States, and to do away with the farce of dealing with the Indians by treaty. The Court has pronounced these statutes constitutional and valid.1 Therefore commerce now between the Indian tribes and the commonwealths is of the same nature as commerce among the commonwealths, and not of the nature of commerce with foreign states. We may also class the power of Congress over the postal service with, but not under, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the commonwealths. I say with, but not under, because this power extends to postal communication within a single commonwealth, as well as among the commonwealths and with foreign states, and because the Congress has interpreted its power in this respect as authorizing it not simply to regulate the postal business, but to authorize the administration to do the postal business, and to do it exclusively; i.e. Congress has claimed. and exercised the power of establishing a governmental monopoly of the postal business over all governmental postal routes, and, since Congress may declare every route a governmental postal route, the monopoly is complete at the option of the Congress. The Court has ratified the interpreta tion which the Congress has placed upon its power in this respect.2 The provision of the constitution upon which the power is based is scant, to say the least.3 It is now settled practice and law, however, that the postal business is a general governmental monopoly; that the Congress may determine, in first instance, what is postal matter and what is not, and may provide wholly and independently for the receiving, carrying and delivery of the same. Congress may not, however, transgress other provisions of the constitution in accomplishing this end. When, for example, Congress excludes 1 United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. Reports, 375. 2 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. Reports, 727. 8 United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, § 7. any matter from the mail, it cannot prohibit the carriage of this matter in some other way than by the mail. If it could, it might, in this way, prevent the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets containing opinions contrary to those entertained by the majority of the members of the Congress at any particular time. This would certainly be an abridgment of the freedom of the press, which is forbidden to the Congress by Article I of the amendments.1 Again, Congress must not so exaggerate the conception of mail matter as to claim the express business as a governmental monopoly. It cannot prohibit from carriage in other ways than through the United States mail anything which was not regarded as mail matter at the time of the formation of the constitution. Lastly, in determining whether or not a specific letter, package or parcel shall be rejected from the mails, the Congress cannot authorize the post-office officials to violate that provision of the constitution which guarantees the papers and effects of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Letters and sealed packages, upon which the proper postage is affixed, cannot be opened except by virtue of a regular search warrant. They are legally as inviolable in the mail as in the domicile of the sender. Whether, under the power to establish post offices and post roads, the legislature of the United States may make the telegraph a governmental monopoly cannot be regarded as entirely settled, although the Congressional act of 1866a and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Pensacola Telegraph Company v. The Western Union Telegraph Company seem to indicate that both the Congress and the Court interpret the constitution as vesting this power in Congress. There is this distinction to be remarked, however, between the postal and the telegraph monopolies, viz; that the first does not necessarily require that the government should 1 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. Reports, 727. 2 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 5 96 U. S. Reports. own or possess the roads, railroads, boats, or even the cars, stage-coaches, wagons, etc., over which or upon which the mails may be carried, while the latter would require the possession of the telegraphic lines. I know it is claimed that the government may own the post roads, and, if the claim be valid, this distinction would make no difference; but I do not think it is settled law that the government may build, buy and own railroads, for example, under the power of Congress to establish post offices and post roads. It seems to me that it must still be regarded as an open question whether the Congress has the power to make a governmental monopoly of the telegraphic business of the country. The advantage or disadvantage of doing so is a question of political economy with which we have in this work nothing to do. Finally, along with but hardly under the power to regulate commerce, we may class the power of Congress to fix the standards of weights and measures.2 This cannot be claimed as an exclusive power of the legislature of the general government as against the commonwealths. Congress may occupy the ground whenever it sees fit, and the acts of Congress will displace the acts of the commonwealths upon this subject; but until Congress acts, the commonwealths may regulate the system of weights and measures. They have always fixed these standards, and the fact that they have adopted a common system has made it unnecessary for Congress to legislate upon the subject. The Congress has, however, taken an initial step in such legislation. It has made it lawful for any person to employ the metric system, but has not made it obligatory. I think this is an unfortunate beginning. It may introduce great confusion where we now have substantial uniformity. Under existing conditions, it is certainly better either to do nothing at all, or to make some system obligatory as well as lawful. 3 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, 4th edition, vol. 2, p. 61 ff. 2 United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, § 5. 3 United States Revised Statutes, secs. 3569, 3570. 4. Legislation in respect to the Monetary System. The constitution confers upon the legislature of the gen eral government the power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin," and the power to "borrow money." "2 At the same time it forbids the commonwealths to coin any money or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or to emit bills of credit. A little scrutiny of these provisions will make it manifest that the power to regulate the monetary system of the United States is conferred exclusively upon the legislature of the general government. The commonwealths are directly forbidden to create either a metal or a paper currency. The Congress is vested expressly with the power to create metal money, and impliedly with the power to create paper money. It is vested expressly with the power to regulate the value of all metal money and, impliedly, with the power to regulate the value of the paper money which it may create or authorize; and it is vested, impliedly, with the power to make anything it will a legal tender in payment of any debt.5 The expression that "no State" (commonwealth) "shall make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts" would appear, at first view, to authorize the commonwealth to make gold and silver legal tender, even though the Congress should fail to make them legal tender, or should make some other metal legal tender, or should make only gold or only silver legal tender. It must be kept in mind, however, that gold and silver are gold and silver coin only by virtue of a quality impressed upon them by an act of Congress. Congress may withdraw this quality at any time; and what was gold and silver coin, and might have been made legal tender, then becomes only gold and silver, and cannot be made legal tender by the commonwealths. Again, the power vested in Congress by the constitution to coin money, is a general power and does not limit Congress in the choice of the metal to which it will give the quality of money. Congress may therefore choose some other metal than gold or silver and impress upon it exclusively the legal tender quality. Any person compelled by the laws of a commonwealth to accept anything else could go to the courts of the United States for relief; and it is to be presumed, from the reasoning of the case just cited, that relief would be granted. The same situation would be created if a commonwealth should undertake to make debts payable either in gold or in silver, when the Congress made only gold or only silver legal tender; or if a commonwealth should undertake to make debts payable only in gold or only in silver, when the law of Congress made both legal tender. Lastly, if Congress should give both gold and silver the quality of money without making either legal tender, or should confer the legal tender quality upon some other metal, but not exclusively, I suppose the commonwealths might then make gold and silver coin legal tender. From this analysis it will appear that the provision which declares that no commonwealth "shall make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts" can hardly be held to confer upon the commonwealths a concurrent power with the Congress in this respect. Substantially, the creation and regulation of the monetary system of the United States is an exclusive power of the legislature of the general government. 5. Legislation in respect to Inventions and Discoveries. The constitution vests in the legislature of the general government the power to secure "for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective |