officers, to frame its own rules of procedure and to regulate its own discipline.1 The Diet is thus made independent of any other parts of the government in respect to these matters. It is, however, limited by two provisions of the constitution, viz; that the sessions of the Diet shall be public, and that true reports of the proceedings of the Diet in public sittings shall not subject the reporter to prosecution. The language of the two provisions may be so construed as to deny to the Diet any power, upon any occasion, to hold a secret sitting, and it may be so construed as to allow it in exceptional cases. The commentators do not agree in their interpretations. Schulze holds that it is a general principle of parliamentary law that, under certain circumstances, a legislative body may hold secret sittings, even though publicity of procedure be the general rule; and he declares that this view is recognized in the second of these provisions, which, in ordaining the freedom of publication of the public sittings, implies that there may be secret sittings.2 Laband, on the other hand, holds that the common law of parliamentary procedure upon a given point cannot be followed against a plain mandate of the constitution, and that the language of the second provision refers not to possible secret sittings of the Diet, but to the sittings of the commissions and divisions of the Diet.3 Laband also claims that in the exercise of its discipline, the Diet cannot expel a member. The Diet undoubtedly has the power to commit one of its own members or an outsider for contempt.

On the other hand, the Federal Council does not enjoy the same constitutional independence over against the executive department of the government. The constitution makes the Chancellor of the Empire, appointed by the Emperor, the

1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 27.

2 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, S. 85.
8 Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 323.

4 Ibid. Bd. I, S. 316.

president of the Federal Council, and gives the Chancellor the power to designate his substitute, in his own absence, from among the members of the Council. In the "Schlussprotokoll" to the agreement between the North German Union and Bavaria concerning the admission of the latter into the union, is contained the assurance from the representative of the Prussian King that, in case Prussia should be prevented from occupying the presidency of the Federal Council, the Bavarian government would be regarded as succeeding to that right.1 Laband interprets this as meaning that the Chancellor in designating his substitute as presiding officer of the Federal Council must prefer the members from Bavaria before those from any other commonwealth, except Prussia.2 If the Chancellor should fail to make a substitution, I suppose that the Bavarian representative might take the chair by virtue of this agreement. the Chancellor should be absent having designated no substitute, and no representative from Bavaria should be present, then the body would be compelled either to elect a presiding officer or to separate because of incapacity to organize. I do not find this exigency provided for by the organic law or treated by the commentators. From the standpoint of political science I should say that under such circumstances, the power of the Council to elect its presiding officer ought certainly to be recognized.

Moreover, the constitution virtually appoints three of the five members of the committee on foreign affairs in the Federal Council by ordering that Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg shall always have seats therein; and it also virtually appoints the chairman of this committee by ordering that the chairmanship shall belong to Bavaria. It also virtually appoints one member of the standing committee for the

1 Bundesgesetzblatt, 1871, S. 23.

2 Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 255.
8 Reichsverfassung, Art. 8.

army and fortifications by ordering that Bavaria shall always have a seat therein.1

Again, the constitution vests in the Emperor the power to appoint all the members of this committee (on the army and fortifications), except the Bavarian member, and all the members of the standing committee for the navy.2

Lastly, the constitution limits still further the power of the Federal Council over its own internal organization by commanding the forming of seven standing committees in that body, viz; for the army and fortifications, for the navy, for customs and taxation, for commerce and intercourse, for railroads, post-office and telegraph, for the judiciary and for the exchequer; and it ordains that, in each of these committees, at least four commonwealths besides Prussia shall be represented, and that each commonwealth shall have but one voice in these committees.3

The constitution contains no further provisions in reference to the election of officers or the power to determine rules of procedure and discipline. We must conclude that all residuary powers of this nature belong to the Federal Council. We must go upon the presumption that every legislative body has all the powers recognized by the universal principles of parliamentary law, unless the constitution or the statutes direct otherwise. The Federal Council has. assumed these powers, and nobody has disputed its exercise of them.1

9. The Mode of Legislation.

The constitution vests the power of initiating legislation exclusively and equally in the Federal Council and the Diet.5 That is, the Emperor has no power to initiate legislation. He may, as King of Prussia, cause his representatives in the Federal Council to do so, but that is another thing. The

1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 8.

2 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

4 Von Rönne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs, Bd. I, S. 208.
5 Reichsverfassung, Art. 5.