majority sustained the views of the Ministry in both cases, viz; that the vote of confidence in the administration, and the appropriation of money for the arming and transportation of the troops, by the legislature were constitutional forms of consent to the making of offensive war.1 I think we must regard another point as settled by these precedents, viz; that subsequent consent by the chambers will indemnify the President's acts. Of course, a President who makes war without the authorization of the chambers takes a serious risk; but exigencies may arise under which he would be obliged to take this responsibility or see the welfare of the state irredeemably sacrificed. I think this clause of the constitution makes the President commander-in-chief of the army and navy. It seems to be a necessary implication. 2. The constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint and send ambassadors, envoys and consuls to foreign states, and to receive ambassadors, envoys and consuls from foreign states. He has thus the power in first instance to recognize, so far as France is concerned, the independence of a foreign state and its right to be regarded as a member of the international sisterhood. As regards the sending of French representatives to a given state, the legislature may control him by refusing to establish the posts and to vote the required salaries; but, in the reception of representatives from a foreign state, he is left by the constitution uncontrolled. The constitution seems to treat this prerogative as purely ceremonial. It connects it in the text with the power to preside at state ceremonies. 3. The constitution empowers the President to negotiate and to conclude all treaties and agreements with foreign states. If, however, the proposed treaty should be one of 8 Ibid. Art. 3, § 5. 1 Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der französischen Republik, S. 46 ff. peace or commerce, or should involve the finances or the territory of the state, or should relate to the personal or property rights of Frenchmen in foreign states, it must be voted by the two chambers before the President can constitutionally ratify it;1 and if the foreign state should conclude with the President any agreement touching any of these subjects without the ratification of the legislature duly given thereto, France would not be bound by any principle of international law to fulfil the same. The foreign state, in dealing with the French President, is bound to know the extent of his powers as provided in the constitution. Almost every treaty which can be imagined would involve one or more of these points; a fact which makes it advisable when dealing with the French government, to demand the consent of the legislative bodies to all agreements entered into with the executive. In all cases, the President is constitutionally required to inform the chambers of his acts and agreements so soon as the security and welfare of the state will permit.2 II. The Powers of the President in Legislation. It I. The constitution confers upon the President the power to call the legislature together in extraordinary session, and imposes upon him the duty of so doing, when both chambers demand it by absolute majority vote in each.3 confers upon him the power to adjourn the chambers twice during the same session. ment must not be for a longer and the legislature must sit for each year, excluding the periods of adjournment by the President.5 4 But the single adjournperiod than one month, at least five months of 2. It confers upon him the power to prorogue the legislature, i.e. to close its sessions. If the legislature be in 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 8, § 2. 2 Ibid. Art. 8, § I. 5 Ibid. Art. 1, § 2; Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der französischen Republik, S. 48. regular session, the President cannot constitutionally prorogue it until it shall have sat for at least five months.1 3. It confers upon him the power, with the consent of the Senate, to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at such time, and as often as, he may deem it proper and for the welfare of the state. During the period of dissolution, the Senate cannot, of course, sit as a legislative body. The dissolution of the Deputies works the prorogation of the Senate. The purpose of the dissolution is to give the electors the opportunity to express their opinion upon a given question. Accordingly, the constitution orders the new elections to be held within two months from the date of the dissolution, and orders the newly elected chamber to assemble within ten days from the completion of the elections. It is the duty of the President to see that these commands are fulfilled. 4. The constitution confers upon the President the power to propose to the legislative chambers that they go into national assembly for the purpose of revising the constitution.5 If, however, they should refuse to do this, the constitution provides no means by which the President can enforce his suggestion. If the Deputy Chamber alone should refuse while the Senate acceded, it would be possible for the President, in agreement with the Senate, to bring a pressure upon the Deputies by the threat of dissolution. He might even, in agreement with the Senate, decree dissolution in order to let the electors speak upon the subject. 5. The constitution confers upon the President the power to initiate legislation. He must send his projects to the 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 1, § 2; Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der französischen Republik, S. 48. 2 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février, 1875, Art. 5, § 1. 3 Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der französischen Republik, S. 48 ff.; Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 1, § 2. 4 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février, 1875, Art. 5, § 2, modifie par la loi constitutionnelle des 13-14 août, 1884, Art. 1. 5 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février, 1875, Art. 8, § 1. 6 Ibid. Art. 3, § I. chambers by a minister.1 He may send them to either chamber first, at his discretion, unless they contain items of financial legislation, in which case he must send them first to the Chamber of Deputies.2 He may cause his projects to be explained and defended before the chambers, not only by his ministers, but by commissioners specially appointed by him for the purpose.3 6. It confers upon him the power to require the chambers to reconsider any law passed by them. This requirement must be made within the period allowed by the constitution before promulgation of the law, and it must be made through a message giving reasons. Reconsideration cannot be constitutionally refused by the chambers; but a re-passage of the law by the ordinary majority will overcome the presidential interposition. 7. The constitution vests in the President the power to promulgate the laws. It leaves him to his own discretion in regard to the manner of promulgation; but requires that he shall not delay promulgation beyond one month from the date when the law shall have been transmitted to him as finally adopted by the legislature, or beyond three days when both chambers shall have voted that promulgation is urgent. I suppose the vote of urgence may be taken at any time in regard to laws already in the hands of the President and not declared urgent by the chambers at the time of the transmission, and that its requirement must always be obeyed by the President. The commentator Lebon, who, at the time he wrote, was chief secretary of the President of the Senate, makes a distinction between promulgation and publication of the laws. He defines promul 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 6, § 1. 5 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février, 1875, Art. 3, § 1. gation in the French system to be the decree whereby the President certifies that the law has been regularly passed, and commands its execution; while publication is the printing of the law in the governmental gazette.2 I do not find this distinction in the constitution itself. The constitution appears to me to treat publication as a part of promulgation. The governmental practice appears to me to sustain this view. The governmental decree regulating this matter is styled "Décret du 5 novembre, 1870, relatif à la promulgation des lois et décrets," and directs that the promulgation of the laws and decrees shall be effected by their insertion in the Fournal Officiel, etc. I think the distinction made by Lebon is German, not French. The tendency of such a distinction, and of such a definition of promulgation, is towards according the executive a larger discretion in promulgation than the principles of the French system warrant. III. Civil Administrative Powers. I. The constitution confers upon the President the power to supervise and effect the execution of the laws. This is his most important duty. 2. In order to enable him to fulfil this duty, the constitution expressly empowers him to appoint all the officials, and impliedly empowers him to dismiss them all, unless otherwise ordered by an act of the legislature. The legislature has protected the military officials, the university professors, and the judges against this discretionary power of dismissal, and has passed some fragmentary legislation upon the subject of qualifications for appointment. (The latter subject is for the most part regulated by executive decrees.) It is clear that the legislature does not regard itself as trenching upon the President's constitutional power of appointment in undertaking such legislation. 3. The President is also empowered to make disposi 2 Ibid. 4 Ibid. Art. 3, § 4. 1 Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der französischen Republik, S. 49. |