and full enjoyment of civil and political rights are made the qualifications for membership in the Senate.1 These statutes prescribe also certain disqualifications in addition to those implied as negations of the above-mentioned qualifications. They disqualify the members of the families who have reigned in France from seats in either chamber. They disqualify military persons in active service, either in the army or the navy, from seats in either chamber; except that, in the case of the Senate, the marshals, the admirals, the staff-officers remaining in the active service beyond the period required by law but having no command, the staff-officers of the reserve, the members of the territorial army and military persons generally who belong to the reserve, even though 'they may be doing actual service, are admitted to seats; and except that, in the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the members of the territorial army and of the reserve of the home army, even though they may be doing actual service, are admitted to seats.5 These statutes further disqualify from seats in either house all persons holding at the time of election, or having held within six months previously, high office in the judicial administration or in any branch of the civil, educational or ecclesiastical administration, which would enable them to exercise an undue official influence upon their own elections. Finally, these statutes disqualify from seats in either chamber persons holding any salaried office whatsoever.7 Excepted from this rule, however, are the ministers, under-secretaries of State, ambassadors and plenipotentiaries; the prefect of the Seine, the prefect of 1 Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Art. 4. 2 Loi du 16 juin, 1885, Art. 4; Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Art. 4, § 2. 3 Loi organique du 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 7; Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Art. 5. 4 Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Art. 5, § 2. 5 Loi organique du 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 7, § 4. 6 Ibid. Art. 12; Loi organique du 2 août, 1875, Art. 21. 7 Loi organique du 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 8; Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Disposition transitoire. 45089 the police, the first president of the Court of Cassation, the first president of the Court of Accounts, the first president of the Court of Appeals at Paris, the procureur général of the Court of Cassation, the procureur général of the Court of Accounts, and the procureur général of the Court of Appeals at Paris, the archbishops, bishops, presidents of consistorial bodies, the grand rabbis, the university professors, and temporary incumbents generally. These officials may be chosen to the Senate and take their seats without resigning their offices, and persons already holding seats in the Senate may accept such offices without resigning or vacating their seats. These officials may also be chosen to the Chamber of Deputies and may take their seats without resigning their offices. If, however, a member of the Chamber of Deputies be appointed to one of these offices and accepts the appointment, he thereby vacates his seat; but he may be re-elected and, after re-election, may hold the office and the mandate at the same time. The ministers, under-secretaries of State and persons holding any office temporarily, i.e. for a term of not more than six months, are excepted from this requirement. They may hold mandate and office at the same time without re-election.2 Each chamber, however, is vested by the constitution with the ultimate power to pass upon the eligibility of its members.3 5. The Rights and Privileges of Members. The constitution provides that no member of either chamber shall be arrested or tried during the legislative session upon a charge of crime or misdemeanor, save by authority of the chamber to which he may belong, unless he be taken in the commission of the act; and that a member under arrest or on 1 Loi organique du 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 8, § 3, Art. 9; Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Disposition transitoire. 2 Loi organique du 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 11. Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 10. trial, at the opening of a session, must be liberated and his trial suspended during the continuance of the session upon the demand of the chamber to which he may belong.1 The constitution provides, further, that no member of either chamber shall be prosecuted or in any manner held legally responsible for the opinions he may express or the votes he may give in the exercise of his legislative functions.2 The constitution does not give the members of either house the right to payment for their services. The statutes do; but that does not make the principle of compensation a constitutional principle. 6. The Assembly, Adjournment, Prorogation and Dissolution of the Legislature. The constitution vests in the legislature the power of selfassembly, but fixes the day upon which the assembly for the regular session of the year shall take place, viz; the second Monday in January of each year.3 The constitution further requires that the legislature shall remain in session for at least five months of each year, and that the session shall open and close for both houses at the same time.4 The constitution also vests in the legislature the power to move the President to call an extra session of the legislature, by making it obligatory upon him to do so when it shall be demanded by an absolute majority of the members of each chamber. The demand, however, must be made. between sessions, not simply during the period of an adjournment.5 The power of adjourning from day to day and for short. periods during the session is exercised by each chamber, although no express warrant for the practice is to be found in the text of the constitution. The constitution vests in the President the power of adjournment, but limits the same, as 2 Ibid. Art. 13. 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 14. 8 Ibid. Art. 1, § I. 4 Ibid. Art. 1, § 2; Art. 4. 5 Ibid. Art. 2. to duration, to one month and, as to number of adjournments, to two.1 The chambers may therefore reassemble at the end of the month without any call from the President and may disregard a third order of the President to adjourn during the same session. The chambers have no power to prorogue themselves; ie. to close their session. I mean they have no direct power to do so; but the fact that the President exercises this power through a ministry responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, gives that chamber the indirect power to secure the termination of a session after the five months required by the constitution shall have expired. It may be said, of course, that the Chamber of Deputies may also, in this manner, cause the dissolution of the legislature. It must be remembered, however, that for dissolution the President must have the consent of the Senate. The subserviency of the ministers to the will of the Chamber of Deputies does not alone suffice to secure dissolution. 7. The Principle of the Quorum. The constitution has nothing to say in regard to the prin ciples of the quorum and majority in the process of legislation. It fixes the majority necessary in each chamber to proceed to a revision of the constitution. It fixes the majority necessary in the National Assembly to revise the constitution and elect the President.4 It fixes the number of members of each chamber who may require of the President the convocation of the legislature.5 It fixes the majority necessary to vote a public session in regard to a subject which has been considered in secret session. In all of these cases it fixes the majority at one more than the half of the legal number of voices. This is what I term the absolute majority. From 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet, 1875, Art. 2, § 2. these precedents, we might possibly conclude that the constitution intends the principle of the absolute majority in the passage of ordinary laws. We might, on the other hand, conclude that these cases are intended as exceptions to the general principle of parliamentary law that the quorum is the absolute majority of the legal number of voices, and that the majority of those voting, a quorum being present, is sufficient to pass a project of law. The French chambers have apparently interpreted the constitution as leaving to each of them the power to determine the principles of the quorum and majority according to its own discretion, except in the cases expressly reserved. I draw this conclusion from the fact that in practice they have adopted in some respects different principles; i.e. they have not followed, in all respects, the general principles of parliamentary law. The Chamber of Deputies requires for a quorum that one more than the half of the legal number of members shall be present. The Senate requires that one more than the half of the legal number of members shall not only be present, but vote upon the question. Both chambers require one more than the half of those voting to pass the project. A tie is counted in the negative. In neither chamber is a quorum necessary for discussion, but only for voting.1 8. The internal Organization of the Legislative Chambers. The constitution accords to each chamber the power to elect its bureau of officers, and declares that the term of these officers covers the regular session at the beginning of which they are chosen, and any extraordinary sessions which may be called before the opening of the next regular annual session. The constitution also accords to each chamber the power to determine its own rules of procedure and discipline. It does not expressly vest these powers in the chambers. It simply limits them in two respects. We must conclude, 1 Saint Girons, Manuel de droit constitutionnel, pp. 314, 315. |