country, nor can with honour continue in this island."

It is now manifest that George III never understood the position of a constitutional sovereign; he had however acuteness enough to perceive that supreme authority could only be attained by acquiring a predominant influence in the House of Commons. With this view, therefore, according to the language of Burke, "the King abandoned the oldfashioned fortress of prerogative, and made a lodgment in the stronghold of Parliament itself."

The result was disastrous both at home and abroad. The House of Commons, being notoriously influenced by the King, was distrusted by the people, and even the Corporation of London was alienated from its traditional loyalty to the House of Hanover. George III, moreover, in the anxiety of these incessant struggles with his ministers and his Parliament, deranged the balance of a mind

verging on insanity, and then blamed his ministers for discomposing his shattered intellect.

The prolongation of the war with North America, and the obstinate refusal to consider a timely adjustment of the Roman Catholic claims, need only be mentioned to recall the serious and enduring mischief occasioned by the conscientious but injudicious policy of this unfortunate sovereign.

It would, in truth, have been better both for the King himself and for the country, if George III had imitated his immediate predecessors, and had relinquished the attempt to guide the policy of the state.

The interference of George IV in public affairs was mainly directed to two objects: the divorce of his wife, and the exclusion of the Roman Catholics from Parliament. In both these objects he was defeated, after having sullied his personal honour weakened the authority of his government,

and even endangered the tranquillity of the realm.

The history of the five reigns here shortly noticed, which however occupied a period of one hundred and twenty years, would lead to the conclusion that a constitutional sovereign will act wisely in restricting himself to his formal functions, and leaving to his ministers the trouble and odium of state affairs.

If this were the true theory of the British Constitution, it would be the wisest course for the king not to harass himself with the study of political affairs either domestic or foreign. Since he is not responsible, and cannot control them, he should rest satisfied with the dignified splendour of his station, and amuse his leisure with the patronage of the fine arts, or with public ceremonies, where the gracious condescension of a king will always gain popular applause.

The qualities desirable in such a king would be of a neutral type. He might indeed

As justice, verity, temperance, stableness," but vigorous intellectual faculties, earnest convictions, energy of character, warmth of feeling, and other endowments, which, in private life attract affection and respect, would be misplaced and probably be mischievous in a constitutional king. Hallam observes, "A king possessed of ambitious views and gifted with great abilities might endanger the balance of the Constitution."

Even in his religious belief indifference will be preferable to zeal, for kings too often display their faith by persecuting or vexing some of their subjects. An active-minded king would assuredly form political opinions, and these may mar the equable temperament with which he should regard rival states

men.

Personal attachments and aversions will interfere with the appointment of public

functionaries, and royal favourites are universally detested. George II objected to Chatham, whom he called a trumpet of sedition. George III declared he never would accept Charles Fox as a minister. George IV said he had made a vow to himself, which as a gentleman he could not break, never to admit Canning into the Cabinet.

In all these cases the king eventually yielded; but not until much personal bitterness had been created, and the national interests had suffered from the private feelings or political predilections of the sovereign.

A constitutional king must be prepared to accept as his ministers men whom he distrusts, and to ratify with his royal sanction measures which he disapproves. From his elevated station he must often see contending politicians engaged in a selfish struggle for office, and hazarding the permanent interest of the realm for the sake of a party triumph.

Walter Bagehot, in his treatise on the