therefore, that it impliedly vests these powers under these express limitations. The limitations are, that the sittings of each chamber shall, as a rule, be open to the public,1 but that a certain number of members in either chamber, the number to be fixed by the chamber itself in its rules of procedure, may demand that the chamber go into secret committee and that the chamber may yield to the demand;2 and that the ministers shall at all times have the right to enter either chamber and shall be heard whenever they demand it.3 The constitution does not vest in the chambers, either expressly or by way of specific implication, a power to punish outsiders for contempt. As a result of general implication, however, we must conclude that each chamber possesses such a power, and can be divested of the power in question only by way of agreement with the other chamber; i.e. by the enactment of a law regulating this matter. Such a law, however, may be abolished in the manner of its enactment; i.e. at the pleasure of the two chambers. We find this implication in the principles that, in the French system, the constitution creates no domain of liberty for the individual against the government, and does not enumerate the powers of the legislature, and in the fact that the legislature has not deprived the individual chambers of this power recognized to all legislative chambers by the general principles of parliamentary law. 9. The Mode of Legislation in the French System. Legislation may be initiated generally by either chamber,1 or by the President through the ministry.5 There is but a single modification of this principle, viz; that financial legislation must be considered and passed upon first in the Cham 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 5, § I. ber of Deputies.1 This provision of the constitution must be interpreted as placing the initiation of financial legislation in the President and in the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate cannot initiate such legislation. The Senate, however, claims and has exercised the power to amend all bills and projects of this nature. The Chamber of Deputies has denied this power to the Senate, in principle, in the extent claimed, but, in practice, has accepted many amendments imposed by the Senate upon the financial measures sent to it from the Chamber.2 All measures, wherever and however initiated, must be passed, in all parts, by both chambers, in order to their legal validity. The passage by both houses is, moreover, sufficient to give them legal validity; i.e. the President has no veto upon the acts of the legislature. Generally, he must promulgate all laws passed by the chambers within one month. from the date of their transmission to him.3 If either chamber declares urgency in promulgation, he must promulgate the law declared urgent within three days from the date of its transmission to him.4 Within these respective periods the President may, by a message giving reasons, demand a reconsideration of the measure or measures, and the chambers are bound by the constitution to give ear to the demand.5 A repassage of the measures by the regular majority vote is sufficient, however, to overcome the President's objections. This power to cause reconsideration is thus not a veto power. tainly, however, a conservative provision, and has advantages without any corresponding disadvantages. 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 24 février, 1875, Art. 8. It is cer 2 Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der französischen Republik, S. 71. 3 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 7, § 1. CHAPTER V. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE IF now we compare the provisions of these four typical constitutions in regard to the construction of the legislative department, we shall find, in general, a substantial agreement, with some diversity, however, in regard to important details. 1. We may say that modern constitutional law has settled firmly upon the bicameral system in the legislature, with substantial parity of powers in the two houses, except in dealing with the budget; and that, in the control of the finances, a larger privilege is regularly confided to the more popular house; i.e. the house least removed in its origin from universal suffrage and direct election. The occasion of the establishment of the bicameral legislature may be different in the different states, but the cause is one and the same everywhere. The primary purpose of the legislature is to ascertain what the law ought to be; to determine, not what the will of the people commands, but what the reason of the people, the common consciousness, demands. The legislature must be so constructed as best to fulfil this purpose. Now the interpretation of the common consciousness is a far more difficult matter than the registry of the popular will. It requires research, reasoning, the balancing of opinions and interests, the classification of facts and the generalization of principles. A single body of men is always in danger of adopting hasty and one-sided views, of accepting facts upon insufficient tests, of being satisfied with incomplete generalizations, and of mistaking happy phrases for sound principles. Two legislative bodies do not always escape these crude and one-sided processes and results, but they are far more likely to do so than is a single body. There is a sort of natural and healthy rivalry between the two bodies, which causes each to subject the measures proceeding from the other to a careful scrutiny and a destructive criticism, even though the same party may be in majority in both. In this conflict of views between the two houses lies in fact the only safeguard against hasty and ill-digested legislation when the same party is in majority in both houses. A disagreement between the majorities in such a case is far more likely, also, to lead to a deeper generalization of principle than when the struggle is between the majority and the minority in each house; since the majority in each house will be much more inclined to look into the real merits of the question in the former than in the latter instance, and will come to a decision far more independent of partisanship. The necessity of a double, independent deliberation is thus the fundamental principle of the bicameral system in the construction of the legislature. A legislature of one chamber inclines too much to radicalism. One of three chambers or more would incline too much to conservatism. The true mean between conservatism and progress, and therefore the true interpretation of the common consciousness at each particular moment, will be best secured by the legislature of two chambers. There is another reason for this system, which, though less philosophic, is fully as practical. It is that two chambers are necessary to preserve the balance of power between the legislative and executive departments. The single-chamber legislature tends to subject the executive to its will. It then introduces into the administration a confusion which degenerates into anarchy. The necessity of the state then produces the military executive, who subjects the legislature to himself. History so often presents these events in this sequence, that we cannot refrain from connecting them as cause and effect. The two chambers, on the other hand, are a support in the first place to the executive power, and therefore in the second place to the legislature. By preventing legislative usurpation in the beginning, the bicameral legislature avoids executive usurpation in the end. The occasion of the adoption of the bicameral system in these different states was, undoubtedly, to secure the representation of diverse and possibly conflicting interests. The antitheses of peerage and commonalty, of monarchism and republicanism, of confederatism and nationalism, gave the occasion for establishing the bicameral legislative system in these different states. Such occasions, however, may change and wholly disappear without necessarily affecting the soundness of the principle. The cause remains, and can be removed only by such elevation of the culture and character of the legislative members as will render them unerring interpreters of the common consciousness without the help of opposition, and by such elevation of the culture and character of the constituencies as will lead them to elect only such persons to bear the legislative mandate. The disappearance of the peerage, of monarchism or of confederatism is then no sufficient reason for the abolition of the bicameral legislature. Its usefulness and necessity depend upon a different reason— a reason which will persist until the culture and character of mankind are so elevated as to make it of little consequence whether the legislature be composed of one chamber or a half-dozen. Upon the same fundamental principle rests the different lengths of the legislative terms in the two houses. The short term and total change tend to produce a body too hasty in action, too prompt in innovation. The long term and gradual change, on the other hand, tend to produce a body too prone to adhere to precedents, too averse to striking out upon new |