Hinc illæ lacrymæ!

to you the mystery as far as I can. Mr De Quincey, some time before I have mentioned, took his departure from my house to London, and, in order to save time and expense, I begged that, instead of sending the sheets down to me to be corrected, they should be transferred directly to him for that purpose; and I determined to send the remaining portions of the MSS. to him as they were finished, to be by him transmitted to the press. This was a most unfortunate resolution; for at the same time as the subject of punctuation in prose was one to which I had never attended, and had, of course, settled no scheme of it in my own mind, I deputed that office to Mr De Quincey. He had been so scrupulous with the compositor in having his own plan rigorously followed to an iota, that the man took the pet, and whole weeks elapsed without the books advancing a step. And, as if there was some fatality attending it, now that it has been entirely printed off full ten days, I have reason to believe it is not published. And this owing to the printer (I conceive) having neglected to inform Mr Stuart that the printing was finished; Mr Stuart having undertaken to advertise and have it published. So that the pamphlet has been lying ten days (and ten days at this season and after so long delay!) like a ship on a dry dock. Now is not this provoking? But I write the account to you, not for sympathy, but to clear myself from any imputation of indolence and procrastination which otherwise you would be justified in throwing upon me. My hands, in fact, have been completely tied. I should the less have regretted the late appearance of the work if I had been at liberty to employ the time in adding to its value, but in fact I expected its appearance every day. I abandoned every thought of the kind. But I must take up with the old proverb, What cannot be cured must be endured!' The pamphlet was sent off to me ten days

ago, and the world may perhaps not see it these ten weeks!"

Southey's opinion of the pamphlet was expressed unreservedly in a characteristic letter to Sir Walter Scott.*

"KESWICK, July 30, 1809.

MY DEAR SCOTT,-Wordsworth's pamphlet will fail of producing any general effect, because the sentences are long and involved; and his friend, De Quincey, who corrected the press, has rendered them more obscure by an unusual system of punctuation. This fault will outweigh all its merits. The public never can like anything which they feel it difficult to understand. . I impute Wordsworth's want of perspicuity to two causes-his admiration of Milton's prose, and his habit of dictating instead of writing: if he were his own scribe, his eye would tell him where to stop; but, in dictating, his own thoughts are to himself familiarly intelligible, and he goes on, unconscious either of the length of the sentence, or the difficulty a common reader must necessarily find in following its meaning to the end, and unravelling all its involutions. .-Yours very truly, ROBERT SOUTHEY.”

In the long letter, or rather essay, which Wordsworth addressed to General (then Captain) Pasley, of the Royal Engineers, in March 1811, he developed the principles of his pamphlet still further. This letter will be found in full in the Memoirs, vol. i., pp. 406-420. One or two passages may be extracted. The prescience it displays in reference to Italian and German unity, and the new balance of power in Europe, is noteworthy. It is, in some respects, the most remarkable letter Wordsworth ever wrote.

"I am of your mind, that we ought not to make peace

* Life and Correspondence of Robert Southey, vol. iii. pp. 246-247.

with France, on any account, till she is humiliated, and her power brought within reasonable bounds. It is our duty and our interest to be at war with her; but I do not think with you, that a state of peace would give to France that superiority which you seem so clearly to foresee.

Now, when I look at the condition of our country, and compare it with that of France, and reflect upon the length of the time, and the infinite combination of favourable circumstances which have been necessary to produce the laws, the regulations, the customs, the moral character, and the physical enginery of all sorts, through means, and by aid of which, labour is carried on in this happy land, and when I think of the wealth and population (concentrated too in so small a space) which we must have at command for military purposes, I confess I have not much dread, looking either at war or peace, of any power which France with respect to us is likely to attain for years, I may say for generations. Whatever may be the form of a government, its spirit at least must be mild and free, before agriculture, trade, commerce, and manufactures can thrive under it; and if these do not prosper in a state, it may extend its empire to right and to left, and it will only carry poverty and desolation along with it, without being itself permanently enriched.

I cannot but think that generations must pass away before France, or any of the countries under its thraldom, can attain those habits, and that character, and those establishments, which must be attained, before it can wield its population in a manner that will ensure our overthrow.

For my own part, I do not think it possible that France, with all her command of territory and coast, can outstrip us in naval power, unless she could previously,

by her land power, cut us off from timber and naval stores, necessary for the building and equipment of our fleet. In that intellectual superiority which, as I have mentioned, we possess over her, we should find means to build as many ships as she could build, and also could procure sailors to man them. The same energy would furnish means for maintaining the men; and if they could be fed and maintained, they would surely be produced.

Why, then, am I for war with France? First, because I think our naval superiority may be more cheaply maintained, and more easily, by war than by peace; and because I think, that if the war were conducted upon those principles of martial policy which you so admirably and nobly enforce, united with (or rather bottomed upon) those notions of justice and right, and that knowledge of and reverence for the moral sentiments of mankind, which in my Tract I attempted to portray and illustrate, the tide of military success would immediately turn in our favour; and we should find no more difficulty in reducing the French power than Gustavus Adolphus did in reducing that of the German Empire in his day. You maintain, that as the military power of France is in progress, ours must be so

also, or we must perish.

you contend also, that this increase or progress can only be brought about by conquests permanently established upon the Continent; and, calling in the doctrines of the writers upon the law of nations to your aid, you are for beginning with the conquest of Sicily, and so on, through Italy, Switzerland, &c., &c. Now it does not appear to me,though I should rejoice heartily to see a British army march from Calabria, triumphantly to the heart of the Alps, and from Holland to the centre of Germany,-yet it does not appear to me that the conquest and permanent possession

of these countries is necessary either to produce those resources of men or money, which the security and prosperity of our country requires. .. So far as concerns ourselves and our security, I do not think that so wide a space of conquered country is desirable; and, as a patriot, I have no wish for it. If I desire it, it is not for our sakes directly, but for the benefit of those unhappy nations whom we should rescue, and whose prosperity would be reflected back upon ourselves. Holding these notions, it is natural, highly as I rate the importance of military power, and deeply as I feel its necessity for the protection of every excellence and virtue, that I should rest my hopes with respect to the emancipation of Europe more upon moral influence, and the wishes and opinions of the people of the respective nations, than you appear to do. As I have written in my pamphlet, on the moral qualities of a people must its salvation ultimately depend. Something higher than military excellence must be taught as higher! something more fundamental, as more fundamental."

Adopting the opinion of the writers upon the laws of nations, you treat of conquest, as if conquest could in itself, nakedly and abstractedly considered, confer rights. If we once admit this proposition, all morality is driven out of the world. We conquer Italy-that is, we raise the British standard in Italy,—and, by the aid of the inhabitants, we expel the French from the country, and have a right to keep it for ourselves. This, if I am not mistaken, is not only implied, but explicitly maintained in your book. Undoubtedly, if it be clear that the possession of Italy is necessary for our security, we have a right to keep possession of it, if we should ever be able to master it by the sword; but not because we have gained it by conquest, may we therefore keep it,-no; the sword, as the sword, can give no rights, but because a great and noble nation, like