stitutional law of the United States; and where they vest powers in the executive in regard to these matters, they either prescribe the manner in which the powers shall be exercised, or require the joint action of the executive and of one branch of the legislature in their exercise.

If any principles touching these matters can be said to be established in the general practice, they are as follows: nonpermanence in the legislature; general periodicity of assembly, either by order of the constitution or according to the necessities of government; and substantial self-control in the legislature, modified only by such power of executive interference as will keep the legislature in touch with the constituencies, prevent its neglect of duty and check too violent conflicts in the houses.

7. The Principle of the Quorum.

This topic is made a subject of constitutional provision in regard to but three of the eight legislative houses whose construction we are analyzing, viz; the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, and the Diet of the German Empire. In the other five cases the question is left to the determination of each house, as a matter of internal procedure. This is, certainly, a defect. It exposes the state to the danger of a double legislature on the one side, or a stoppage of all legislative action on the other, at the caprice of an undefined number of members of each house. A revision of these constitutions should not overlook this point.

In those cases where the quorum is fixed by the constitutions there is substantial agreement upon the principle that the presence of a majority of the legal number of members in the house is necessary and sufficient to the transaction of legislative business. This principle is also adopted as a rule of procedure by both houses of the French legislature. The French Senate requires not only the presence of the majority of its members, but also their votes, for or against a motion.

The quorum of the absolute majority, i.e. the majority of the legal number of members, may be said to be the modern principle in general legislation. Its reason is that the majority represents in this respect the whole, and is vested with the powers of the whole. If this were not the principle, legislative action would be exposed to the tricks and stratagems of the minority to an unbearable degree.

The three legislative houses which do not follow this principle, viz; the two houses of the British Parliament and German Federal Council, must be regarded as exceptional cases. There are reasons of convenience and reasons of state which make the rule unnecessary in these cases. In both houses of the British Parliament legislation is controlled so completely by the ministry that there is no opportunity for either body to be captured by a minority of the members. The ministers represent the majority in the House of Commons; i.e. a majority quorum of the House of Commons is present in the ministry. . It is not, therefore, necessary to hold to a majority quorum in the houses, and it would, frequently, be inconvenient. The exception in these cases is therefore more apparent, as I have shown, than real. In the case of the German Federal Council it would be a constant threat to the efficiency of the Imperial legislature, if the activity of the Council could be suspended by the failure of the commonwealth governments to send their representatives. The natural excuses for absence, which exist in regard to membership in the other legislative houses, do not exist in this case. The members of the Federal Council are mere instruments. They hold at the pleasure of the commonwealth governments sending them. They can be relieved at any moment. If they are compelled to be absent, other persons can be immediately substituted. The absence of members from the Federal Council can, as a rule, only mean a particularistic hostility to the Empire on the part of the commonwealth governments whose representatives do

not appear. It would be a poor political science which did not provide against the abuse by the commonwealths of such a control over Imperial legislation. The practice of regarding the Federal Council as competent to do business upon the appearance of the Chancellor or his substitute at a regularly called meeting fully provides against this danger. At the same time the rule creates no hardships for the commonwealths nor does it expose the Council to the caprice of a minority. The peculiar character of the Federal Council makes the majority quorum unnecessary and possibly dangerous.

8. The Principles of Internal Organization and Procedure. The general constitutional principle upon this subject is that each house shall determine for itself its internal official organization, its rules of discipline, and its rules of procedure. This principle, however, is placed under a variety of limitations in all four of the constitutions. The purpose of these limitations may be said to be threefold, viz; the maintenance of intercourse between the legislature and the executive, the information and protection of the public, and the protection of the individual member against the tyranny of the legislative body.

Accordingly, in three out of four of the upper houses of the legislatures which we are considering, a part of the official bureau is filled either by express constitutional direction or by executive act; and in one of the four lower houses, all the officials of the house except the speaker are appointed by the executive. In seven of the eight houses, publicity of procedure is required either by constitutional law or custom. In every case, the expulsion of a member for violating the rules of order and procedure is either prohibited, or permitted only by vote of an extraordinary majority. In every case, finally, the power to try and punish an outsider for contempt is limited both as to the extent of the power and the gravity of the penalty. The four systems do not exactly agree upon the details of these limitations; but in principle and in purpose, the limitations are substantially identical.

Within the domain thus bounded, each house is permitted to develop its parliamentary practice according to its own judgment and convenience. This is certainly good political science. Any other principle would result to a greater or less degree in the destruction of legislative independence. The parliamentary practice developed by these eight legislative houses is substantially uniform. We may say that upon this subject we have a jus gentium. The body of this law, however, is neither constitutional law nor statute law. The consideration of its details, therefore, does not come within the scope of this work.

9. The Mode of Legislation.

Upon this subject, or at least upon its main features, the four systems under examination are in substantial harmony. They agree in conferring the initiation of legislation upon each house; in requiring the approval of both houses to the validity of a project; in making the vote of a majority of the members voting upon the project, a quorum being present, necessary and sufficient; and in according to the executive certain influence and power upon the course of legislation. These are the general principles. They are subject, however, to some exceptions; and the point last noted, the participation of the executive in legislation, will need some explanation.

The exceptions are as follows. In all these systems, except the German, the initiation of financial legislation is vested, wholly or partly, exclusively or primarily, in the lower houses. In the German Federal Council certain bills cannot be passed without the consent of the Prussian representatives, and certain other bills cannot be passed without the consent of the representatives of the commonwealth particularly affected. In the French Senate a majority of the whole number of voices to which the body is legally entitled must vote upon the project in order to effect its passage.

The first of these exceptions is not obsolete, indeed, but anachronous. There is a practical and necessary reason for

its continued existence in the English system, but nowhere else. That reason is to be found primarily in the principle of parliamentary government. In complete parliamentary government a rejection of the budget by either house of the legislature means the resignation of the ministry. If, then, the House of Lords could reject the budget, it could defeat government by the party in majority in the House of Commons; ie. it could render real parliamentary government an impossibility, since real parliamentary government is government by the leaders of the majority in the lower house (or at least in one house) of the legislature. The mere amendment of the budget might not have this extreme effect, but it would greatly embarrass parliamentary government. The ultimate reason for the exception, however, is to be found in the fact that the House of Commons contains the exclusive representation of that part of the population which bears the burden of taxation.

It might be said that the same primary reason for the exception exists in the French system, since this also is a system of parliamentary government; but, as we have seen, the parliamentary system in France is, to a greater or less degree, artificial. The exclusive control of the administration by the Chamber of Deputies is not a provision of the constitution. It is not conceded in principle by the Senate. The ultimate reason for the exception is altogether lacking in the French system. The Senate represents the bearers of the burdens of the state, just as truly as does the Chamber of Deputies.

The second of the exceptions above noted (vis; the power of a particular commonwealth to defeat legislation in the German Federal Council) rests upon no scientific principle. The exception in favor of the minor commonwealths is a remnant of confederatism, which in the further development of the system must disappear. The special exception in favor of the Prussian representation in the Federal Council rests, however, in the absence of a veto power in the Emperor,