The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England
Cambridge University Press, 2005 M09 8 - 204 páginas
The Efficient Secret is an analysis of the institutional changes in parliamentary government in nineteenth-century England, concentrating on the years between the first and third Reform Acts. Professor Gary W. Cox employs a rational choice model to analyze the problems of voter choice and to examine the emergence of party loyalty in the electorate, the development of cabinet government, and their legislative consequences. The introductory chapters provide the historical setting for this study and briefly survey nineteenth-century political and economic events. Professor Cox then focuses on the increases in party voting in Parliament and in the electorate. To support his argument concerning these parallel developments, he uses statistical evidence drawn from poll books and newspapers.
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Introduction and outline
The historical setting
The measurement and theory of party cohesion
The Peelites and the disruption of the party system
The origin of the efficient secret
The electoral connection and ministerial ambition
threats of resignation
The development of a partyoriented electorate
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