PAGE

[SUBSECT.] 4. Continuation of the Subject.---Evidence of Testimony

tacitly recognised as a ground of Belief, in our most certain Conclu-

sions concerning Contingent Truths.-Difference between the logical

and the popular meanings of the word Probability, . .

179

183

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Logic.

Sect. 1. Of the Demonstrations of the Syllogistic Rules given by Aristotle

and his Commentators, . . . . .

Sect. 2. General Reflections on the Aim of the Aristotelian Logic, and on

the Intellectual Habits which the study of it has a tendency to

form.—That the improvement of the power of Reasoning ought

to be regarded as only a secondary Object in the culture of the

Understanding, . . . . . .

SECT. 3. In what respects the study of the Aristotelian Logic may be useful

to Disputants.-A general acquaintance with it justly regarded

as an essential accomplishment to those who are liberally edu-

cated.- Doubts suggested by some late Writers, concerning

Aristotle's claim to the invention of the Syllogistic Theory,

202

216

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE METHOD OF INQUIRY POINTED OUT IN THE EXPERIMENTAL

OR INDUCTIVE LOGIC.

230

253

263

Sect. 1. Mistakes of the Ancients concerning the proper object of Philoso-

phy.-Ideas of Bacon on the same Subject.-Inductive Reason-

ing.-Analysis and Synthesis. - Essential difference between

Legitimate and Hypothetical Theories, . . .

Sect. 2. Continuation of the Subject. The Induction of Aristo!le com-

pared with that of Bacon, : : : : :

Sect. 3. Of the Import of the Words Analysis and Synthesis in the Lan-

guage of Modern Philosophy, . . . .

[SUBSECT.] 1. Preliminary Observations on the Analysis and Synthesis

of the Greek Geometricians, . . . . .

[SUBSECT.] 2. Critical Remarks on the vague Use, among Modern

Writers, of the terms Analysis and Synthesis, . . .

Sect. 4. The Consideration of the Inductive Logic resumed, .

[SUBSECT.] 1. Additional Remarks on the distinction between Expe-

rience and Analogy.-Of the grounds afforded by the latter for

Scientific Inference and Conjecture, .

.

263

272

284

284

PAGE

298

316

322

[SUBSECT.] 2. Use and Abuse of Hypotheses in Philosophical In-

quiries. – Difference between Gratuitous Hypotheses, and those

which are supported by presumptions suggested by Analogy.-In-

direct Evidence which a Hypothesis may derive from its agreement

with the Phenomena.-Cautions against extending some of these

conclusions to the Philosophy of the Human Mind, . .

(SUBSECT.] 3. Supplemental Observations on the Words Induction and

Analogy, as used in Mathematics, . . . . .

Sect. 5. Of certain misapplications of the Words Experience and Induc-

tion in the phraseology of Modern Science.—Illustrations from

Medicine and from Political Economy, . . .

Sect. 6. Of the Speculation concerning Final Causes, . . .

[SUBSECT.] 1. Opinion of Lord Bacon on the subject.—Final Causes

rejected by Descartes, and by the majority of French Philosophers.-

Recognised as legitimate Objects of research by Newton.— Tacitly

acknowledged by all as a useful Logical Guide, even in Sciences

which have no immediate relation to Theology, · ·

[SUBSECT.] 2. Danger of confounding Final with Physical Causes in

the Philosophy of the Human Mind,

Conclusion of Part Second, [First Subdivision,] .

Notes and ILLUSTRATIONS, . . . . . . .

335

335

349

358

369

ELEMENTS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

PART SECOND, [FIRST SUBDIVISION.]

(TO THE SECOND VOLUME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF

THE HUMAN MIND.]

AFTER an interval of more than twenty years, I venture to present to the public a Second Volume on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

When the preceding Part was sent to the press, I expected that a few short chapters would comprehend all that I had further to offer concerning the Intellectual Powers; and that I should be able to employ the greater part of this volume in examining those principles of our constitution, which are immediately connected with the Theory of Morals.* On proceeding, however, to attempt an analysis of Reason, in the more strict acceptation of that term, I found so many doubts crowding on me with respect to the logical doctrines then generally received, that I was forced to abandon the comparatively limited plan according to which I had originally intended to treat of the Understanding, and, in the meantime, to suspend the continuation of my work, till a more unbroken leisure should allow me to resume it with a less divided attention.

* See vols. vi., vii.- Ed. VOL. III.