paths. Either alone would be likely to interpret but one side of the common consciousness. Either alone would be likely to destroy in the end the foundations of its own existence; for true conservatism requires the constant repair of the old, and true progress the constant adjustment of the new. The difference in the terms of the two houses makes the legislature a far more faithful interpreter of the consciousness of the state; preserves it from provoking revolution. by holding too long to the forms of a past phase of social and political development, and from provoking reaction by a too sudden and radical formulation of the existing phase. The difference of terms, accordingly, rests both upon sound philosophy and successful practice.

The one exception to the parity of powers in the two chambers― the larger powers of the more popular chamber in financial legislation is not contained at all in one of the four constitutions, and not in equal degree in the other three. This distinction arose originally, so far as these four states are concerned, in the British constitution, and was due to the fact that the constituencies (if we may so call them) represented in the upper house were largely exempt from taxation. Naturally, the representatives of those who paid the taxes came to be regarded as holding the exclusive power to vote the taxes and the expenditures. Where this cause of the discrimination fails, there is neither reason nor policy in the further maintenance of the discrimination. It is destructive, in the end, to the bicameral system. The chamber having the exclusive control of the purse will obtain control of legislation, and will finally reduce the other chamber to the position of a registering body. This result has been very nearly reached in the British legislature. There is no reason whatever for a discrimination of this sort in the legislatures of the United States and of France. Neither house in these bodies contains any member who represents an exempted constituency. It is true, however, that this discrimination is made,

in some degree, in the constitutions of the United States and of France. I think it rests in both cases upon an imitation of the English example. In France it has given rise to many serious struggles between the two chambers, which as yet have settled no principle. In the United States it has been largely ignored in practice. In the German system it disappears altogether. I think we must regard it as a fortuitous discrimination. It rests upon no sound philosophy. A sound philosophy would recommend that the state withdraw exemptions, and establish complete parity of powers between the two houses of the legislature. It is only thus that the full benefit of the bicameral system can be attained.

2. These four typical states are in substantial harmony upon the question of the source from which the lower houses of their legislatures proceed. In all four, the source is universal suffrage, or a suffrage very nearly universal. By universal suffrage is meant the suffrage of all resident loyal male citizens, of mature age, suffering no civil disability. In the qualifications established by the four states, we find differences of detail corresponding with the differences of history and environment; but in each the existing system is based upon the fundamental principle above stated. None of them, however, regards the suffrage as a private right of the individual, but as a public function conferred by the constitution upon certain individuals. None of them, therefore, regard the electorate as the source of the legislative power. The state, through the constitution, confers the legislative power. The electors simply designate the persons who shall participate in the exercise of the power.

The four systems which we have examined agree also in the mode of electing the members of the lower houses, at least so far as the general principles are concerned. These general principles are direct ballot, district ticket and relative majority. These principles have not been reached without considerable experiment with their opposites. The indirect

vote, the viva voce vote, the general ticket and the absolute majority have been tried again and again, in every form of combination, but have all, at last, been discarded as either vicious or impracticable. In the constitution of this chamber, the aim must be to bring the elected as close as possible to the original electors, and to secure an honest, independent and intelligent vote. The indirect vote creates too wide a separation between the original holders of the suffrage and the holders of the mandates in the lower house; the viva voce vote may deprive the voter of his independence, and is also impracticable where the number of voters is large. The general ticket subjects the voter too completely to the direc tion of the machine; and the requirement of the absolute majority, i.e. the majority of all voting or of all registered, is inconvenient and, in some cases, unattainable. Two of the four constitutions require for election in first instance a majority of all voting; but when this fails, one of the two constitutions accepts the principle of the plurality at the second election, and the other limits the voting, in the second election, to the two persons who shall have received the highest number of votes upon the first ballot. We may say, therefore, that decision by plurality is a general principle of the constitutional law of the present day in the election of the members of the lower house of the legislature.

In the construction of the upper houses, however, the same uniformity does not exist. No two of them proceed from the same immediate source. It may be said, however, that they all proceed from the same ultimate source. The British Lords of Parliament are all appointed by the Crown, either immediately or remotely. But at the present time the Crown issues the patent under the advice of the ministry, and the ministry is composed of the chiefs of the majority in the House of Commons and is responsible to that body. The members of the German Federal Council are appointed immediately by the executive heads of the commonwealths of the

Empire. These executive heads act under the advice of a ministry, the members of which are, in greater or less degree, responsible to the legislatures of the respective commonwealths. The members of the Senate of the United States are chosen immediately by the legislatures of the several commonwealths; and the members of the French Senate are chosen by a college of electors, chosen in part directly, and in part indirectly, by the original holders of the suffrage. It may, therefore, be said that the upper houses of all these legislatures proceed ultimately from the original holders of the suffrage.

They therefore differ from each other and from the lower houses rather in respect to the manner in which their members are chosen than in respect to the ultimate source of their mandates. The manner of their choice is, in all cases, indirect. The degree of indirectness varies, and the organs employed in the selection differ in number and in character. But the purpose of the indirect choice is the same in all cases, viz; to balance the radicalness of the direct popular choice by the conservatism of the indirect, without breaking away from the ultimate popular source of all the institutions. of the modern state. The great and controlling purpose of every system for selecting legislative members is to discover and bring together the real political aristocracy of the state for the interpretation of the common consciousness of right and policy. The system of direct popular election has its virtues and its vices. It keeps the legislator in touch with the popular feeling, but, if not checked and neutralized, it tends to the production of demagogues and phrase-makers. On the other hand, the system of indirect choice may, if it be not skilfully regulated, produce an excessively conservative body. It may also produce a very weak body. Properly regulated, however, it is as likely, to say the least, to bring the true aristocracy to the front as is the direct system. Certainly the senators of the United States and of

France will not suffer by comparison with the members of the more popular chambers in these states. It can hardly be said that the methods of selecting the upper houses in England and Germany have proved so successful in practice as those of the United States and of France, although the membership of the House of Lords and of the Federal Council has been and is of high quality, and has generally manifested great legislative capacity. The difficulty with these bodies, when compared with the senates of France and of the United States, is simply that the immediate base on which they stand is narrower. The consciousness of this tends to produce a timidity which is highly detrimental to the development of legislative capacity. A Senate, for example, composed entirely of members appointed immediately by the executive, even though for a life term, is generally too much inclined to preserve an artificial harmony. The method of selection of its members is too one-sided. The hereditary principle gives great individual independence to the members as against each other, and as against the other governmental organs; but such a tenure tends to arouse popular hostility to the existence of the body, and membership in such a house appears to rest too much upon accident. Election by electors chosen by the original holders of the suffrage gives the broadest foundation for an upper house. This method of choice confers upon the legislators so chosen all the courage that direct election would give them, and provides most efficiently against crudeness, one-sidedness or accident.

A legislature composed of two houses, the one proceeding from direct popular election, the other from indirect, at one remove, ought among a fairly cultivated people to produce the most perfect legislation possible; because it is calculated to bring out the legislative talent of the state both on the side of progress and on that of conservatism, and to give it strength to act with courage and independence.

Upon the question of confiding to each house of the legis