the advantages possessed by the United States judiciary over the judiciaries of Germany and of France, as consisting in these facts: The destruction of the judicial department by legislative action can be accomplished only gradually in the system of the United States, while it can be done immediately in those of Germany and France; and the judicial tenure is originally fixed by the constitution in the system of the United States, while in the other two it is fixed by statute. In these respects, however, the Court of the Lords. of Appeal in the English system seems to be quite as well off as the Supreme Court of the United States. These are indeed substantial and important advantages. They secure the judiciary of the United States against any hasty action of the Congress at any given moment. Do they, however, sufficiently explain the peculiar authority accorded to judicial decision by the custom of our constitution? Do they explain the fact that, when the Supreme Court of the United States refuses to apply an act of the Congress to a given case on account of its alleged unconstitutionality, the Congress and the President immediately accept the decision as having, ipso facto, abolished the congressional act for all cases, or, at least, suspended its operation until the Court shall itself reverse the decision? In England, France, and Germany, as we know, such an effect is scarcely thought of. We have seen, however, that the Supreme Courts of England, France, and Germany might deal with a particular case just as the Supreme Court of the United States deals with it, and that the legislatures of these respective states have only about the same powers of coercion over these courts that the Congress of the United States possesses. Moreover there is no provision in the constitution of the United States, any more than in the constitutions of these other states, which clothes the judiciary with power to declare an act of the legislature generally null and void on account of its conceived repugnance to the constitution, or on any other account. What, then, is it which causes this all-important generalization to be made, immediately and unconditionally, from a special decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, when such a generalization is scarcely dreamed of anywhere else? We must go back of statutes and constitutions for the explanation. Back of these, however, there lies nothing in the domain of political science but public opinion. It is then the consciousness of the American people that law must rest upon justice and reason, that the constitution is a more ultimate formulation of the fundamental principles of justice and reason than mere legislative acts, and that the judiciary is a better interpreter of those fundamental principles than the legislature, it is this consciousness which has given such authority to the interpretation of the constitution by the Supreme Court. This consciousness has been awakened and developed by the fact that the political education of the people has been directed by the jurists rather than by the warriors or the priests; and it is the reflex influence of this education that upholds and sustains, in the United States, the aristocracy of the robe. I do not hesitate to call the governmental system of the United States the aristocracy of the robe; and I do not hesitate to pronounce this the truest aristocracy for the purposes of government which the world has yet produced. I believe that the secret of the peculiarities and the excellencies of the political system of the United States, when compared with those systems founded and developed by priests, warriors, and landlords, is the predominant influence therein of the jurists and the lawyers. I find in it, in particular, the explanation of the problem which I have been discussing the explanation of the authority accorded, in our practice, to the decisions of our Supreme Court. But government by lawyers has its weak points and its dangers. If the lawyers separate law from history and jurisprudence, and jurisprudence from ethics, they will inevitably and speedily loose that spiritual influence over the conscious ness of the people, which is the sole basis of their power. Let this once happen, and the courts will be unable to stand between the constitution and the legislature. The legislature will become almighty. That branch of the government in which, especially under universal suffrage, party blindness and passion are most sure to prevail, and in which the least sense of personal responsibility exists, will have at its mercy those individual rights which we term civil liberty. The student of political history knows only too well that the despotism of the legislature is more to be dreaded than that of the executive, and that the escape from the former is generally accomplished only by the creation of the latter. I think there is reason to fear that the legal profession of to-day in the United States does not appreciate its position, and is not sufficiently impressed with its duty to preserve the ideal source of its power. There is reason to fear that law is coming to be regarded by the mass of lawyers too much as an industry; and if this be true of them, it will surely follow that it will be so regarded by the mass of the people. It rests with the lawyers and the teachers of law to determine for themselves whether they will divest themselves of their great spiritual power over the consciousness of the people; whether they will give up the commanding influence which their predecessors have held in the making of this great republic, and which those predecessors exercised with such beneficent results to the welfare of the whole people. INDEX. In this index, the symbols (E.), (F.), (G.), (P.), and (U. S.) indicate that the topics thus Aberdeen University, representation in Absorption of one State by another, i 40; its morality and beneficent effects, i 41. "Adhering to their enemies" (U.S.), term Admission to the Union (U.S.) of a for- "Affecting ambassadors" (U.S.), phrase African peoples, their power of political Albanian ethnology, i 15. Allegiance, personal, and the State, i 51; Alsace-Lorraine (G.), no constitutional Amending power in Constitution, its im- Amendment to the Constitution (U. S.), ciple of representation in Congress, America, North, its geographic unities, Americans, North, their view of a colonial Amnesty, defined and distinguished from Anarchy, a permanent impossibility, i 52. Ancienneté, principle of, ii 9. Ancienneté in the male line, principle of, ii 9. Appalachian slope, i 12. Appeals (U. S.), Congress may regulate, Apprenticeship, law of (U.S.), a means of Appropriation of money (U. S.), i 196. Archbishops (E.), sit in House of Lords, Aristocratic government, tendency of always predominant in them, i 111; im- Aristotle, his propositions of the forms of Army (G.), Commonwealth exemptions Army (U. S.), appropriations for, ii 152, Arrest, immunity from, of members of Arrondissements (F.), ii 97. Arrowsmith v. Harmoning (U.S.), doc- Art and community organization, i 31. Aryan nations, their power of political Asia, has produced all great religions, but Asiatic peoples, their power of political Assembly, National, of 1789 (F.), i 53. Association, right of, and the State, i 87. l'Etat" (F.), jurisdiction of the Senate Austria, ethnology of its population, i 27; does not enter the Rheinbund, i 113; Bagehot, Walter, on the Cabinet (E.), Bail, excessive (U. S.), i 187. Balkan peninsula, as a geographic unity, Bankruptcy, legislation concerning (U.S.), Barbarism, no right to, i 46. Barbier v. Connolly (U. S.), doctrine of Basque ethnology, i 13, 14; political rela |