Religion and Science, established the existence of God.

We arrive at this not by thought, but by a consciousness transcending thought. It is the existence of this consciousness which enables us to come nigh to God— to understand God with an intelligence beyond that of definite thought. If thought is the organ of religious knowledge, then, as we have abundantly shown, as Dr. Mansel has abundantly proved, we can know nothing of God. If thought is necessarily co-extensive with consciousness, we can know nothing of God.

Accept Dean Mansel's premises, and you must accept his conclusion-you must base religion, not upon human science, nor upon human consciousness, but you must take the theology offered you as revealed, because you

cannot have any consciousness of your own about God. Dr. Mansel observes, 'The Absolute and the Infinite are names not indicating an object of thought or consciousness (sic) at all, but the mere absence of conditions under which consciousness is possible. What can be known only as a negative naturally cannot be affirmed to exist, hence God cannot (revelation apart) be affirmed to exist.' That in a nutshell is Dr. Mansel's argument; and as Mr. H. Spencer points out, if the premiss is granted, the inference follows: but he goes on to show that the premiss is not strictly true, there remains a qualification which saves us from the scepticism otherwise necessitated by accepting Dean Mansel's argument. 'It is not to be denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate its more general or psychological aspect, we find that these propositions (about the Infinite and the Absolute as equally outside thought and consciousness) are imperfect statements of the truth, omitting or rather excluding as they do an all-important fact. To speak specifically: besides that definite consciousness of which logic formulates the laws, there is also an indefinite consciousness, which cannot be formulated; besides complete thoughts, and thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still real in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.' Of such a kind are the thoughts of man about the Infinite God,

which I have preferred to designate consciousnesses rather than thoughts.

10. Now, brethren, I hope you will lend me your attention one step further in this branch of my argument. You try and conceive of this God, this Creator, this Invisible Spirit-call it what you will, conceive of Him in His totality, and He is utterly beyond the reach of definite thought though not beyond consciousness; but conceive of Him in certain relations with ourselves, and He is at once brought within the reach of definite thought as well as consciousness. God in relation to man is conceived of as Power wielded by Intellect and Will; but it is quite possible there may be an existence as much transcending the conditions of intellect and will, as intellect and will transcend mechanical motion. It is no doubt beyond experience, but it is quite possible that such an existence may be the existence of God in His totality. Thus this intellect and will through which we think we know God, may be only a small part of that great whole which is called God in His totality. What I wish to point to is this—a distinction between the partial nature of God revealed to man in the Universe, especially in human nature, and the whole nature of God beyond man's ken. This is a most important distinction, because it enables us to relegate to the sphere of the infinite totality of God a number of anomalies, inconsistencies, and injustices which we cannot explain when we contemplate God as alone He can be intellectually contemplated: viz., God as He exists in relation

to us, as contrasted with God as He exists in His un

known totality.

For instance, the universe abounds in strange mysteries. If we try to think with the intellect of man, guided by the moral sense, why this thing goes wrong, why this cruelty is permitted, why the young and gifted are taken from us, why we when innocent are called upon to suffer all kinds of misery, not only is it difficult to assume that God loves man, it is even hard to suppose that His intelligence is always active, so blundering and blind and mechanical does nature sometimes appear to be. For instance, the laws of disease are philosophically as subtle and beautiful as the laws of health; but is the law which provides an artificial covering to protect the formation of an internal calculus in the human body as wise, as loving, a law as that which constantly purifies the bad blood by a fresh supply of oxygen? In the last case we exclaim, 'Behold a beneficent Creator!' in the first, Behold a blind Law!' but with the doctrine of God's totality in full view, we are at liberty to assume that there may be beyond, something which will reconcile all these things, so that God is seen to act in relation to us harshly, His laws sometimes working blindly and cruelly for the individual, whilst for the whole of nature and the ultimate destinies even of the individual man all is well.

Let me give you an illustration. A member of Parliament is one man in relation to his constituents—the people who have sent him to parliament; he is another man with reference to his country, and it may be very

possible that what would be pleasing and agreeable to his constituency may not be for the good of his country. As he sits in parliament, he may vote for a tax which will fall very heavily upon his constituents, and yet very lightly upon the country at large, and his constituency will then abuse him as an unprofitable representative, because he has voted for something which seems bad for them, although it happened to be good for the country. As a member of parliament he belongs to a corporation, and he is acting with a representative corporation; acting in his totality, in his larger corporate capacity, his ways are inscrutable to small-minded provincialists; but all is well done, he is of necessity one thing with reference to the constituency, and another to the country.

We are God's provincialists in the great country of the universe. Cannot you imagine roughly that God may be dealing with the world and with individuals in some. such way as this; and that it would clear up a great many of the cruelties of the world, if we knew what the Divine purpose was in its totality? I believe that God must constantly act for the present with reference to the individual harshly, but that we are parts of some scheme of infinite dimensions, parts of a scheme of infinite duration, of infinite development; and that if we could see the whole, we should see how the cruelties we complain of, the apparent inconsistencies, contradictions, wastings, failures, discords, could be harmonised by a knowledge of the great whole to be worked out by the Divine energy. That is a thought I wish to insist upon. God, in His totality, is: incomprehensible.